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WILSON, KENNETH A., Ed.D. Legal Aspects of Due Process Hearings in the 
State of North Carolina, 1978-1984. (1985) 
Directed by Dr. Joseph E. Bryson. 192 pp. 
The purposes of this study were, first, to determine the impact 
of the procedural safeguards mandated by Public Law 94-142—Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, and, second, to examine the 
opinion of the North Carolina Exceptional Children Program administra­
tors on the effects of due process hearings in North Carolina schools. 
The following six factors were selected for direct examination: 
incidence factors; precipitating factors; initiating factors; decision 
factors; factors that reiate to the characteristics of the children, 
and factors that concerned time, cost, characteristics of the parents; 
and comments from program administrators for exceptional children. 
Key court decisions in the history of exceptional children were 
presented along with the influencing rationale for each case. Schol­
arly opinion was sought and presented from legal periodicals and the 
general literature. Due process hearings in North Carolina were studied 
and an analysis was done based on the six factors used in the study. 
A series of survey questions were developed and reviewed by a 
selected group of educators. One hundred forty-two school systems were 
surveyed and sixty-two North Carolina due process hearings were ana 
lyzed. One Hundred and six of the school systems in North Carolina 
participated in the study. 
The consensus from the respondents was that prehearing mediation 
was helpful in averting formal due process hearings. However, the 
number of hearings initiated would be an invalid criterion for use in 
evaluating federal and state implementation of procedural safeguards. 
Disagreements over the severity of the handicapping condition and 
the consequent needs were the reason for the majority of the due process 
hearings held. Requests for private placement by parents and school 
systems recommending placement in the existing system were also a 
frequent issue. 
The decisions of the hearing officers most often favored the 
schools' recommendations. The trend of the appeals involved issues 
related to the quality and quantity of services available through the 
local school system. 
Children classified as mentally handicapped, male children, and 
children in the age range of ten to sixteen were most involved in due 
process hearings in North Carolina. Parents who were involved were 
overwhelmingly middle- and upper-income whites. 
School systems in North Carolina should initiate parental 
involvement in the early phase of the child's educational program with 
a step-by-step plan to avoid due process hearings which includes a 
mediation process. The North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, 
Division for Exceptional Children, needs to conduct a needs assessment 
of the types of programs and services being offered. Inservice on how 
to avoid and how to proceed with due process cases is needed. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of the Study 
This will be an exploratory inquiry into the impact of the pro­
cedural safeguards mandated by Public Law 94-142—Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975—at two levels: the administrative 
unit of special education and the client pupils and their parents or 
guardians. The legislation, an extension of the earlier Education of 
the Handicapped Act (P.L 93-380), is the culmination of laws and liti­
gation whose goal has been to guarantee educational opportunities for 
handicapped children. Specifically, the act is concerned with the con­
ditions required for assurance of procedural fairness in the areas of 
identification, evaluation, placement, and the provisions for free 
appropriate public education for handicapped children. 
The due process procedural safeguards stipulated by the law* 
include the following: (1) That parents or guardians have the right to 
examine all relevant records of the child as well as the right to 
obtain an independent educational evaluation of the child; (2) that 
parents or guardians must be given written prior notice in their native 
language whenever the school proposes to initiate or change or refuses 
to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, educational 
^Public Law 94-142, Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
of 1975, 83 Stat. 773 (codified at 20 U.S.C. 1232-1453) sec. 615. 
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placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public 
education; (3) that parents or guardians be fully informed of the pro­
cedural safeguards; (4) that parents or guardians have the right to 
present complaints with respect to the identification, evaluation, 
educational placement, or the provision of a free appropriate public 
education for their child: (5) that upon presentation of a complaint, 
the parents or guardians shall have an opportunity for an impartial 
due process hearing. In the hearing they are to be given the right to 
be accompanied and advised by counsel. The parents or guardians are 
also to be granted the right to a written or electronic verbatim record 
of such hearings and the right to written findings of fact and deci­
sions; (6) that any party aggrieved by the decision has the right to 
appeal to the state educational agency and ultimately the right to 
bring a civil action; and (7) that whenever the parents or guardians of 
the child are not known, the state must assign an individual who is not 
an employee of the local or state educational agency to act as a surro­
gate for the parents. 
The key consideration in the study is that education involves a 
long-term continuing relationship among the parents (or guardians), 
child, and school, and one must be concerned with the long-term conse­
quence of the conflicts engendered by any dispute. This study focused 
on identifying factors which are associated with the process of provid­
ing educational services to handicapped children, and particularly 
where there is a disagreement between the school system and the parents 
or guardians that is likely to lead to a district-level due process 
hearing. The factors proposed were obtained from a review of the 
3  
literature, legislation, litigation, and interviews with persons who 
have been involved in the due process system (school officials, hearing 
officers, lawyers, and advocates). 
Eight research questions were generated by the study: 
1. How many due process cases were initiated and heard in 
the state of North Carolina from August 1978 to August 1984? 
2. Who were the children referred? 
3. What were the critical issues that had generated hearings? 
4. Who initiated the hearings? 
5. What were the decisions of the hearing officers? 
6. Were the decisions of the hearing officers implemented? 
7. What were the time line and expense involved in each of the 
hearings? 
8. Did the school systems mediate with parents to avert formal 
due process hearings? 
Definitions of Terms 
In order that the reader and the investigator of this study may 
benefit by the use of common meanings, the following terms are defined. 
Child Count. An annual count of children receiving special 
2 education and related services. 
Public Law 94-142. It is the purpose of this act to assure that 
all handicapped children have available to them a free appropriate pub­
lic education which emphasizes a special education and related services 
^Public Law 94-142, sec. 611, a,3. 
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designed to meet their unique needs. This law includes provisions 
requiring equal educational opportunities for all children. It also 
provides for specific safeguards regarding the assignment of children 
3 
to classes for exceptional children. 
Right to Education. "Public Law 94-142 mandates a free appro­
priate public education for each exceptional child. Within the federal 
law, a legal framework has established the following mandates: 1) All 
exceptional children and their parents shall be guaranteed due process 
with regard to identification, evaluation, and placement procedures. 
2) A written, individualized educational program shall be developed 
for each child determined to have special educational needs. 3) Educa­
tional placement decisions for each exceptional child shall always be 
in the least restrictive environment appropriate to the child's learn­
ing needs. 4) Responsibility for providing the appropriate educational 
program for each child rests with the local education agency. 5) A 
periodic review shall be conducted by the education agency at least 
annually to evaluate the exceptional child's progress and to rewrite 
4 the educational plan." 
Equal Protection. The claim is that the plaintiffs have the 
same rights to education as other children. The claim has two parts. 
First, the complaint may be that there is differential treatment 
within the class of developmentally disabled children, that some are 
^The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, P.L. 
94-142, sec. 615 C20 U.S.C. 1411 et seqj. 
4 Scottie Torres Higgins, Special Education Administrative 
Policies Manual (Reston, Virqiniai Council for Exception Children, 
1977), p. 1. 
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receiving education while others are not. In this case, the violation 
of equal protection consists of the irrationality in providing or 
denying education to persons classified as developmentally disabled. 
Second, the complaint may be that some disabled children are 
not receiving the education that normal children are. In this case, 
the violation consists of the irrationality in providing or denying 
education to persons who are similarly classified as being school-aged 
children. The solution to these complaints is that all children, 
including the handicapped, be included in public education systems.^ 
Substantive Due Process. "Claimed violations of Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process are more likely to arise 
when a pupil or a group of pupils has been misclassified because 
incorrect or invalid criteria were used to determine abilities and thus 
which track should be followed in school."6 
Surrogate Parent. Public Law 93-380 provides for the appoint­
ment of a "parent surrogate," i.e., an individual appointed to safe­
guard a child's rights in the specific instance of educational decision 
making—identification, evaluation, and placement.^ 
Procedural Due Process. "Typically, courts set forth detailed 
procedural requirements. School authorities are first required to 
locate and notify all handicapped children and advise them of their 
5 
H. Rutherford Turnbull, III, Legal Aspects of Educating the 
Developmentally Disabled (Topeka, Kansas: National Organization on 
Legal Problems of Education, 1975), pp. 13-14. 
6Ibid., p. 20. 
^Higgins, p. 500. 
6  
rights to education. After locating the handicapped children, school 
authorities are required to evaluate them and place them in appropriate 
programs. Court decisions, consent decrees, or statutes lay out the 
procedural steps to be observed in placing a child, changing his place-
O 
ment, or excluding him from school" 
Governor's Advocacy Group. The Governor has created this group 
to serve as a permanent committee on exceptional children. The commit­
tee consists of representatives from state and local agencies charged 
which delivering services to exceptional children. This panel advises 
the state education agency on unmet needs, comments publically on 
rules and regulations, and assists the state in developing and report­
ing such data and evaluations as may be needed by the United States 
Commissioner of Education. 
Related Services. "Transportation, and such developmental, 
corrective and other supportive services (including speech pathology 
and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational 
therapy, recreation, and medical and counseling services, except that 
such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes 
only) as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from 
special education, and includes the early identification and assess-
q 
ment of handicapping conditions in children." 
8Turnbull, pp. 22-23. 
Q 
Higgins, pp. 16-18. 
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Appropriate Education. "An individualized program for a speci­
fied time period provided at no cost to the parents in order to meet 
the specific special education needs of an exceptional child."10 
Free, Appropriate Public Education. "Special education and 
related services which (a) have been provided at public expense, under 
public supervision and direction, and without charge, (b) meet the 
standards of the state educational agency, (c) include an appropriate 
preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the state 
involved, and (d) are provided in conformity with the individualized 
education program required under section 614 (a) (5) of Public Law 
94-142, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act.nli 
Special Education. "The provision of a continuum of child-
centered educational and supportive services in combination with those 
provided in the general school program to meet the needs of students 
12 who are handicapped.1 
Public Expense. Public expense means that the local education 
agency either pays for the full cost of the evaluation or insures that 
13 the evaluation is otherwise provided at no cost to the parents. 
Individualized Education Program for the Handicapped. "A written 
statement for each handicapped child developed in any meeting by a 
12 NSBA Council of School Attorneys, Preventing and Defending 
Suits by Handicapped Students (Washington, DCl National School Boards 
Association, 1982), p. A-8. 
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Higgins, pp. 16-18. 
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representative of the local educational agency or an intermediate 
educational unit who shall be qualified to provide, or supervise the 
provision of, specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs 
of handicapped children, the teacher, the parents or guardian of such 
child, and, whenever appropriate, the child."14 
Handicapped Students. "Students between the ages of three and 
twenty-one, inclusive, with educational handicaps Cphysically handi­
capped, mentally retarded, emotionally disturbed, learning disabled, 
speech handicapped, autistic, or multiply handicapped) . . . and 
students between birth and age twenty-two, inclusive, who are audiori-
ally handicapped or visually handicapped, whose disabilities are so 
limiting as to require the provision of special services in place of 
15 
or in addition to instruction in the regular classroom." 
Residential Placement. "Handicapped children are eligible for 
School District Special Education Services by virtue of residence in 
the school district. Service to nonresident pupils temporarily con­
fined to a hospital or agency within the district is contingent upon 
16 
compliance with state and local policy and procedures." 
Due Process. The right of the individual faced with state 
action threatening life, liberty, or property to be informed of the 
imminence of such action, to have assistance in defending against such 
action, to present evidence and question those presenting evidence 
^NSBA Council of School Attorneys, p. A-9. 
i6Ibid. 
9  
regarding such action and therein to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses and have impartial review of such action.17 
Handicapped Children. Children who are mentally retarded, hard 
of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handicapped, seriously 
emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or children with . 
specific learning disabilities, who by reason thereof require special 
18 
education and related services. 
General Description of the Study 
The study will be exploratory in nature, utilizing a case-study 
approach to examine local education agency due process hearings. The 
objectives of this study were to determine the incidence of due process 
hearings involving local education agencies in North Carolina, and the 
issues precipitating those hearings in order to determine the initia­
tors of those hearings, and to assess the decisions of the hearing 
officers in relation to the recommendations of the school. In addition, 
the characteristics of the children and their parents or guardians, 
the school district expense and time involved in each hearning, and 
the school systems' use of internal due process procedures or mediation 
prior to formal due process proceedings were analyzed. 
The study covered the administrative units in North Carolina 
that have had due process hearings. These are the 142 local education 
agencies with a total school population of 1,770,894 pupils. 
17Henry C. Black, Black's Law Dictionary (St. Paul: West 
Publishing Company, 1968), p. 590. 
^Public Law 94-142, sec. 602, 1. 
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While the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 
and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 first established 
the basic framework for determining the rights of handicapped students, 
both the courts and the Congress are continually interpreting and 
changing the standards with which school boards must comply. There is 
a need to keep abreast of changes made since the passage of these laws 
and to seek new perspectives on various aspects of them and their 
regulations. 
All of the regulations adopted under Section 504 and Public Law 
94-142 were recodified and redesignated because of the establishment of 
the Department of Education. The regulations under Section 504 were 
transferred from 45 CFR Part 104 effective May 9, 1980. Public Law 
94-142 regulations were transferred from 45 CFR Part 121a to 34 CFR 
Part 300 effective November 12, 1980. 
In recent years numerous judicial decisions have overruled the 
practices of school districts that have excluded developmentally 
disabled children from educational programs. There is a need to 
examine these cases and their underlying legal principles, including 
the emerging "right to education" and the Fourteenth Amendment rights 
to equal protection and due process. Exceptional children administra­
tors need to know the implications of these cases as they identify, 
evaluate, and place handicapped children in appropriate educational 
programs. 
The practices of identification, least restrictive, and most 
appropriate service are perennial topics of debate among teachers, 
1 1  
parents, administrators, and university theoreticians. Educational 
decision-makers have to be concerned not only about the least restric­
tive and most appropriate setting, but also with constitutional require­
ments as well. Chester Nolte stated that students are entitled to due 
process of law when they are being assigned to certain tracks and that 
the educator who makes the assignment must be able to prove that the 
19 
assignment is in the child's best interest. As of this date, this 
specific principle has not been tested in a court of law. 
Since 1973, the incidence of cases involving racial discrimina­
tion has diminished; however, there is a notable increase in litigation 
involving questions of due process and individual rights and equal 
educational opportunities related to grouping and classification 
20 practices. Since American society, in general, seems to be placing 
more and more emphasis on individual freedoms, it is not surprising 
that questions regarding deprivation of an individuals constitutional 
rights without due process are now the norm rather than the exception. 
Neither is it unexpected that there is an increase fn court cases 
involving such public school practices as sorting, classifying, and 
21 labeling children. 
19 Chester M. Nolte, Due Process and Its Historical Development 
in Education, U.S. Educational Resources Information Center, ERIC 
Document ED 088 186 CApril 1974), p. 14. 
20Ibid., p. 13. 
21 Merle McClung, "School Classification: Some Legal Approaches 
to Labels," Classification Materials (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Center for Law and Education, 19731, p. 5. 
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Parents who raise official questions regarding service or 
classification policies generally question whether such service offends 
the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States 
Constitution. Due process questions generally are concerned with 
whether students are afforded procedural safeguards which insure that 
any label or service model has been fairly applied. In some cases, 
however, parents may even question the label itself, thus resulting in 
22 substantive due process questions. 
In 1975, the United States Congress passed the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act (P.L. 94-142). This law includes provisions 
requiring equal educational opportunities for all children. It also 
provides for specific safeguards regarding the assignment of children 
to classes for exceptional children. As school officials attempt to 
implement this law, it is likely that litigation in this area will 
continue. 
Thus, this study is significant in that it provides educational 
decision-makers with a comprehensive analysis of the legal aspects of 
due process in the public schools. The study provides educational 
leaders with a set of guidelines to use when making crucial decisions 
regarding due process hearings—guide!ines which may prevent decision­
makers from becoming involved in litigation. 
The significance of this study can be accentuated by analyzing 
the due process hearings that have occurred in North Carolina. A 
1 3  
review of these cases indicates that the need for hearings occurs in 
all types of school districts—large, small, rural, and suburban. 
It is largely because of higher educational costs that boards 
of education have failed to provide the educational needs of excep­
tional children. Special educators have failed to plead successfully 
for funds. Whatever the reason for failure to meet the needs of 
handicapped children, lack of money is an inadequate defense in liti­
gation hearings brought to ensure the right of the handicapped to 
education. 
The study was planned and conducted within the limits of the 
school districts that have had due process hearings in North Carolina, 
and those due process hearings completed during the period from August 
14, 1978 through August 1984. 
Methods of Analysis 
From the review of the literature, litigation, and legislation, 
a series of interview questions was developed (Appendix B) regarding 
the internal due process machinery in each administrative unit as well 
as each due process hearing requested and conducted during the 
period from August 1978 through August 1984. The questions were 
mailed to the program administrators for exceptional children in North 
Carolina along with a letter of introduction (Appendix A) that also 
requested an appointment for an interview. The program administrators 
for exceptional children or their designees who agree to participate 
in the study will be visited or interviewed by phone. 
1 4  
The specific information thus collected regarding each due 
process hearing studied, in conjunction with information collected on 
the internal due process machinery of each local education agency was 
analyzed. The answers to the research questions were reported in terms 
of frequencies and percentages. The analysis of the results related 
considerable information regarding special education due process hear­
ings for the state of North Carolina. 
Significance of the Study 
The importance of the study rests on the answers to two ques­
tions: "Why study procedural safeguards?" and "Why study special edu­
cation due process hearings?" The most convincing response to the 
first question came from William R. Hazard: 
Slogans and catch-phrases abound in literature about schooling. 
"Equality of educational opportunity," "education for democratic 
living," "relevant education," and "meeting the needs of all youth" 
are but a few of the high-sounding but hollow slogans cluttering 
discussion about public schooling. The latent ambiguity of such 
slogans impedes the painful but necessary public examination of 
schools, pupils, teachers, and their educational attainments. 
The schools operate within the social, political, economic, and 
legal context of the larger society. Though they may reflect 
some of the social ideals, more likely they will mirror the social 
realities. The disparity between the real and imagined expecta­
tions and accomplishments of the public schools feeds the fire of 
public dialogue but does not necessarily produce appropriate 
action. The crises in urban schools across the nation illustrate 
the malfunctions plaguing our social institutions.23 
School officials should be aware of the accomplishments of the 
schools in light of current litigation and legislation regarding equal 
^William R. Hazard, Education and the Law, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Free Press, 1978), p. 313. 
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education opportunities and due process safeguards. In part, it is 
this concept which answers the "Why study special education due process 
[learnings?" 
The doctrine of due process emerged as a legal principle upon 
which much of the litigation in special education has been based. The 
litigation has resulted in the incorporation of due process in both 
state and federal legislation culminating in P.L. 94-142. 
Shortly before the enactment of P.L. 94-142, federal legislation 
was enacted that focused on the responsibility of the federal govern­
ment to provide financial assistance to the states to assist in the 
education of handicapped children. In this regard, Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 has fashioned this formula: 
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United 
States . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be 
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving federal financial assistance.24 
Public Law 94-142 provides such assistance in return for assur­
ances that participating states have a policy mandating the right to 
education for all handicapped children within a specified time period. 
The state's educational policy must be consistent with the stated 
purpose of the Act: 
. . .  t o  a s s u r e  t h a t  a l l  h a n d i c a p p e d  c h i l d r e n  h a v e  a v a i l a b l e  
to them, within the time periods specified in (the Act), a free 
appropriate public education which emphasizes special education 
and related services designed to meet their unique needs, to 
assure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents 
O A  
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, "Nondiscrimi­
nation on the Basis of Handicap," Federal Register (Washington, DC: 
Office of the Secretary, May 4, 1977), sec. 84.4, p. 22678. 
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or guardians are protected, to assist states and localities to 
provide for the education of all handicapped children, and to 
assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to educate handi­
capped children.25 
The required state policy regarding the education of handicapped 
26 children has been developed for North Carolina in regulations that 
follow the mandate of P.L. 94-142. Specifically, North Carolina 
. . . requires a system of educational opportunities for all 
children with special needs and requires the identification and 
evaluation of the needs of children and the adequacy of various 
education programs before placement of children, and shall 
provide for periodic evaluation of the benefits of programs to 
the individual child and the nature of the child's needs there­
after.2' 
The significance of procedural due process in the education of 
handicapped children was enunciated by the Bureau of Education for the 
Handicapped (BEH) preamble to the proposed regulations for Public Law 
94-142. 
A basic tenet of the American system of government as pro­
vided by the United States Constitution, is that any individual 
who is threatened or becomes subject to serious or adverse action 
by public authorities must be provided with full rights of due 
process of law. Such procedures provide to the individual the 
opportunity to contest the proposed action within a series of 
proceedings which insure that fairness and good judgment govern 
the entire decision-making process.2® 
25Public Law 94-142, sec. 601, 4, (c). 
26 
State Board of Education, Rules and Regulations. 
27 
North Carolina General Statue, 115C-106. 
28 
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, "Proposed 
Rules for Education of Handicapped Children and Incentive Grants 
Program," Federal Register (December 30, 1976), p. 56972. 
17 
Further elaborating on the importance of procedural due process, 
BEH emphasized that the implementation of the regulation is: 
. . .  t o  p r o d u c e  a  s e t t i n g  i n  w h i c h  i n t e r e s t e d  p a r t i e s  .  .  .  
understand the nature of a child, his needs, the procedures 
and process used to obtain that information, the proposed 
plan to meet the needs of the child, the review procedures 
to determine program effectiveness and, finally, their rights 
under the law.29 
Since P.L. 94-142 was fully implemented, little attention has been paid 
to the results of due process hearings. 
The problems that states have encountered in implementing due 
30 31 process procedures has been documented by Callahan, Kotin, and 
32 D.H.E.W. While the manner in which due process procedures are imple­
mented at the local level is a secondary issue in this study, the 
measurable results of those due process hearings initiated and heard is 
the basis of the study. 
Organization of the Study 
The study consists of five chapters, a selected bibliography, 
and appendices. 
29Ibid. 
30 
Dan W. Callahan, "Procedural Due Process Required for Excep­
tional Children," Georgia Association of Middle School Principals 2 
(Fall 1977):37-42. 
31 
Lawrence Kotin, Due Process in Special Education: Legal Per­
spectives; The State of the States, P.L. 94-142 and Systems Design 
(Boston: Massachusetts Center for Public Interest Law, 1977). 
32 U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Progress 
Toward a Free Appropriate Public Education (Washington, DC: Office of 
Education, 1979), p. 81. 
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Chapter I includes the purpose of the study and a general 
description of the study. 
Chapter II is a review of the related literature, research, 
legislation, and litigation regarding due process safeguards for handi 
capped children. 
Chapter III describes the methodology of the study. 
Chapter IV provides an analysts of the data derived from the 
interviews. 
Chapter V provides an overview of the study along with a sum­
mary, conclusions, and recommendations. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Legislation, litigation, and the pressures of special interest 
groups have been significant in shaping national educational policy 
affecting education of the handicapped. The purpose of this chapter is 
to provide a review of the organizational, legislative, and judicial 
evolutions that led to the development and implementation of the due 
process procedures of Public Law 94-142, the Education for All Handi­
capped Children Act, and the educational implications of these due 
process procedures. 
History of Events 
The organization of education in the United States has been 
highly decentralized from the earliest colonial days. The Constitution 
laid a firm groundwork for this continuing tradition in the Tenth 
Amendment, which leaves the power to provide for public education to 
the states. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States, respectively, or to the people."* 
The Tenth Amendment was interpreted by the judiciary in 1899 
in Cummings v. Richmond County Board of Education: the education of 
^U.S. Constitution, amend. X. 
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the people in schools maintained by state taxation is a matter belong-
2 ing to the respective states. 
Since the United States Constitution does not specifically 
mention educational function, it has followed that those provisions not 
specified by the Constitution become the function of the states. How­
ever, litigation that cites the Constitution has referred to equal 
protection and due process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
The Constitution of the United States provides for guarantees 
and protections in the wording of the Fifth Amendment. "No person 
s h a l l  . . .  b e  d e p r i v e d  o f  l i f e ,  l i b e r t y ,  o r  p r o p e r t y  w i t h o u t  d u e  
3 
process of law." Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states that: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and sub­
ject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with­
out due process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdic­
tion the equal protection of the laws.^ 
Fundamentally, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments seek to 
insure fairness in the exercise of governmental power to the child, the 
family, and the schools. All of these parties will benefit from 
adherence to well-developed educational practices and the elements of 
2 Cummings v. Richmond County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 
(1899}. 
3 U.S. Constitution, amend. V. 
4 U.S. Constitution, amend. XIV. 
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due process. Whether applying the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, the 
due process guarantees assure that handicapped students shall have 
their life, liberty, and property protected. 
There are two aspects of due process—procedural and substan­
tive. Procedural due process means that if an action is to be taken 
against a person that deprives that person of life, liberty, or property 
(e.g, suspending a pupil from school), three basic steps are required: 
first, that proper notice be given to the individual that he or she is 
about to be deprived of life, liberty, or property; second, that the 
individual be given an opportunity to be heard; and finally, that the 
individual be given a fairly conducted hearing. 
Substantive due process means that if the government is going 
to deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property, there must be 
a valid objective, and the action to be taken must be reasonably cal-
5 
culated to achieve the valid objective. 
The significance of procedural due process in the education of 
handicapped children can be viewed in terms of the constitutional 
guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. These guarantee 
further protection of the rights of citizens, to protect action involv­
ing the identification, evaluation, and placement of handicapped 
children, and the provision for free, appropriate public education. In 
terms of the rights of handicapped children, procedural due process has 
a long history which has resulted in litigation and legislation. 
5 
Alexander Kern, Ray Corns, and Walter McCann, Public School 
Law, Cases, and Materials (St. Paul, Minnesota: West, 1979), 
pp. 539-540. 
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The Rights of Children 
Influenced by the Civil Rights Movement of the last few decades, 
state and federal courts have been compelled to examine the legal 
status of children in accordance with fundamental constitutional 
guarantees and privileges. The Supreme Court clearly struck down the 
traditional "in loco parentis" concept in the case of In Re Gault.** 
That 1967 decision related to the rights of juveniles under an 
Arizona law and extended the right of due process procedures to 
children. Gault enumerated six elements of due process guaranteed to 
children: 
1. Notice of the charges 
2. Right to counsel 
3. Right to confrontation and cross-examination 
4. Privileges against self-incrimination 
5. Right to a transcript of the proceedings 
6. Right to appellate review.7 
The implication of Gault is that children cannot be deprived of 
rights simply because they have not achieved adult status. In another 
O 
case, Tinker v. Pes Moines School District, 1969, the Supreme Court 
stipulated that children are persons under the Constitution. 
Hillary Rodham has asserted that the rights of children cannot 
be secured until they are recognized. 
Children's rights cannot be secured until some particular institu­
tion has recognized them and assumed responsibility for enforcing 
them. In the past, adult institutions have not performed this 
function partly . . . because it was thought children have few 
6In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (19671. 
7Ibid. 
STinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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rights to secure. Unfortunately the institutions designed 
specifically for children also have failed to accomplish this aim, 
largely because they were established to safeguard interests, not 
enforce rights, on the assumption that the former could not be done 
without the latter.9 
Throughout the past decade, this recognition and clarification has been 
intensified in public education. 
Traditionally, school boards assumed the power to reject appli­
cants for admission who did not conform to requirements established by 
the board. That power was consistent with the belief that attendance 
in public schools, while compulsory, was viewed as a privilege as 
opposed to a right.^ In an analysis of the 1970 census data, the 
Children's Defense Fund noted that the nation's public schools had 
systematically excluded more than two million children.^ 
Some school exclusions had been based on law and were in many 
quarters considered legal and appropriate. Typical were state statutes 
containing provisions for excluding children with physical or mental 
conditions that prevented or rendered inadvisable their attendance at 
school. In the 1919 Beattie v. State Board of Education,^ the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court insisted "... the rights of a child of school 
9 
Hillary Rodham, "Children Under the Law," Harvard Educational 
Review 43 (November 1973):506. 
^Newton Edwards, The Courts and the Public Schools (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 540. 
^Alan Abeson, Nancy Bolich, and Jayne Haas, "Due Process of 
Law: Background and Intent." In Public Policy and the Education of 
Exceptional Children, ed. Fredrich J. Weintraub, Alan Abeson, Joseph 
Ballard, and Martin LaVor (Reston, Virginia: Council for Exceptional 
Children, 1977), p. 32. 
1 2  
Beattie v. State Board of Education, City of Autigo, 172 N.W. 
153 (1919). 
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age to attend the public schools of the state cannot be insisted upon 
when his presence therein is harmful to the best interests of the 
school 
The legality of denying an education to a child has had an 
impact on handicapped children. This demission has been challenged 
in both state and federal judicial systems. The rationale for such 
litigation has been primarily derived from the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. 
Judicial Background to Due Process Rights 
Due process as guaranteed by the United States Constitution has 
often been ignored by the leaders of educational institutions. Because 
school systems have traditionally turned a deaf ear to parental 
inquiries and pleas for change, the parents have had to turn to the 
courts. Court rulings have caused legislative bodies and governmental 
officials to be more positive in outlining educational rights for the 
handicapped. 
The courts have had a dramatic impact on the functions of local 
school boards. William R. Hazard noted that: 
. . . over the past two decades state and federal courts have 
exercised expressed influence on school policy taking away 
from local boards in many important issues. In particular, the 
application of law to school conflict has changed our percep­
tions of the role of the school board in policy-making. School 
board decisions are rarely accepted these days as the last word; 
more and more citizens regard them as the trigger for legal 
confrontations. Put another way, schooling is no longer regarded 
as a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, but is viewed, along with 
25 
the policies supporting it, as an offer negotiable in court. 
As a result, educational policies are the product of constitu­
tional, statutory, and case-law interpretations.13 
In the landmark cases of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 
(1954), the court said: 
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of 
an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has taken 
to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all 
on equal terms.'4 
Intellectual functioning was introduced in the Brown case. 
John W. Davis, attorney from South Carolina, opened his argument to the 
Supreme Court by saying, 
May it please the Court, I think if the appellants' construction 
of the Fourteenth Amendment should prevail here, there is no 
doubt in my mind that it would catch the Indian within its grasp 
just as much as the Negro. If it should prevail, I am unable to 
see why a state would have any further right to segregate its 
pupils on ground of sex or on the ground of age or on the ground 
of mental capacity.!5 
16 In the 1964 Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, the judge 
said, "as long as the State of Alabama maintains a public school 
system, it cannot make public education 'unavailable' for a class of 
citizens." 
In recent years, the equal protection concept has been applied 
to handicapped children. A number of courts have attacked discrimina­
tory practices as a violation of procedural due process when no hearing 
13 
William R. Hazard, "Courts in the Saddle: School Boards Out," 
Phi Delta Kappan (December 1974): 259. 
^Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 ( 1 9 5 4 ) .  
^Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 231 F. Supp. 743 (1964). 
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is held regarding inappropriate educational decision-making relating 
to the identification, evaluation, and placement of handicapped 
children. 
The argument for due process rights for handicapped children 
has followed the reasoning in the 1971 Supreme Court decision in 
Wisconsin v. Constantineau in which the court held that: 
. . .  a  W i s c o n s i n  l a w  r e q u i r i n g  t h e  p o s t i n g  o f  t h e  n a m e s  o f  
alleged problem drinkers in taverns and package stores for 
the purpose of preventing the sale of liquor to them constituted 
stigmatification serious enough to require prior notice and 
hearing before posting J 7 
Justice William Douglas found the Wisconsin law to be a violation of 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The educational 
connotation that classification of handicapped children also is a 
stigma and should, therefore, also require public notice and a prior 
hearing, is one of the most frequent points made in the right to 
education cases. 
The applicability of procedural due process rights in the 
education of handicapped children was firmly established in the 1971 
suit involving the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children 
(PARC) and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in which thirteen mentally 
18 retarded children were represented in a class action suit. The 
court order provided that the state could not apply any law which would 
postpone, terminate, or deny mentally retarded children access to a 
publicly supported education, including a public school program. 
^Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 39 U.S.L.W. 4128 (1971).. 
18 
The Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children et al. v. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania et al., 334 F. Supp. 1257 (1971) and 343 
F. Supp. 279 (1972). 
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As the Pennsylvania School Code was written, children between 
the ages of six and twenty were eligible for a free public school 
education. The plaintiffs represented children who had been excluded 
from school» "excused" from attendance at public school, had their 
admission to public school postponed, or otherwise had been refused 
free access to public school education because they were retarded. 
The court approved a stipulation which provided that: 
. . .  n o  c h i l d  o f  s c h o o l  a g e  w h o  i s  m e n t a l l y  r e t a r d e d  .  .  .  s h o u l d  
be subjected to a change in educational status without first 
being accorded notice and the opportunity of a due process 
hearing . . J9 
According to Fredrick J. Weintraub, 
One of the most significant aspects of the Pennsylvania Associa­
tion for Retarded Children case . . . was the court's stipula­
tion regarding due process rights of children and their 
parents in regard to education. In examining the question of 
whether children had the right to an education, the court was 
disturbed by the fact that the schools were totally autonomous 
in their decisions to place or not to place. The court ordered 
the state to adopt regulations regarding procedures for "change 
in educational status" of mentally retarded children.2° 
The year following the PARC decision, the same guarantees were 
applied to children with all types of handicaps in the District of 
Columbia. In the 1972 Mills v. Board of Education of District of 
Columbia, parents and guardians of seven handicapped children brought 
a class action suit against the District of Columbia Board of Education 
and petitioned that despite moral and legal obligation, the District 
had excluded handicapped children from educational opportunity. The 
19Ibid, 343 F. Supp. 303. 
20 
Fredrick J. Weintraub, "Recent Influences of Law Regarding the 
Identification and Educational Placement of Children," Focus on 
Exceptional Children (May 1972):6-7. 
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court issued a stipulated agreement and order that declared the consti­
tutional right of all children, regardless of any exceptional condition 
or handicap, to a publicly supported education. It was further 
declared that defendant's rules, policies, and practices, which 
excluded children without a provision for adequate and immediate 
alternative educational services and the absence of prior hearing and 
review of placement procedures, denied the plaintiffs and the class the 
21 right of due process and equal protection of the law. 
The Mills case demanded that procedural safeguards, required by 
the constitutional provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, must be 
offered during the special education placement process. Where PARC 
dealt specifically with the mentally retarded, Mills expanded the con­
cept to all children who are thought to be in need of special education. 
As already indicated the first application of the constitutional 
guarantee of due process to children had occurred earlier in the case 
22 of In Re Gault. In that 1967 case, due process safeguards were 
extended to juveniles in criminal hearings. In the Gault case, which 
is considered to be a landmark case involving children's rights, 
Hillary Rodham wrote: 
Gault held that children in juvenile court were constitutionally 
entitled to certain due process guarantees previously granted 
only to adults in criminal court: (a) notice (to both parent 
and child) adequate to afford reasonable opportunity to prepare 
a defense, including sufficient statement of the charge; 
(b) right to counsel, and if the child is indigent, provision for 
21 
Mills v. Board of Education of District of Columbia, 348 F. 
Supp. 866 (.1972). 
22In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 C1967). 
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the appointment of counsel; (cl privilege against self-
incrimination; and Cd} right to confrontation and cross-
examination of witnesses. The court restricted its holding to 
precisely these procedural guarantees and not others. It also 
limited the guarantees to those juveniles facing possible 
conmitment to a state institution. But Gault declared, generally, 
that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights 
is for adults alone." This and similar language in opinion 
suggested future grounds for arguing the constitutional rights 
of children.23 
In trying to provide all children an education suited to their 
own unique abilities, many problems have developed. Abeson and Zettle 
have described the manifestations of these problems as occurring in 
. . . the exclusion of children who have handicaps, incorrect 
or inappropriate classification, labeling, or placement, and 
the provision of inappropriate education programs, as well as 
arbitrary and capricious educational decis ion-ma king.24 
The requirement for a due process hearing was upheld in the 
1970 case of Marlega v. Board of School Directors.^ The United States 
District Court in Wisconsin ruled that no child could be excluded from 
a free public education on a full-time basis without a due process 
hearing. 
26 
In the 1970 Diana v. State Board of Education, litigation 
focused on the issue of denial of due process rights and on the substan­
tive issue of placement in the least restrictive environment. The class 
23Rodham, p. 499. 
24 
Alan Abeson and Jeffery Zettle, "The End of the Quiet Revolu­
tion: The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975," 
Exceptional Children 44 (October 1977):117. 
25 
Marlega v. Board of School Directors of the City of Milwaukee, 
Civil No. 70-C-8, (U.S.D., Ct. Wisconsin, 1970). 
26Diana v. State Board of Education, C-70 37 R.F.P. (ND. 
California, 1970). 
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action suit was filed on behalf of nine Mexican-American public school 
pupils. The plaintiffs alleged that they were being denied their 
constitutional right to due process by being placed in classes for the 
mentally retarded on the basis of inaccurate test scores. The court 
ordered the following four due process safeguards: 
1. Parent permission must be given for psychological 
examining 
2. An individual case study must be undertaken which includes 
all other pertinent information 
3. A local admissions committee must be established, confer­
ences must be held with parents 
4. Written parental consent must be given before placement 
In November 1971, Larry P. v. Riles was filed as a class action 
suit in California on behalf of all black elementary school children 
27 
in the state. The State of California was charged with inappro­
priately segregating black children into special education classes for 
the educable mentally retarded on the basis of culturally biased tests. 
The complaint argued that the children were not mentally retarded, but 
rather the victims of a testing procedure which penalized them for their 
unfamiliarity with middle-class culture. The complaint further argued 
that the tests ignored the learning experiences the children may have 
had in their homes. On June 2, 1971, the court enjoined the San 
Francisco Unified School District from placing black children in classes 
for the educable mentally retarded on the basis of IQ tests it had 
administered, if the consequences of using such tests resulted in a 
2\arry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 C1972). 
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racial imbalance in the composition of classes for the educable 
mentally retarded. 
The case concluded in 1979 when Chief Judge Robert Peckham 
handed down a decision on Larry P. v. Riles (n.d. Cal. 1979) that said 
the WISC, WISC-R, and Stanford-Benet tests, as administered to black 
children for placement, were unconstitutional. 
Due process and equal protection were cited in Harrison et al. v.  
28 
State of Michigan et al.  C 1 9 7 2 ) .  T h i s  l i t i g a t i o n  w a s  b r o u g h t  o n  
behalf of all children in Michigan being denied a publicly supported 
education because they were labeled retarded, emotionally disturbed, 
or otherwise handicapped. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare 
that the defendants' acts and practices denied them due process of law 
and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and to enjoin the defendants from excluding plain­
tiffs and the class they represented from a regular public school 
placement without providing adequate and immediate alternatives, 
including but not limited to special education and a constitutionally 
adequate prior hearing and periodic review of their status, progress, 
and the adequacy of any educational alternative. The District Court 
granted motions to dismiss. They claimed that the action was rooted by 
a state statute which in unequivocal terms directed the state and other 
educational districts to face up to the problem of providing educational 
programs and services designed to develop the maximum potential of 
every handicapped child. 
28 
Harrison et al. v. State of Michigan et al., 350 F. Supp. 846 
(1972). 
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Although the courts have been indicating that all children can 
benefit from educational services, pupils with specific needs have not 
always been identified. In the 1976 case of Pierce v. Board of Educa-
29 
tion it was alleged that from 1971 to February 1974, the plaintiff 
attended the F. W. Riley School in the city of Chicago. During that 
time the minor plaintiff was discovered to be suffering from a specific 
learning disability. The defendant was advised of this fact by the 
minor plaintiff's parents and various of the plaintiff's privately 
retained physicians, who recommended that the boy be transferred from 
the regular classes of instruction to special education. Nevertheless, 
the defendant failed and refused to either transfer the minor to these 
classes or undertake their own testing and evaluation of the boy. As 
a result of the defendant's failure to comply with their statutory 
duties, the plaintiff remained in regular classes, where he was 
required to compete with students not suffering from a learning dis­
ability and as a result sustained severe and permanent emotional and 
psychic injury requiring hospitalization and medical treatment. The 
court insisted that schools are responsible for identifying pupils in 
need of special services. 
The schools' responsibility for identifying children in need of 
30 
services was affirmed in the 1976 Fredrick L. v. Thomas case. The 
court indicated that: 
. . . professional educators often have difficulty recognizing 
learning disabilities. It thus remains to be shown that lay 
2Q 
Pierce v. Board of Education, 358 N.E. 2d 67 0 976). 
30 
Fredrick L. v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832 (1976).. 
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persons will be able to identify the admitted by large numbers 
of learning disabled children which have not been screened out 
already by teachers and school psychologists. 
Once children are identified as potentially eligible for a 
special education service, an equally serious responsibility must be 
discharged by the agency. Children must be offered an appropriate 
program of services. 
The defendant school board in the M i l l s  case maintained that 
they could not afford to provide a public education to all handicapped 
children. In the words of District Judge John Waddy: 
If sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the 
services and programs that are needed and desirable in the 
system, then available funds must be expanded equitably in such 
a manner that no child is entirely excluded from a publicly 
supported education .... The inadequacies of the . . . 
public school system, whether occasioned by insufficient fund­
ing or administrative inefficiency, certainly cannot be per­
mitted to bear more heavily on the "exceptional" or handicapped 
child than on a normal child.31 
One notable case, where the plaintiffs were offered an inappro­
priate program, is Fialkowski v. Shapp (1975). The court stated: 
. . .  a n  e d u c a t i o n a l  p r o g r a m  m u s t  b e  a s s e s s e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  i t s  
capacity to equip a child with the tools needed in life . . . . 
Placement of children with the intelligence of two year olds 
in a program which emphasizes skills such as reading and writ­
ing would seem inadequate for their needs. The harmful conse­
quences of denying plaintiffs an adequate education is under­
scored by the fact that mentally retarded children have greater 
need for formal education since they are less likely than ordi­
nary children to learn and develop informally.32 
^Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 876 (1972). 
32Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946 (1975). 
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The cases cited, although not exhaustive, illustrated that where 
fundamental rights of handicapped pupils are involved, they will be 
protected. Laws, school policies, and administrative procedures must 
meet the conditions inherent in the definitions of due process and 
equal protection imposed by the courts. If that involvement is not 
provided, a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment may be cited. 
Litigation has been responsible for stimulating the public 
consci e n c e  i n t o  a r t i c u l a t i n g  i t s  o b l i g a t i o n s  t o  c h i l d r e n .  T h o s e  l i t i ­
gations have led to legislative actions that have become meaningful to 
handicapped children, their parents, and the schools. 
Statutory Action 
Prior to the 1970s, handicapped children were often the victims 
of discrimination in terms of identification, evaluation, and placement. 
Consequently, the doctrine of due process emerged as the legal principle 
upon which much of the litigation in special education has been based. 
This litigation in turn has resulted in the incorporation of due 
process provisions in both state and federal legislation. 
In 1971, the United States Senate began an effort which has had 
great consequences for services to the handicapped. An attempt was 
made to amend the Civil Rights Act to recognize that handicapped 
citizens have civil rights, too, and thus to prohibit discrimination 
on the basis of handicaps. The spirit of that amendment was included 
in a final section, Section 504, of the Rehabilitation Amendments of 
35 
1973 (Public Law 93-112) providing: 
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, 
solely, by reason of his/her handicap be excluded from the 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected 
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
federal financial assistance.33 
Final regulations for Section 504 were published May 4, 1977. 
One of the first cases which has relied on Section 504, Hairston v. 
Drosick, very simply stated what the law requires: 
The exclusion of a minimally handicapped child from a regular 
public classroom situation without a bona fide educational 
reason is in violation of Title V of Public Law 93-112, "The 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973," 29 U.S.C. 794. The federal statute 
prescribes discrimination against handicapped individuals in any 
program receiving federal financial assistance. To deny to a 
handicapped child access to a regular public school classroom 
in receipt of federal financial assistance without compelling 
educational justification constitutes discrimination and a 
denial of the benefits of such a program in violation of the 
statute. School officials must make every effort to include 
such children within the regular public classroom situation, even 
at great expense to the school system.3^ 
In regard to procedural safeguards, the Section 504 requirements 
are the following: 
A recipient that operates a public elementary or secondary educa­
tion program shall establish and implement, with respect to actions 
regarding the identification, evaluation, or educational placement 
of persons who, because of handicap, need or are believed to need 
special instruction or related services, a system of procedural 
safeguards that includes notice, an opportunity for the parents or 
guardians of the person to examine relevant records, an impartial 
hearing with opportunity for participation by the parents or o5 
guardian and representation by counsel, and review procedure. 
34. 
Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F Supp. 180 0976). 
35 
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, "Nondiscrimi­
nation on Basis of Handicap," sec. 84.36, p. 22683. 
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Following the 1971 decision in PARC and the 1972 decision in 
Mills, a bill was introduced in the United States Senate in 1972 to 
expand the federal role in regard to procedural safeguards in the 
education of handicapped children. Many of the provisions in the 
court decisions were reflected in Public Law 93-380 passed in 1974. 
In the Education Amendments of 1974 (Public Law 93-380), the 
Congress ordered an immediate assurance from the states that procedures 
were in place to guarantee that all handicapped children within each 
s t a t e  a n d  t h e i r  p a r e n t s  a r e  a s s u r e d  o f  p r o c e d u r a l  s a f e g u a r d s  i n  a l l  
decisions regarding identification, evaluation, and educational place­
ment.36 
As summarized by LeVor: 
These amendments also included vital guarantees of the educational 
rights of exceptional children and their parents, such as assur­
ance of due process procedures and assurance of education in the 
least restrictive environment. Also of great significance in this 
legislation was the requirement that each state establish a goal 
of providing full educational opportunities for all handicapped 
children within each state, along with a comprehensive blueprints 
and detailed timetable toward the achievement of that objective. 
On November 29, 1975, President Gerald Ford signed into law 
Pub l i c  Law 94-142, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act. The 
legislation committed the Federal Government to a most substantial 
financial contribution toward the education of handicapped children. 
36Public Law 93-380, Education Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 484 
(codified at 20 U.S.C. 1402-1461), Sec. 612, d, 13, A. 
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Martin L. LeVor, "Federal Legislation for Exceptional Persons: 
A History." In Public Policy and Education of Exceptional Children, ed. 
Fredrick J. Weinstraub, Alan Aheson, Joseph Ballard, and Martin L. 
LeVor (Reston, Virginia: Council for Exceptional Children, 1977), 
p. 101. 
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It also refined and strengthened those educational rights that had 
originally received attention in Public Law 93-380. Moreover, Public 
Law 94-142 is permanent legislation with no expiration date. This is 
in stark contrast to normal congressional procedure. 
The intent of this legislation is perhaps best expressed in a 
passage from the law itself: 
It is the purpose of this Act to assure that all handicapped 
children have available to them ... a free appropriate public 
education which emphasizes special education and related services 
designed to meet their unique needs, to assure that the rights of 
handicapped children and their parents or guardians are protected, 
to assist states and localities to provide for the education of 
all handicapped children, and to assess and assure the effective­
ness of efforts to educate handicapped children.38 
The requirement necessary to meet the procedural safeguards was 
guaranteed through procedural safeguards: 
Compliance with the procedural safeguards of Section 615 of the 
Education of the Handicapped Act is one means of meeting this 
requirement.39 
Abeson and Zettle likewise noted the relationship between Public 
Law 94-142 and Section 504: 
To be in violation of Public Law 94-142, in most situations, also 
will mean a violation of Section 504, which in its finality can 
mean the withholding of all federal funds. This is particularly 
true in relation to the basic educational rights of children who 
have handicaps. Section 504 in concert with Public Law 94-142 
will be substance of implementation.40 
38Public Law 94-142, sec. 3 (cl. 
39 
USDHEW, "Nondiscrimination on Basis of Handicap, p. 22683. 
40 
Abeson and Zettle, p. 127. 
38 
amending North Carolina law to provide those children with such 
opportunities, the 1977 General Assembly enacted Ch. 927 appropriately 
called the state's "second-step" legislation. These two laws together 
set forth the educational rights of children with special needs. 
The General Assembly of 1973 also responded to the 1972 litiga­
tion by creating the Commission on Children with Special Needs (Ch. 
1422, 1973 Sessions Laws, Second Session, 1974). Ch. 1422 required 
the Commission to evaluate existing state law governmental organization 
with respect to education and human services for children with special 
needs and to recommend changes to the 1975 General Assembly. The 
Commission issued its report on February 1, 1975, and sponsored legis-
42 lation based on it. 
Many states have experienced difficulties in implementing the 
due process provisions of Public Law 94-142 even though many of the 
provisions were part of Public Law 93-380. In a study prepared by the 
Bureau of Education for the Handicapped in the United States Office of 
Education, it was noted that although most of the twenty-six states 
studied had developed acceptable policies regarding due process proce­
dures, many of these states had not been able to implement the poli-
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c i e s .  T h e  B u r e a u  n o t e d  t h a t  o n e  o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  i m p l e m e n t i n g  
the provisions was related to the states' difficulty in acquiring the 
resources needed for effective monitoring. Another problem area in 
42 
Rutherford Turnbull, III, The Law and the Mentally Handicapped 
in North Carolina, 2nd ed. (Chapel Hill: Institute of Government, Tne 
University of North Carolina, 1979), pp. 2-3. 
43 U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Progress 
Toward a Free Appropriate Public Education (Washington, DC: Office of 
Education, 1978), pp. 27-29. 
39 
implementing the due process provision was related to the difficulty 
that many of the states encountered in selecting hearing officers who 
were not affiliated with the agencies serving the children. However, 
according to the Bureau, "... several of these states have found 
ways to improve their due process procedures since the time of the 
44 program review." 
Due process legislation, according to Abeson, Bolick, and Haas, 
will not reduce the educators' professional responsibility or authority 
but rather "... provide them with the leverage to do that which must 
be their goal—to act openly and in the best interests of the children 
45 they serve." Due process can assure that the school personnel will 
do or have the opportunity to do what is required in the education of 
handicapped children. 
As the 1970s emerged it became clear the responsibility to 
adhere to due process requirements was to be upon American educators. 
In the past, decisions exempting a child from school, placing him in a 
special class, or otherwise changing his educational placement, were 
often made without regard to fair procedure. Traditionally, the 
children most affected by such arbitrary and capricious decision­
making were the handicapped or exceptional--the mentally retarded, 
emotionally handicapped speech handicapped, learning disabled, and 
sometimes the gifted. Exceptional children, individually and collec­
tively, were frequently denied the benefits of appropriate public 
education. 
^Ibid., p. 28. 
45 
Abeson, Bolick, and Haas, p. 32. 
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Since the early 1970s, however, the situation has changed 
dramatically. Extensive litigation and legislation have resulted in 
the requirement that state and local education agencies guarantee due 
process protection to handicapped children in all matters pertaining to 
their identification, evaluation, and placement. With enactment by the 
United States Congress of the Education Amendment of 1974 (Public Law 
93-380), all state education agencies, in order to remain eligible for 
federal funds for the education of handicapped children, were required 
to adopt a state plan that would include provisions of adequate due 
process in educational decision-making. 
41 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
This study is a history of handicapped education including 
Federal Court decisions concerning the constitutional imperatives which 
have had relevancy in due process assurance of Public Law 94-142. In 
an attempt to relate the organization and administration of the due 
processes which were imposed by Public Law 94-142 to a study of special 
education school district due process hearings in North Carolina, this 
study focuses on the incidence and precipitating factors, the initia­
tors of the hearing process, and the decisions of the hearing officers. 
This chapter elaborates on the pertinent factors of this study's 
design: the research questions; the nature of the sample; the popula­
tion surveyed; the interview questions; the administration of the inter­
view; the design itself; and the design's control of internal and 
external validity factors. 
Research Questions 
A number of specific questions can be identified under the major 
thrusts of the study: 
1. How many due process cases were initiated and heard by a 
hearing officer at the local education agency level? 
2. Was the enrollment related to the incidence of due process 
hearings at the local education agency level? 
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3. Did internal mediation avert local education agency hear­
ings? 
4. What were the critical issues that had generated hearings? 
5. Who initiated the hearings? 
6. What were the decisions of the hearing officer? 
7. Were the decisions of the hearing officers implemented? 
The focus was on factors associated with the process of provid­
ing educational services to handicapped children, and particularly 
where there is disagreement between the school system and parents or 
guardians that is likely to lead to a local education system level due 
process hearing. The following factors, selected for examination, were 
derived from literature, legislation, litigation, and interviews with 
persons who have been involved in the due process system such as school 
officials, hearing officers, lawyers, and advocates: 
Incidence factors: administrative unit enrollment, and 
administrative unit due process procedure. 
Precipitating factors: change in educational placement status, 
identification and designation of handicap, and the provision for a 
free appropriate public education. 
Initiating factors: educational agency, parent or guardian, 
child. 
Decision factors: decision rendered, the implementation of the 
decision to the initiator. 
In order to determine answers to the research questions, it was 
also necessary to treat factors related to each child as though they 
were equivalent to the central focus of the study. Those factors are 
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the characteristics of the child: age, sex, educational classifica­
tion, and pre-hearing placement. 
In addition, direction was focused on the time, cost, and number 
of school personnel involved in each due process hearing studied; 
general characteristics of the parents or guardians; and general 
comments or suggestions from the directors of special education regard­
ing local education agency-level due process hearings. 
Nature of the Sample 
A familiarity with the organization of special education in North 
Carolina's 142 public school districts is essential to an understanding 
of the procedures utilized in this study and the analysis of the find­
ings. Therefore, prior to a discussion of these portions of the study, 
background information involving the organizational structure employed 
throughout the state in delivering special education services is 
presented. 
To fulfill the state and federal mandates requiring districts to 
provide services for handicapped children, several delivery systems 
have been developed in North Carolina. In some instances individual 
local education systems are of insufficient size to independently pro­
vide for the handicapped children and must provide programs and services 
through a cooperative effort between various local education systems. 
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Point Agreement Plan 
Special education joint agreements represent the organizational 
plan most widely employed to deliver special education services in 
North Carolina. This plan involves a contract between the two or more 
local education systems to establish and provide special education 
services for pupils in each system.^ The purpose of the joint agree­
ment is to enable small local education systems to combine students 
and resources providing a broad base of student population and thus per 
mit the operation of comprehensive services for the handicapped. It is 
common for serving systems to count the student being served on their 
headcount thus drawing state aid for out-of-district students receiving 
services. 
The joint agreements are merely North Carolina's response to 
the need for a delivery system capable of serving all handicapped 
children in the state. The final responsibility for providing an 
educational opportunity for resident handicapped children remains with 
the local education system. 
The Population 
The population of this study consisted of the 142 local educa­
tion systems in North Carolina. These 142 local educational systems 
are divided into eight regions within the state as shown in Table 1. 
^CAC 16 2E.1526. 
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Table 1 
Regional Education Centers and 
O 
Local Education Agencies 
Regional Center Local Education System 
Northeast Regional Education Center 
(Region 1) Williamston, NC 
Beaufort 
Washington 
Bertie 
Camden 
Chowan 
Currituck 
Dare 
Gates 
Hertford 
Hyde 
Martin 
Pasquotank 
Perquimans 
Pitt 
Greenville 
Tyrrell 
Washington 
Southeast Regional Education Center 
(Region 2) Jacksonville, NC Brunswick 
Carteret 
New Bern/Craven 
Duplin 
Greene 
Jones 
Lenoir 
Kinston 
New Hanover 
Onslow 
Pamlico 
Pender 
Sampson 
CIinton 
Wayne 
Goldsboro 
Camp Lejeune Dependent 
Schools 
Conrad Sloan 
Table 1 (continued) 
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Regional Center Local Education System 
Central Regional Education Center 
(Region 3) Knightdale, NC 
Durham 
Durham 
Edgecombe 
Tarboro 
Franklin 
Franklinton 
Granville 
Halifax 
Roanoke Rapids 
Wei don 
Johnston 
Nash 
Rocky Mount 
Northampton 
Vance 
Wake 
Warren 
Wilson 
South Central Regional Education 
Center (Region 4) Carthage, NC Bladen 
Columbus 
Whiteville 
Cumberland 
Fayetteville 
Fort Bragg Dependent 
Schools 
Harnett 
Hoke 
Lee 
Montgomery 
Moore 
Richmond 
Robeson 
Fairmont 
Lumberton 
Red Springs 
Saint Pauls 
Scotland 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Regional Center Local Education System 
North Central Regional Education 
Center (Region 5) Greensboro, NC 
Alamance 
Burlington 
Caswel1 
Chatham 
Davidson 
Lexington 
Thomasvi lie 
Forsyth 
Guilford 
Greensboro 
High Point 
Orange 
Chapel Hill 
Person 
Randolph 
Asheboro 
Rockingham 
Eden 
Western Rockingham 
Reidsville 
Stokes 
Southwest Regional Education 
Center (Region 6) Charlotte, NC Anson 
Cabarrus 
Kannapolis 
Cleveland 
Kings Mountain 
Shelby 
Gaston 
Lincoln 
Mecklenburg 
Rowan 
Salisbury 
Stanly 
Albemarle 
Union 
Monroe 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Regional Center Local Education System 
Northwest Regional Education Alexander 
Center (Region 7) North Wilkesboro, NC Alleghany 
Ashe 
Avery 
Burke 
Caldwell 
Catawba 
Hickory 
Newton-Conover 
Davie 
Iredell 
Mooresville 
Statesvil le 
Surry 
El kin 
Mt. Airy 
Watauga 
Wilkes 
Yadkin 
Western Regional Education Center 
•Region *) Canton, NC Buncombe 
Asheville 
Cherokee 
Clay 
Graham 
Haywood 
Henderson 
Hendersonville 
Jackson 
Macon 
Madison 
McDowell 
Mitchell 
Polk 
Try on 
Rutherford 
Swain 
Transylvania 
Yancey 
2North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, North 
Carolina Education Directory 1984-85 (Raleigh: North Carolina Depart-
ment of Public Instruction, 1985), pp. 22-23. 
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The relatively large number of local education agencies chosen for 
this study was of importance as indicated by Cronbach in Essentials of 
3 Psychological Testing. 
Interview Questions 
The questions for the interview were developed in the following 
manner. A rough draft was constructed which contained items keyed to 
the research questions and which was related to the procedure safe­
guards specified in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Public Law 
94-142, and the Rules Governing Procedures and Services for Children 
with Special Needs in North Carolina. 
4 Content validity, according to Fred Kerlinger , is "the repre­
sentativeness of sampling adequacy of the content . . . the substance, 
the matter, the topics ... of a measuring instrument." For example, 
a psychology professor might ask several colleagues to evaluate the 
content of a text measuring understanding of principles of human 
development. The content validity of the interview questions was 
established in the same manner. 
The effort to establish validity received strong support from 
Dr. Joseph E. Bryson, Professor in the School of Education, University 
of North Carolina at Greensboro. Through his recommendations a panel 
of experienced exceptional children educators was selected to review 
O 
Lee J. Cronbach, Essentials of Psychological Testing (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 167. 
4 Fred Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), p. 458. 
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the interview questions. The ten-member panel included one state 
consultant, one local educational system superintendent, one school 
attorney, one school psychologist, and five local program administra­
tors for exceptional children. These people all gave of their time 
freely. 
Each member of the review panel was asked by telephone to serve 
as a member of the review panel for the study. Upon agreement, each 
received an abstract of the research effort and a copy of the interview 
questions. This writer then arranged for an appointment with each 
member of the panel to discuss the draft. 
One problem regarding the questions related to the amount and 
depth of information needed to describe each local education agency 
hearing. On the issue of questionnaire length, Cronbach suggested 
that "a long test is generally better than a short test' because, 
with every question added, the sample performance becomes more adequate. 
5 
Long tests are less influenced by chance." There also exists a 
danger of creating an instrument which is so long that it elicits 
boredom and causes the respondent to fail to complete the instrument. 
These matters were given considerable attention as the instrument was 
being developed. 
The review panel suggested that the interview questions be sent 
with the letter of introduction so that the directors of special educa­
tion could obtain some of the facts in advance of the interview. The 
review panel also felt that the program administrators of exceptional 
5 
Cronbach, p. 171. 
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children might feel more comfortable in participating in the study if 
they were aware of the areas of inquiry. This technique of sending the 
questions in advance of the interview was also recommended by Paul 
Leedy in Practical Research: Planning and Design.** 
After unanimity was achieved in regard to a final draft of 
interview questions, the next phase in the process of evaluating the 
instrument was to give the instrument to one assistant superintendent of 
schools for curriculum, one special education consultant, and one school 
psychologist. Each of these people was well versed in the field of 
special education. The readers were asked to review the questions and 
provide comments. The results were compared to the final recommenda­
tions of the review panel. The correlation of results of the two 
groups was quite high. Thus validity and readability of the actual 
questions were established by comparing the responses of the two 
groups—the review panel and the practitioners. 
The final phase in the process of evaluating the interview ques­
tions was to receive the approval of this writer's doctoral committee. 
Their suggestions were utilized to refine the interview questions and 
the letter of introduction. 
Administration of the Interview Survey 
Each of the 142 program administrators of exceptional children 
of North Carolina received an introductory letter explaining the nature 
and the auspices of the study (Appendix A] and a copy of the interview 
g 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1974), p. 87. 
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survey questions (Appendix B). The letter stated that the interview 
survey would require twenty-five to thirty minutes of the director's 
time. To enlist a high level of participation, the director was 
assured that complete anonymity would prevail throughout the study. 
Neither their name, the name of the local educational system of excep­
tional children, nor the names of the individual school would be 
included with direct information regarding local educational system due 
process hearings. Finally, mutual benefits were stressed from their 
participation. The program administrators were promised a local educa­
tional system due process procedure that would reflect North Carolina 
law, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Public Law 94-142. 
Fifteen days after the introductory letter and survey were 
mailed, each program administrator that had not responded received a 
phone call and was asked to participate in the survey. Eight program 
administrators or their designees immediately responded by returning 
the survey. This response corresponded to 53 percent of the sample. 
Four of the program administrators were on vacation and required sub­
sequent phone calls before a contact could be arranged. Three of the 
directors, although interested in the study, declined to participate 
because they felt their local education system was too small or because 
they had not had a due process hearing. 
Table 2 summarizes the number of local education agencies and 
schools represented and the number of interview surveys used. 
For one local education agency, two interviews were necessary to 
obtain the information. The coordination of local education agency due 
process hearings was assigned to a coordinator of the elementary school 
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Table 2 
Local Administrative Units Who Have 
Had Due Process Hearings 
Local Education Agency 
and Hearing Date 
Number of Due 
Process Hearings 
Participation 
in the Study 
Person County 
9/4/79 
8/28/80 
Pitt County 
2/25/80 
Reidsville 
10/27/81 
Robeson County 
12/14/78 
1/03/80 
Salisbury 
10/1/80 
Vance County 
1/22/82 
Wilson County 
10/11/78 
Wake County 
10/23/78 
12/06/78 
2/1/82 
Moore County 
1/12/79 
1/12/79 
1/12/79 
Mount Airy 
7/30/80 
7/30/81 
7/30/81 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
3 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Table 2 (continued) 
Local Education Agency 
and Hearing Date 
Number of Due 
Process Hearings 
Participation 
in the Study 
Newton-Conover 
7/15/82 
1 X 
New Hanover 
11/02/78 
1 X 
Orange County 
2/23/81 
1 X 
Perquimans County 
10/31/79 
1 X 
Harnett County 
9/11/79 
1 X 
Hertford County 
3/23/82 
1 X 
High Point City 
7/31/78 
1 X 
Kinston 
1/10/83 
1 X 
Madlson-Mayodan City 
10/30/79 
12/08/82 
2 X 
Durham County 
7/30/79 
2/09/82 
2 X 
Elizabeth City/Pasquotank 
2/5/79 
4/14/80 
2 X 
Haywood County 
2/15/79 
1 X 
Forsyth County 
11/21/79 
2 X 
Gaston County 
4/17/81 
1 X 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Local Education Agency 
and Hearing Date 
Number of Due 
Process Hearings 
Participation 
in the Study 
Greensboro 
11/18/80 
1/06/81 
Guilford County 
6/04/79 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
1/04/79 
1/05/79 
4/20/79 
4/27/79 
2/21/80 
6/17/80 
10/16/80 
11/11/80 
9/21/81 
3/05/82 
Chapel Hill-Carrboro 
5/17/79 
Concord City 
8/22/79 
6/02/80 
Cumberland County 
4/12/79 
Albemarle City 
1/30/80 
Alexander County 
3/05/82 
Brunswick 
8/14/81 
Burl ington 
8/12/83 
Burke County 
12/19/79 
7/15/82 
1 
10 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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Local Education Agency 
and Hearing Date 
Cabarrus County 
5/15/80 
Caldwell County 
11/06/78 
Table 2 (continued) 
Number of Due 
Process Hearings 
1 
1 
Participation 
in the Study 
X 
X 
districts and a coordinator of the high school district. In this local 
education agency, the interviewer met with the director's designees. 
Most of the program administrators or their designees were 
cooperative and encouraged discussion. Quite often their questions were 
curtailed in the interest of time. Occasionally the less interested 
respondents were asked to expand on an initial statement. 
An alternative survey method based on written responses to a 
questionnaire was used in addition to the interview. This approach 
was acceptable because of the distance assumed and difficulty in 
interviewing all local education agency program administrators of 
exceptional children. Since factual information was needed, there was 
no problem in using both the survey and interview approach. 
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CHAPTER IV 
REVIEW OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
Included in this chapter are major federal court decisions 
relating to handicapped education, especially due process considera­
tions. The later part of this chapter includes cases concerning the 
least restrictive and most appropriate setting issues that cause school 
systems and parents of handicapped children difficulties. 
Section 504 and Public Law 94-142 were recodified and redesig­
nated when the Department of Education was established in 1976. The 
regulations under Section 504 were transferred from 45 Code of Federal 
Regulations Part 84 to 34 Code of Federal Regulations Part 104 effec­
tive May 9, 1980. Public Law 94-142 regulations were transferred from 
45 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121a to 34 Code of Federal Regula­
tions Part 300 effective November 21, 1980. 
Cases Selected for Review 
Cases chosen for review in this chapter were selected because 
they met one or more of the following criteria: 
1. The case is considered a landmark case in the broad con­
stitutional areas of special education and due process 
procedures. 
2. The case helped to establish legal precedent or case law in 
a particular area. 
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3. The issues in the case relate to one of the following sub­
topics: (a) changing interpretations, (b) services a 
school must provide, and (c) denial of due process in 
placement, services or classification of students. 
4. The case brought additional services sought by parents. 
Appropriate Education 
The Supreme Court's decision on Board of Education of the 
Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley^ means more than 
business as usual to educators of exceptional children. Justice William 
Rehnquist's opinion will be eagerly grasped by the many judges already 
predisposed to avoid involvement in educational decision-making; in 
the hands of skillful attorneys for education agencies, it provides a 
powerful tool for convincing the remaining courts that the determina­
tion of what constitutes an "appropriate" education for handicapped 
children is a responsibility of schools, not judges. So long as schools 
follow the criteria of the Rowley decision and meticulously apply the 
procedural safeguards mandated by Public Law 94-142, their educational 
decisions stand little chance of being overturned. 
The impact of the Rowley decision is clear from even a cursory 
reading of the Court's opinion. Justice Rehnquist explicitly warned 
lower courts against "second guessing" educational decisions and 
advised his brethren to give state administrative decisions "due 
^Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School 
District v. Rowley, 1981-82 EHLR DEC. 553.656 (1982). 
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weight," limiting their review to the procedural aspects of the dis­
pute. But where this posture is insufficient to resolve the matter 
at hand, and it becomes necessary for a court to determine whether an 
appropriate education is being provided, he stated that Public Law 
94-1421s substantive requirements are satisfied as a matter of law 
when the child is being given personalized instruction with sufficient 
support services to enable the child to benefit educationally from that 
instruction. Rarely should a school not be able to demonstrate that a 
p 
child is receiving educational benefit. 
The Rowley decision will be persuasive in most situations 
because it gives direction for educators. Even if motivated by a 
desire to impose a conservative interpretation upon a liberal statute, 
the opinion falls well within the mainstream of judicial efforts to 
avoid becoming enmeshed in educational matters. Bluntly put, most 
courts simply do not feel competent to decide educational disputes, a 
discomfiture that increases substantially in matters of special educa-
4 
tion. 
A particularly piquant statement of this attitude occurred in 
5 Grkman v. Scanlon, in which Senior District Judge Edward Dumbauld 
stated protestingly: 
In the case at bar, the Court is again called upon unwillingly 
to function as a super-superintendent of schools. In that 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
5Grkman v. Scanlon, 1981082 EHLR DEC. 553.508 (WD PA 1981). 
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capacity, as (the late Supreme Court) Justice Robert H. Jackson 
noted, "we act in these matters not by authority of competence 
but by force of our commissions." (Citation omitted.) The 
question for decision is where an eight-year-old girl shall fi 
receive an "appropriate" education as mandated by Federal law. 
Judge Dumbauld went on to observe: 
"To determine what constitutes appropriate relief, the Court 
must in effect determine what constitutes an appropriate education."* 
*If this is thought an unsuitable task for a court, . . ., one 
may take comfort in the fact that sometimes the Pennsylvania 
legislature confers upon the Courts of Common Pleas, rather 
than the Public Utilities Commission, the power to regulate 
public utility service.7 
Thus, courts have held that education is a matter traditionally 
Q 
entrusted to the states and that there is no Constitutional right to 
g 
an education. More specifically, they have been unable to discern 
generally accepted professional standards of education, an indispensable 
prerequisite for the imposition and finding of liability. 
This last barrier has prevented, for the most part, suits for 
educational malpractice, even where the alleged malpractice has 
involved a ministerial act, as opposed to the exercise of professional 
judgment.^ So, when a school district failed to retest a student 
originally placed in a class for children with retarded mental develop­
ment, the parents' suit was characterized as an attack upon the 
6lbid. 
7Ibid., p. 509. 
8Epperson v..Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
g 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1 0973). 
61 
professional judgment of the board of education, i.e., educational mal 
practice, and dismissed, even though the professional judgment was 
simply a failure to retest pursuant to the recommendation of the 
evaluating psychologist.^ 
More recently, a Maryland State Court also dismissed an action 
for educational malpractice, citing a long string of supporting case 
law, as precluded by considerations of public policy, 
among them being the absence of a workable rule of care 
against which the defendants' conduct may be measured, an 
inherent uncertainty in determining the cause and nature of 
any damages, and the extreme burden which would be imposed 
on the already strained resources of the public school 
system, to say nothing of those of the judiciary.12 
Disclaiming any desire to make the judiciary "overseers of both day-tO' 
day operation of our educational process as well as the formulation of 
its governing policies," the court noted that such matters have been 
properly entrusted to the State Department of Education and local 
13 
school boards. 
These impediments failing, the courts have resorted to more 
traditional, less direct means. One, certainly not limited to educa­
tional matters, is to refuse to decide, or defer a decision, until the 
dispute is sharpened to the point that judicial resolution is unavoid­
able or judicial remedies are appropriate. The doctrine of exhaustion 
of administrative remedies is a favored example of this practice and 
^Hoffman v. The Board of Education of the City of New York, 
1979-80 EHLR DEC. 551:382 (Ct. Appls. NY 1979). 
12 Hunter v. Board of Education of Montgomery County, 1981-82 
EHLR DEC. 553:559 (Ct. Appls. MC 1982). 
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has been invoked even where the failure has resulted not from parental 
14 inaction, but because of the educational agency's misconduct. Thus, 
the First Circuit has affirmed a lower court's dismissal of an action 
by parents, for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies, 
despite the appellate court's finding that the education agency's 
actions were improper and unjustifiable: 
The Secretary (of the Department of Education) refused plaintiffs' 
request for further agency action and hearing on the ground that 
plaintiffs' suit was currently pending. The Secretary's ground 
in fact provides no justification for refusing plaintiffs the 
procedures to which the statute and regulations entitled them. 
Even had it done so, the Secretary's letters make plain that 
he was unwilling to provide any further department proceedings 
to exhaust.15 
The failure to exhaust administrative remedies has also been 
invoked in the face of contentions that the administrative agency has 
predetermined the issue, thus rendering the administrative process 
futile.In a New York State case, parents challenged a State regu­
lation that established a quantitative test for demonstrating the 
existence of a "severe discrepancy" between achievement and ability in 
order to support the finding of learning disability. The parents 
alleged that, under Federal regulations, a more flexible, qualitative 
test was required and the underlying objective of the state regulation 
was to limit the numbers of children who would be identified as learning 
14Ibid. 
^Exratty v. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 1980-81 EHLR 
DEC. 552:444 (CA-1 1981) at 552:447. 
16Ibid. 
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disabled.^7 To substantiate this allegation, they pointed to a state 
policy memorandum informing local education systems that identification 
of more than two percent of their school populations as learning dis­
abled would subject the system to an on-site review. The "chilling 
effect" of such a memorandum, they contended, was obvious. 
In reversing a district court decision for the parents, the 
Second Circuit rejected the parents' contention that exhaustion would 
18 
be futile because the state, in effect, had predetermined the issue. 
Noting the state's explanation that its rule was not strictly a quanti­
tative one, the court concluded that plaintiffs had not "made the 
requisite showing that they cannot secure the relief they seek from the 
19 
state." The court continued: 
The Commissioner contends that the rule will be administered 
flexibly and qualitatively, that it is an interpretive rule 
and not a restrictive one. If the rule is not flexibly 
administered, first resort should be to State processes and 
the Commissioner. There is no reason to think the Commissioner 
will fail to enforce the law.20 
The court also used the exhaustion doctrine to defer considera­
tion of the state regulation itself, pointing to conflicting opinions 
concerning the significance of the rule and its alleged deficiencies. 
l8Riley v. Ambach, 1979-80 EHLR DEC. 551:668 (ED NY 1980). 
19Riley v. Ambach, 1980-81 EHLR DEC. 552:410 (CA-2 1980) at 
552:414. 
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The effect of the rule, the court said, 
will be much more clearly focused when a particular child can 
show that application of the rule caused his or her ineligi­
bility in circumstances where he or she would have qualified 
under the prior standard. 
Rather than balance such (conflicting) views (on the signifi­
cance of the rule) in the abstract, we think the merits of 
the challenge to the standard will be more appropriate for 
adjudication in a case in which the standard has been applied 
.... When the merits of dispute are better resolved on a 
detailed factual record, a court properly may elect to await 2i 
the events that will permit the development of such a record. 
None of the foregoing means, of course, that all courts con­
sistently have refused in the past, or will refuse in the future, either 
to inject themselves into educational disputes or substantively deter-
22 mine matters fairly brought before them. Court involvement in educa­
tional matters, as it has been in the past, will continue to be a 
product of factors such as the personal and political outlook of the 
particular judge, the skill of the attorney in presenting the matter as 
one amenable to judicial resolution, and controlling case law. However, 
ample evidence supports the conclusion that, for a variety of reasons 
and by well-tested and established mechanisms, most courts have 
abstained from educational disputes, leaving them for decision by 
others,23 
The Rowley decision recognizes, reaffirms, and builds upon this 
abstinence. In addition, it provides a methodology by which it can be 
continued in cases arising under Public Law 94-142. 
21 Ibid. 
22Ibid. 
23Ibid. 
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The Supreme Court answered two questions in Rowley; What is 
meant by Public Law 94—1421s requirement of a "free appropriate public 
education," and what is the role of state and federal courts in exer-
24 
cising the review granted by the Act? Judging by the number and 
size of the briefs filed in the case, it is clear that Rowley was 
seized upon by many as being of widespread importance. Indeed, the 
glacier of paper that slowly engulfed the court—not to mention the 
packed courtroom during oral argument—exceeded the normal activity 
that attends the court's first interpretation of a statute.^ And, 
in fact, the atmosphere surrounding the court's review was character­
ized chiefly by anxiety. 
One cause for this anxiety is the general belief, noted briefly 
before, that the court has become increasingly "conservative" in 
2fi 
interpreting and applying the law. The Rowleys and, perhaps even 
more, the advocacy groups supporting them were greatly concerned about 
what might be left of Public Law 94-142 following the court's decision. 
For their part, the school district and its supporters saw an oppor­
tunity, finally, to place some limits upon the programs and services 
required to be provided by schools. That is why the briefs filed in 
24 Board of Education of the Hendrick. Hudson Central School 
District v. Rowley, 1981-82 EHLR DEC. 553.656 (1982}. 
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Rowley were so expansive in the issues addressed, many of which were 
71 neither raised nor analyzed in the lower court proceedings. 
That the court, in accepting review of the lower court decision, 
had some broader objective in mind was not a groundless fear. For one 
thing, the United States Solicitor General, at the court's invitation, 
had advised the court to decline review and, in doing so, had offered 
28 many reasons usually considered persuasive. The lower court decision 
the Solicitor General had noted, turned on the peculiar factual cir­
cumstances of the case, a point underscored by the Court of Appeals' 
admonition that its decision not be cited as precedent. In addition, 
the Solicitor General pointed out, there was no conflict among the 
circuits on the meaning of "appropriate education." Finally, it was 
suggested that the lower court opinion was consistent with the statute-
in other words, that it was correct. Nevertheless, the court granted 
the petition for certiorari. 
Another factor contributing to the charged atmosphere was the 
court's earlier decision in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. 
29 
Halderman. In that case, the court found that the "bill of rights" 
provision of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights 
Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 6010, does not create any substantive rights to 
27 In addition to the parties directly involved and the brief 
on the merits of the U.S. Department of Justice, at least seven 
supporting briefs were filed, most on the side of Rowley. 
28 Brief of the U. S. Solicitor General Opposing Petition for 
Certiorari, 1981-82 EHLR DEC. 553:145. 
291980-81 EHLR DEC. 552:321 (1981). 
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"appropriate treatment" in the "least restrictive environment," in 
30 
favor of the mentally retarded. Although Pennhurst involved a 
statute fundamentally different from Public Law 94-142, the court's 
language was so sweeping that its psychological impact was devastat-
31 ing. The best that could be said, in the words of one advocacy 
group, was that the decision showed "little sympathy with the efforts 
of developmentally disabled people to compel the states to provide them 
32 
with adequate treatment." It was not unreasonable to fear that the 
"mindset" lurking in Pennhurst could be carried over to Rowley and 
33 
Public Law 94-142, with similarly disastrous results. 
Finally, the poor facts presented by the case were perhaps the 
most intangible factor contributing to the surrounding anxiety. It is 
generally conceded that, in order to provide a firm foundation for 
subsequent lower court decisions, the Supreme Court's first interpreta­
t i o n  o f  a  s t a t u t e  s h o u l d  r e s u l t  i n  a  r e s o u n d i n g  v i c t o r y — t h a t  i s ,  a  
broad and expansive interpretation of the scope of the law and the 
30Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 For its part, the Court paid deference to its Pennhurst argu-
ment in Rowley. In rejecting arguments accepted by the lower courts, 
that P.L. 94-142 required maximazation of potential, Justice Rehnquist 
(who also wrote the Pennhurst decision) found insufficient isolated 
supporting statements in the legislative history. "Moreover," he con­
tinued, "even were we to agree that these statements evince a congres­
sional intent to maximize each child's potential, we could not hold that 
Congress had successfully imposed that burden upon the states," citing 
Pennhurst. 
33 
Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School 
District v. Rowley, 1981-82 EHLR DEC. 443:656. 
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intent of Congress in enacting it. These results usually flow from 
cases presenting factual situations showing egregious violations of the 
law and massive harm or damages to the plaintiff. In this vein, cases 
Involving the handicapped traditionally have presented "worst case" 
situations; not only have the offending institutions clearly violated 
the law, but the individual plaintiffs have evoked great personal 
sympathy and compassion. 
Row!ey simply was not this kind of case. The school district 
and its personnel had taken extensive measures to facilitate Amy 
Rowley's successful placement and performance—a point that was hammered 
home by its counsel during oral argument to the Supreme Court.^ In 
addition, Amy's performance in class had been far from unsuccessful. In 
fact, she had been and was performing better than most of her class­
mates, even without the signing-interpreter service claimed to be 
essential to her education. Thus, although Amy might not have under­
stood a substantial part of the communication taking place in her class­
rooms, the Rowleys were unable to demonstrate how she was being 
harmed."^ 
With these apparent "deficiencies" in mind and faced with a 
broad range of issues raised for the first time in the Supreme Court by 
the school district, advocacy groups concluded that the court had to be 
provided with counter-arguments defending virtually every aspect of the 
statute. In such a manner the stakes were gradually increased. 
69 
In writing the Court's majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist 
quickly disposed of lower court findings that Public Law 94-142 does 
not itself define what is meant by an "appropriate" education. He 
agreed that "like many statutory definitions, this one tends toward 
the cryptic rather than the comprehensive, but that Is scarcely a 
reason for abandoning the quest for legislative intent"; functional or 
not, "it is the principal tool which Congress has given us for parsing 
the critical phrase of the Act."36 
Looking to the definition, as well as other statutory language 
37 38 
defining "special education" and "related services," Justice 
Rehnquist concluded that free appropriate public education consists of 
educational instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of 
the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to 
39 
permit the child "to benefit" from the instruction. Other portions of 
the statute evidence a congressional intent, he opined, not to pre­
scribe a substantive standard of education—and certainly not the 
standard applied by the lower courts—but rather an intention to bring 
previously excluded handicapped children into the public education 
40 
systems of the states. In doing so, he continued, the states are 
also required to adopt and follow procedures that will result in 
36 
Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School 
District v. Rowley, 1981-82 EHLR DEC. 553:656. 
3720 U.S.C. SS 140106). 
382Q U.S.C. SS 140U17). 
39Ibid. 
40Ibid. 
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individualized consideration of and instruction for each child. 
Nevertheless, he said, "there remains the question of whether the 
legislative history indicates a Congressional intent that such education 
(to be provided a handicapped child) meet some additional substantive 
standard. For an answer we turn to that history."4^ 
At this point, it is useful to note a number of observations. 
First, Justice Rehnquist is undoubtedly correct in focusing on the 
definition of free appropriate public education contained in Public Law 
94-142; the trial court's reliance on the language of parallel regula-
42 tions under SS 504 was an obvious defect in its decision. Further, it 
also appears beyond refute that the statutory definition is inconclusive 
on its face, and that there is no readily apparent Congressional pre­
scription of the substantive level of education to be provided under 
the statute. Justice Rehnquist appears to be on similarly firm ground 
in his emphasis on the importance of procedures in realizing the under­
lying purposes of the Act, since it is difficult to find, in other 
federal legislation concerning matters of such traditional local concern 
^Note 1, supra, at 553:656. 
42 The trial court noted, correctly, that P.L. 94-142 does not 
define the term "appropriate education," but then continued by stating 
that "(t)he regulations promulgated thereunder supply a functional 
explanation ..." Rowley v. The Board of Education of the Hendrick 
Hudson Central School District (SD NY 2980), 1979-80 EHLR DEC. 551:506 
at 551:509 (emphasis supplied). Although the court's contextual 
reference is to P.L. 94-142, the regulations it cites are those 
promulgated under SS 504, 29 U.S.C. SS 794. Why the trial court over­
looked the definition of FAPE in P.L. 94-142, 20 U.S.C. SS 1401(18) 
remains a mystery. 
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as education, a statute that is so prescriptive in its procedural obli­
gations.^ 
Less certain, however, is Justice Rehnquist's emphasis of the 
words "to benefit" contained in the definition of "related services." 
Taking the words from that definition and incorporating them in the 
definition of free appropriate public education appears to be neither 
clearly correct nor incorrect, but it is a critical step in translating 
the meaning of free appropriate public education into a standard that 
can be more easily understood, applied and defended. 
Turning to Public Law 94-142's legislative history, Justice 
Rehnquist easily built a convincing argument that the chief concern of 
Congress was assuring handicapped children access to an adequate, 
44 publicly supported education. As he noted, the relevant committee 
reports, landmark cases, and research submitted by the (then) Bureau of 
Education for the Handicapped spoke almost exclusively in terms of 
access. Moreover, since indiscriminate exclusion and programming were 
the chief problems at that time, it is not difficult to conclude that 
the primary Congressional objective was assuring access to public 
45 
schools. 
Having established to his satisfaction that Public Law 94-142 was 
enacted to provide handicapped children with access to public education, 
Justice Rehnquist could have stopped. His reasoning is logically 
43lbid. 
44Ibid. 
45Ibid. 
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complete at the point where he identifies the congressional objective. 
No less than anyone else, he was aware of the difficulties in identi­
fying and explicating a substantive standard. That he did not stop, 
but rather continued his search for a substantive standard, provides an 
opportunity for speculation. 
A clue may be revealed in the first two sentences of the next 
portion of the opinion.^6 There Justice Rehnquist states that the 
intent to confer educational benefit is "implicit" in the concept of 
requiring access because, in effect, Congress would have been foolish 
"to spend millions of dollars in providing access . . . only to have the 
handicapped child receive no benefit from that education.These 
words recast in the form of a question rather than a conclusion, sound 
very much like the kind of informal discussion that surrounds the formu-
48 lation of a majority opinion of the court. 
For example, consider the following line of inquiry; if strict 
equality of access were all the Congress intended, it could easily have 
said that in language far simpler than Public Law 94-142 and, moreover, 
w i t h o u t  p r o v i d i n g  f e d e r a l  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  t h e  s t a t e s .  I s n ' t  
access precisely the objective Congress intended in enacting SS 504? 
Surely, then, something more than mere access was intended by Public 
Law 94-142. And doesn't the increasing scale of federal financial 
assistance (even though unmet) indicate not merely access but rather 
46 
Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School 
District v. Rowley, 1981-82 EHLR DEC. 553:667. 
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meaningful access by increasing the level of services for handicapped 
children?4® 
It is impossible to know, of course, whether a give-and-take 
such as this surrounded preparation of the court's opinion. But it can 
be effectively argued that there is simply too much evidence in the 
legislative record of Public Law 94-142 to dismiss out-of-hand the con-
50 elusion that the statute requires more than equal access. It is 
possible, then, that Justice Rehnquist was compelled to address this 
51 issue in order to attract sufficient support for majority opinion. 
Whatever the reason, Justice Rehnquist was now faced with the 
"more difficult problem" of determining when handicapped children are 
"receiving sufficient educational benefits" to satisfy the requirements 
of Public Law 94-142. He recalled his earlier conclusion that there 
was no evidence of Congressional intent to prescribe a substantive 
•i 
standard under the Act. He referred also to the inherent difficulty of 
formulating one standard for such a broad range of problems. Accord­
ingly, he set aside any "attempt today to establish any one test for 
d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  a d e q u a c y  o f  e d u c a t i o n a l  b e n e f i t  c o n f e r r e d  u p o n  a l l  
children covered by the Act." Nevertheless, he concluded, in the case 
before him involving Amy Rowley, who is in the public school classroom, 
who is receiving substantial specialized instruction and related 
services, and who is, moreover, performing above average, there could 
49Ibid. 
50Ibid. 
51Ibid. 
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be no doubt that educational benefit is being conferred and that free 
52 
appropriate public education is being provided. 
However, though he was unwilling to articulate a single compre­
hensive test, Justice Rehnquist enunciated criteria that can be used 
to assess whether free appropriate public education is being provided. 
These are the following: 
1. personalized instruction with sufficient support services 
to permit the child to benefit educationally from that 
instruction 
2. instruction and services provided at public expense, meet­
ing the state's other educational standards, approximating 
grade levels used in "regular" education and comporting 
with the child's individualized education plan 
3. individualized education plan formulated in accordance with 
the requirements of the Act and, if the child is being 
educated in the regular classrooms of the public schools, 
reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing 
marks and advance from grade to grade. 
It is worthwhile observing that, in gauging the scope of these criteria, 
approximately 70 percent of school-aged handicapped children are now 
53 
being educated in regular public schools. 
52 
Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School 
District v. Rowley, 1981-82 EHLR DEC. 553:656, fn. 25. 
530SE, 2nd Annual Report to Congress, 1 EHLR 104:260. 
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Justice Rehnquist turned next to the second issue presented in 
the case: what is the scope of judicial review under Public Law 94-
54 
142? The school board had urged a very limited scope of review 
authority—that the courts have only limited power to review for state 
procedural compliance and no power to review the substance of a state 
program. The Rowleys contended that the courts exercise de novo 
review over both procedures and policies. Here, though he expressly 
rejected the school board's argument, Justice Rehnquist ultimately 
stated a position that is far closer to the school board's conclusion 
than it is to that of the Rowleys. 
He did this first by pointing to the importance Congress attached 
to the procedural safeguards, noting their detail and emphasis upon 
school/parent joint decision-making, and concluding that Congress 
believed the proper substantive result would be reached, in most cases, 
55 when the procedural safeguards were adhered to. 
In addition, he suggested that adherence to those safeguards, 
and the hearing process that flows from them, would be an exercise in 
futility if the result of those processes were not entitled to some 
5 fi 
deference upon judicial review. No doubt that observation has occur­
red to many special education administrators and their counsel. 
For these reasons, Justice Rehnquist concluded that courts are 
limited to two questions in reviewing suits brought under Public Law 
5420 U.S.C. SS 1415 (e) (2}. 
55Ibid. 
56Ibid. 
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94-142: 
1. Has the state complied with the procedures set forth in 
the act? 
2. Is the individualized education plan developed through the 
mandated procedures reasonably calculated to enable the 
child to receive educational benefits? 
"If these requirements are met, the state has complied with the obli­
gations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more."^ 
In weighing the impact of the Rowley decision, it is important, 
preliminarily, to note some factors that may appear obvious, but carry 
some special weight in this case. One of these is that Rowley is the 
first Supreme Court decision on Public Law 94-142 and the first inter­
pretation of a statute by the court is always of substantial importance 
and weight. The fact that the court addressed what can be characterized 
fairly as the "substantive heart" of the statute, of course, magnifies 
the importance of the decision. 
Similarly, the court's decision is controlling law for all lower 
courts, state and federal, asked to construe the federal statute. 
Accordingly, any plaintiff contending that a child is not receiving a 
free appropriate public education under Public Law 94-142 must show now 
either that the school district has not met the Rowley test or that the 
test does not apply. A school district can effectively minimize its 
liability by adhering to the procedural requirements of Public Law 94-
142. Whether there are any circumstances under which the Rowley test 
57 
Note 1, supra, at 553:656. 
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does not apply in construing the federal definition of FAPE remains to 
be seen; as of this time, they are not obvious. 
More intangibly, courts will be referred to, if they do not 
recall Justice Rehnquist's language concerning the respective roles of 
educators, parents, and the judiciary in making educational decisions. 
It has been noted, earlier in this analysis, that many judges would 
prefer not to become involved in education decision-making; Justice 
Rehnquist's language provides all the additional justification they 
require, if any. Those who are not so included will have to become far 
more creative in distinguishing Rowley and, even then, stand a far 
greater chance of being reversed on appeal. 
This writer feels that courts will be far less likely to delve 
into the substance of special education cases.^ They will look at 
administrative hearing decisions more charitably, giving more weight to 
59 
the hearing record. They will look, first and foremost, to the pro­
cedures followed by the school in arriving at a specific programming 
decision and, assuming that those procedures are adequate, will concur 
in the school's decision in most, if not all cases.®® In other words, 
they will follow Justice Rehnquist's direction to weigh the substantive 
outcome within procedural standards. 
58Ibid. 
59Ibid. 
60Ibid. 
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There is some evidence that this is already occurring. In 
Frank v. Grover,^ the court reviewed the evidence contained in the 
record of the due process and review hearings and, after noting that 
"tt)he Act as interpreted in Rowley does not require a discussion of 
the comparable benefits of an oral-only education versus those of a 
total coirmunication education," stated its conclusions in almost 
exactly the language used by Justice Rehnquist in defining the scope of 
62 
judicial review. 
However, even when a court, for one reason or another, more 
closely examines the substance of an education decision, the adequacy 
of the program being offered will be measured against the standard of 
"educational benefit" rather than "appropriateness." As has been 
previously suggested, that is no small difference. Most school board 
attorneys, to say nothing of special education administrators, will 
find it far easier to explain how a program will "benefit" a child, as 
distinguished from how the program is "appropriate" for the child. In 
the same manner, it should be far simpler to document a "reasonable 
calculation" of educational benefit; guaranteed success is not 
• j 63 required. 
Nevertheless, Rowley will increase the pressures on state educa­
tion systems to get their houses in order, at least in the short run. 
The first thing that is likely to occur is a shift of special education 
61 Current EHLR DEC. 554:148 (Cir. Ct. WI 1982). 
62Ibid at 554:152. 
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litigation from the federal to state courts. These suits will concen­
trate on rights provided by state, not federal, law because many state 
statutes conferring the right to special education are far more expan­
sive than Public Law 94-142. A recent state court decision noted, for 
example, the declaration of its state legislature that "the policy of 
the state is to ensure every child a fair and full opportunity to 
reach his full potential."^ It therefore distinguished Rowley and 
concluded that state law required that "a handicapped child should be 
given an opportunity to achieve his full potential commensurate with 
65 
that given other children." The statute of Arkansas similarly pro­
claims: "It shall be the responsibility of the school district and the 
state to provide the most appropriate services based on a careful 
r c  
evaluation of the child's needs." It seems reasonable to assume that 
similar "bombshell" language is contained in statutes of other states, 
waiting to be invoked. 
Finally, having raised the procedural safeguards to the status 
of "holy writ," it will be far more difficult in the future for courts, 
67 
state and federal, to excuse procedural violations. Thus far, no 
court has established a test for assessing the materiality of a proce­
dural violation, e.g., how serious must a procedural violation be 
64 
Harrell v. Wilson County Schools, Current EHLR DEC. 554:125 
(CT. Appls, NC 1982) at 554:127. 
66 
Arkansas Statute SS 81-2133; see also, In re Traverse Bay 
Area Intermediate School District (MI SEA 1982}, Current EHLR DEC, 
504:140 at 504:142. 
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g o  
before it fatally contaminates a substantive education decision? The 
importance which the Row!ey decision attributes to procedural matters 
will make this a far more pressing question. Adherence to mandated 
procedures will be examined from the top down and the search may include 
matters that have, thus far, been tolerated by SEP—such as impartial­
ity of hearing officers. 
On the balance, however, the Row!ey decision points the way for 
education systems. It remains to be seen whether the opportunity will 
be grasped. 
Related Services 
Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975,69 
a handicapped child is entitled to a free, appropriate public education 
consisting of special education and related services designed to meet 
the special needs of the handicapped child. The regulations define 
related services as including: 
transportation and such developmental, corrective, and other 
supportive services as are required to assist a handicapped child 
68But cf., Anderson v. Thompson, 1981-82 EHLR DEC. 553:105 
(CA-7 1981), in which the court held that an award of money damages is 
authorized by EHA in two exceptional circumstances, one of which is 
where the school district has "acted in bad faith by failing to comply 
with the procedural provisions of (20 U.S.C., SS 1415} in an egregious 
fashion." 1981-82 EHLR DEC. 553:110. The Anderson test, however, by 
its terms applies only to cases involving requests for money damages 
and, in addition, was formulated prior to the Rowley decision. It 
seems likely that a somewhat lesser standard wf11 be developed, to be 
used in cases attacking the substance of the education decision, as a 
result of the Rowley decision. 
6920 U.S.C., SS 1401, et seq. 
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to benefit from special education and includes speech pathology 
and audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational 
therapy, recreation, early identification and assessment of dis­
abilities in children, counseling services, and medical services 
for diagnostic and evaluation purposes. The term also includes 
school health services, social work services in the school, and 
parent counseling and training.'0 
Recently, school districts have had to confront changing inter­
pretations on how far the courts will go in including certain services 
to which a handicapped child may be entitled. The case of Tatro v. 
Texas^ provides a useful model to examine the nature of this problem. 
Amber Tatro is a four-year-old child with spina befida, causing 
her to suffer from both orthopedica and speech handicaps, along with a 
neurogenic bladder. Because of the neurogenic bladder, Amber cannot 
empty her bladder voluntarily and has to be catheterized every three 
or four hours to avoid developing chronic and possibly fatal kidney 
infection. The school district developed an Individualized Education 
Program ClEP). that was satisfactory to the parents in all respects 
but one. It failed to provide for the Clean Intermittent Catheteriza­
tion (CIC) to be administered to Amber during the school day. 
Amber's challenge to the school system's denial of the Clean 
Intermittent Catheterization in the federal district court was unsuc-
72 cessful. The court, although sympathizing with her plight, concluded 
that the Clean Intermittent Catheterization was not a related service 
7034 C.F.R. SS 300.13 Q980). 
71481 F. Supp. 1224 CN.D. Tex. 1979), rev'd, 625 F.2d 447 
CFifth Cir. 1980]L. 
^481 F. Supp. 1224. Suit was brought under 20 U.S.C. SS 1415 
(e) (2). 
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in the statutory sense because it did not arise from the effort to 
educate. The court pointed out that: 
. . . (t)here is a difference between maintenance of the life 
systems and enhancing a handicapped person's ability to learn, 
the Clean Intermittent Catheterization is essential to Amber's 
life, but once that life maintenance service is provided, it is 
unrelated to her learning skills.73 
Plaintiffs cannot convert a statute prohibiting discrimination 
in certain governmental programs to a statute requiring, in 
essence, the setting up of governmental health care for people 
seeking to participate in such programs.74 
However, in an opinion issued on September 2, 1980, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court and ruled that 
the school system was obligated to provide Clean Intermittent Catheteri­
zation as one of the related services to which the child was entitled.7^ 
The court reasoned that.Amber was entitled to a free, appropriate public 
education which should be provided in the regular classroom to the 
maximum extent possible.76 To accomplish this in Amber's case, it is 
necessary to provide catheterization while she is at school. Ergo, the 
catheterization is a "supportive service" that is required to assist a 
handicapped child to benefit from special education.77 
Following the Tatro decision, the United States Department of 
Education, on January 19, 1981, published a policy interpretation 
defining catheterization as a related service when it is required in 
73Id. at 1227. 
74Id. at 1229. 
75625 F.2d 447. 
76Id. at 563. 
77Id. at 563-64. 
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order to provide a free, appropriate public education in the least 
78 
restrictive environment. However, the effective date of the inter­
pretation was twice postponed by the Reagan Administration, first to 
79 
March 30, then to May 10. On May 8, the operative date of the inter-
Of) 
pretation was indefinitely postponed by the Department of Education. 
To forestall worries about the decision in Camenisch v. Univer-
81 
sity of Texas is worth noting. That case involved the question of 
whether or not an educational agency was required to provide a sign 
language interpreter for a deaf student at the post-secondary education 
level. The Fifth Circuit there affirmed the district court's ruling 
requiring the University of Texas to procure and pay for a qualified 
interpreter for a deaf student under the provisions of Section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. In doing so, the court distinguished 
QO 
the Supreme Court decision in Southeastern Community College v. Davis 
by pointing out that unlike Davis, a deaf person seeking admission to a 
nursing program, Camenisch was a fully qualified individual in that he 
could perform well in his profession in spite of his handicap. All he 
needed was the education and training that would allow him to continue. 
7846 Fed. Reg. 4912 (1981). 
7946 Fed. Reg. 12495; 46 Reg. 18975. 
8046 Fed. Reg. 25614. 
81 Id. at 535-6. 
82632 F2d at 948. 
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Residential Placement 
Closely associated with the concept of related services is the 
question of residential placement. The Handicapped Act regulations 
require that "if placement in a public or private residential program 
is necessary to provide special education and related services to the 
handicapped child, the program including nonmedical care and room and 
board, must be at no cost to the parents of the child. 
It might appear from this that before a school system would be 
obligated to pay for all of the costs of a residential placement, three 
determinations should have to be made: (1). that the child is handi­
capped and therefore entitled to special education and related services; 
(.2) that the child is in need of some type of residential placement; and 
(3) that the special education and related services cannot be provided 
without the residential placement. 
Instead, courts appear to be ordering school districts to pro­
vide residential placement if the need for such placement merely arises 
out of the handicap, as opposed to being necessary for educational 
84 purposes. 
OC 
In North v. District of Columbia Board of Education, a severely 
handicapped sixteen-year-old boy was determined by the school system's 
placement committee to be in need of a residential placement in order to 
83Dec. 15, 1980 ticket #80-1002). 
^616 F.2d 127 (.Fifth Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded on other 
grounds, U.S. , 101 S. Ct. 1830 (1981). 
85442 U.S. 397, 99 S. Ct. 2361 (1979). Cited at 616 F.2d at 132. 
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receive a free appropriate public education. The school system found 
such a placement after being ordered to do so by a hearing officer. 
However, problems developed and the placement became unavailable. 
The parents requested that the school system provide emergency residen­
tial placement until some other appropriate placement was found. The 
school system refused, contending that plaintiff's problems were emo­
tional, social, and otherwise noneducation, and that the school system 
should not be required to provide living arrangements that were not 
QC 
strictly of an educational nature. 
Possibly because the school system's own placement committee 
originally recommended the residential placement as being required or 
possibly because the school system had suggested that neglect proceed­
ings be initiated against the parents if they did not provide for their 
child, the district court refused to attempt to separate the social, 
emotional, medical, and educational problems to determine which one 
required the residential placement. Instead, the court assigned sole 
87 responsibility for the residential placement to the school board. 
The North decision was cited with approval by the district of 
88 
Delaware in the case of Kruelle v. Biggs. The Kruelle case, however, 
differed from North in that the school system had never recommended the 
residential placement, as was originally done in North. The school 
86C.F.R. SS 300.302. 
87 
See North v. District of Columbia Board of Education, 471 F. 
Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1979): Kruelle v. Biggs, 489 F. Supp. 169 CD. Del. 
1980). 
88471 F. Supp. 136. 
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system had developed appropriate services and treatments in the Indi­
vidualized Education Program CIEP)> a fact that parents did not dis­
pute. The parents simply were claiming that their son required a 
residential placement as part of the individualized education program. 
The court stated the issue as "not whether (.the current placement) is 
adequate for what it offers, but whether Paul (Kruelle) requires more 
continuous care than that available in a six-hour school day in order 
to learn."89 
Although the court appropriately framed the issue in terms of 
whether or not the residential placement was required in order for the 
child to learn, the decision apparently was based upon the testimony of 
a doctor of osteopathy, who had not testified at the original hearing. 
This doctor, who was also the child psychiatrist consulted by the 
parents, had testified that what Paul needed was "an around-the-clock 
placement with programming by people who know how to do it in order to 
90 
maximize Paul's chances of learning." Maximizing chances" to learn 
was a standard ostensibly rejected although actually followed in the 
91 
Rowley case. But the court here ruled that it was "evident that Paul 
will realize his learning potential only if he receives more profes-
92 sional help than the Meadowwood School's day program can offer him." 
89Id. at 140. 
90Id. at 142. 
91489 F. Supp. at 173. 
92Id. at 172. 
87 
It is important to note that sympathy may have played a part in 
these decisions. For example, in the Kruelle case, not only did the 
child have extremely severe emotional and physical problems, but he was 
93 
also being represented by his parents. This sympathy factor is real 
and can be difficult to overcome. 
What happens when the residential placement is ordered and the 
school system does not have the money to fund the placement? In Hines 
95 
v. Pitt County Board of Education, the court pointed out that state 
and local school officials had suggested that they could not afford 
the up to $1,850.00 per month tuition that might be required to imple­
ment a residential placement. But because the state had volunteered to 
participate in the Handicapped Act program, the court found that it had 
96 to comply with, the requirements. If there was a money shortage, the 
burden could not be allowed to fall on one single child or group of 
97 children, but should be spread equally to all children in the system. 
93Id. at 173. 
94 See notes 15-19, supra. 
95489 F. Supp. at 173-74, (N.D. Ind. 1979). 
96Ibid. 
97 Paul had been described as a profoundly retarded child whose 
physical development was further complicated by cerebral palsy. At 
age 12, he could not walk, dress himself, or eat unaided . . . was not 
toilet trained . . . did not speak, and his receptive communication 
level was extremely low. In addition to his physical problems, he had 
a history of emotional problems which resulted in choking and self-
induced vomiting when experiencing stress. 
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Discipline 
One area that generates much interest and concern is the disci­
pline of handicapped students. What should be done with a handicapped 
student who commits an act of misconducts which, if committed by a 
nonhandicapped student, would result in expulsion? 
98 
In Doe v. Koger, an Indiana district court ruled that the 
Handicapped Act did not prohibit expulsions of handicapped children in 
general, but rather, "only prohibits the expulsion of handicapped 
99 children who are disruptive because of their handicap." The court 
ruled that the change in placement procedures of the Handicapped Act 
should be utilized to determine whether or not the handicap is the 
cause of the child's propensity to disrupt.100 Unfortunately, though, 
the court did not stop there. Seemingly unknowingly, the court shifted 
from determining whether or not the handicap is a cause of the miscon­
duct to requiring that a determination be made as to whether the stu­
dent's misconduct was a result of an inappropriate placement, saying 
that "when a handicapped child is involved, expulsion must not be pur­
sued until after it has been determined that the handicapped child has 
been appropriately placed."101 
98471 F. Supp. at 138, 140 (N.D. Cal. 1979}. For example, in 
North the court felt it would not serve the child's best interests to 
institute neglect proceedings against his parents who refused to accept 
him after he was discharged from his original placement. 
99497 F. Supp. 403 (E.D.N.C. 1980). 
100Id. at 408. See also Mills v. Board of Education of the Dis­
trict of Columbia, 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972). 
101480 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind. 1979). 
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In Stuart v. Nappi102 and S-1 v. Turlington J03 federal district 
courts for Connecticut and Florida, respectively, have ruled that 
expulsions of handicapped students must be treated as a change in place­
ment and must be accomplished by following the change in placement pro­
cedures outlined under the Act and its regulations and keeping in mind 
the requirement of the least restrictive environment J^ The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has affirmed the district court's ruling in 
S-1 v. Turlington.105 
The S-1 case involved seven educable mentally retarded children 
who were expelled from school for separate unrelated acts of misconduct. 
The acts included threats to teachers and other students, vandalism, and 
sexual misconduct in class. All of these expelled students were 
afforded the procedural protections required by Goss v. Lopez J 
In only one case did a student raise his handicap as a defense in 
the expulsion proceedings J0'' Based upon the testimony presented to 
them, the school board made a determination in the discipline hearing 
that S-1 knew and understood the rules, understood the consequences of 
violating the rules and had handicaps which were not behavioral in 
102Ibid. 
103Ibid. 
104Id. at 229. 
105Ibid. 
106Ibid. 
^See Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235 CD. Conn. 1978) and 
S-1 v. Turlington, 3 EHLR 551:211 CS.D. Fla. 1979}„ aff'd, 635 F.2d 
342 (5th Cir. 1981), petition for certiorari filed April 22, 1981, 
Docket #80-1770. 
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nature. They concluded that S-l's handicap of being mentally retarded 
was not the cause of his misconduct. 
In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that the district 
court had refused to determine whether a handicapped student can ever 
108 be expelled. The appellate court refused to dodge the question 
because of the "gray areas" that might result if the question were 
left unanswered and held that "expulsion is still a proper disciplinary 
tool under the Education for All Handicapped Act CEHA) and Section 504 
109 when proper procedures are utilized and under proper circumstances." 
What then are the proper circumstances under which a handicapped 
child may be expelled? The school district in S-l argued that expulsion 
of a handicapped child would be appropriate where the handicap was not 
a behavioral handicap or where the child possessed sufficient intelli­
gence to understand rules and comply with them. For example, if a child 
is seriously emotionally disturbed, then the child's misconduct might 
very well be a manifestation of the handicap itself. To expel the child 
under those circumstances would be punishing the child for the child's 
handicap. Also, it would not be appropriate to expel a child who was 
profoundly retarded and did not have the ability to understand rules 
and whose compliance or noncompliance with such rules would be a random 
occurrence as opposed to an intentional actJ^ 
108635 F2d 352 (Fifth Cir. 1981). 
109419 U.S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975), cited at 635 F2d at 344. 
^°Id. at 344. Except for S-l, the students were not given, nor 
did they request, hearings to determine whether their misconduct was a 
manifestation of their handicap. 
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On the other hand, if the handicapped child was simply orthopedi-
cally impaired, mildly mentally retarded, visually impaired, hearing 
impaired, speech impaired, or simply had a specific learning disability, 
then there would be no reason why such a child could not comply with 
the rules just like any other child. If such a handicapped child 
committed an act which, if done by a nonhandicapped child, would result 
in the expulsion of that child, then expulsion would also be appropriate 
for the handicapped child. The school district argued that the fact of 
being handicapped does not exempt or immunize the handicapped child from 
the normal discipline procedures of the school except in the two cir­
cumstances already mentioned J^ 
The Fifth Circuit, in rejecting the school district's position, 
relied in part on the testimony of a clinical psychologist testifying 
on behalf of plaintiffs. The psychologist had testified at the hearing 
that: 
a connection between the misconduct upon which the expulsions 
were based and the plaintiff's handicap may have existed . . . 
a child with a low intellectual function and perhaps the lessen­
ing of control would respond to stress or respond to a threat 
in the only way they feel adequate, which may be verbal aggres­
sive behavior.ll2 
The court also noted the psychologist's example of an orthopedi-
cally impaired child who would provoke fights notwithstanding the fact 
that he is likely to lose. She indicated that would be his way of 
112Id. at 347. 
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dealing with stress and feelings of physical vulnerability, and in that 
113 
sense the misconduct was connected to the handicap. 
Apparently, the proper circumstances where expulsion would be 
available with respect to a handicapped child would be when it is 
determined that the student's misconduct does not bear a relationship 
to his handicapping condition. This determination cannot be made by 
the school board but must be made by a trained and knowledgeable group 
114 of persons. But it would seem that to rule out expulsion, all the 
child really needs is a psychologist that will testify that the child 
may have been frustrated because of the handicapping condition, and 
that this might have caused him to act inappropriately in a stressful 
situation.^5 
If a connection is established, then expulsion of a handicapped 
student would not be appropriate. On the other hand, if there is no 
connection between the handicapping condition and a given misconduct, 
then expulsion would be appropriate following the proper procedures. 
Because the court specifically ruled that expulsion is a change in 
educational placement, proper procedures would be the change in place­
ment procedures found under the act and its regulations, not the Goss v. 
Lopez due process procedures for discipline in ordinary situations. In 
other words, there is a dual discipline system for expulsion depending 
,13id. 
1,4Id. at 350. 
115Ibid. 
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upon whether the child is handicapped or not. The court said that: 
unlike any other disruptive child, before a disruptive handi­
capped child can be expelled, it must be determined whether 
the handicap is the cause of the child's propensity to dis­
rupt. This issue must be determined through the change of 
placement procedures required by the handicapped actJ^ 
The fact of this dual discipline system is even more readily 
apparent in light of the Fifth Circuit's final clarifying statement 
with respect to expulsion of handicapped students. Although the court 
ruled that expulsion was still a proper disciplinary tool for a handi­
capped student under proper circumstances and following proper proce­
dures, the court also stated that it could not "authorize the complete 
cessation of educational services during an expulsion period.^ A 
student, through his or her own misconduct, can lose the right to 
receive educational services, just as a student might lose any other 
valuable right, including liberty, as a result of misconduct. But the 
Handicapped Act seems to have created a right that can never be lost. 
Apparently, the court is saying that a handicapped student can be 
expelled so long as you do not really expel him. 
The effect of this ruling is still unclear. For example, what 
is a school's responsibility when, for appropriate cause, it decides to 
expel a student that it has no reason to believe is handicapped, but 
the student subsequently asserts that the misconduct in question is the 
result of an undiagnosed handicap? Need the school comply with S-l or 
can it follow its normal expulsion process? In Florida, within one 
^®Id. at 348, citing Doe v. Krueger, 480 F. Supp. at 229. 
117Id. at 348. 
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week of the Fifth Circuit's decision, a sixteen-year-old eleventh grade 
student stabbed another student during a fight over a boy friend on a 
school bus. The school board had started expulsion procedures when the 
attorney who had represented S-l appeared with a copy of the Fifth 
Circuit opinion. Although the student had never been classified as 
handicapped, the attorney contended that the student might have an 
undiagnosed learning disability and if so, it would not be appropriate 
to expel the student. The school board had no choice but to agree to 
postpone the expulsion decision pending the outcome of the testing 
evaluation. 
The position taken in S-l is in agreement with the position 
suggested by the Department of Education in December of 1980 on what 
process is due under Section 504 when it becomes necessary to expel a 
118 student who is handicapped. The department's position is that in 
expelling a handicapped child, a determination must first be made on 
whether there is a relationship between a student's misconduct and the 
student's handicap. The department is presently deciding whether or 
not to issue a regulation dealing with this subject. 
Testing Bias 
Another area of concern is charges of testing bias. In Larry P. 
119 
v. Riles plaintiffs were black students who claimed that the IQ 
tests used by defendant were biased and that the defendant discriminated 
11845 Fed. Reg. 85082, 85083. 
119495 F. Supp. 926 (n.d. Cal. 1979L 
95 
against blacks by using them. They alleged that the tests resulted in 
the misplacement of black children in special classes for the educable 
120 
mentally retarded. In reaching its decision, the court accepted 
expert testimony concerning the discriminatory nature of certain IQ 
tests. 
However, in Parents in Action on Special Education (PASE) v. 
121 Hannon, the court was not impressed with testing experts concerning 
the impact of the testing, but rather, wanted to review each and every 
question on the challenged test to determine which ones were in fact 
1 22 discriminatory and how. During this process, the court found that 
many of the attorneys and experts involved had not even read the ques-
123 
tions. After reviewing all of the questions, they found that only 
124 nine of them should not be used because of bias. 
The court also rejected plaintiffs' claim that the school dis­
trict must prove that the tests are not biased, ruling instead that the 
school system only needs to show that the total process used was free 
n- f  Kiac 125 of bias. 
120Id. at 931. 
121506 F Supp. 831 CN.D. 111. 1980). 
122Id. at 837. 
123Id. 
124Id. at 875. 
125Id. at 880. 
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In 1979, the District Court for the Eastern Dfstritt of 
126 
Pennsylvania ruled in Armstrong v. Kline, that a Pennsylvania 
blanket prohibition against educational programs for the handicapped 
extending beyond the normal 180-day school year violated the Handi­
capped Act. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has upheld the 
1 27 
district court's determination, although it should be emphasized 
that this case does not require that all mentally retarded children be 
provided with year-round school, but simply that there not be a prohi­
bition against it in case an individual cffild is determined to be in 
need of such year-round school. On June 22, 1981, the Supreme Court 
128 denied a motion for certiorari in the case. 
Fees 
When, if ever, is a prevailing plaintiff in a special education 
case entitled to attorney's fees? It has generally been assumed that 
fees are unavailable in cases brought solely under the Education for All 
Handicapped Act (EHA), which contains no express fee provision. How­
ever, plaintiffs who assert Education for All Handicapped Act claims 
often raise related or parallel claims under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 504 of the 
126476 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1979) aff'd, 629 F2d 269 (3d cir. 
1980). 
127629 F2d 269. 
12849 U.S.L.W. 3949. 
1 29 
Rehabilitation Act (Section 504). In such cases, fees are often 
sought pursuant to two related statutes: The Civil Rights Attorney's 
Fee Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, which authorizes fees to private 
paties who prevail in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and 
131 
Section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act which provides for fees for 
successful private claimants under Section 504. 
The question of whether to allow fee awards in such cases has 
bedeviled the courts, which have sometimes approved the practice and 
132 sometimes found it contrary to Congressional intent. Now, in 
Smith v. Robinson, the Supreme Court has concluded that fees are gener­
ally unavailable under Section 1988 or Section 505 for claims that fall 
within the scope of the Education for All Handicapped Act. However, 
the court has also suggested that this general rule may not apply to 
certain special education claims, particularly those concerning pro­
cedural irregularities in the special education system. 
129 
29 U.S.C. Sec. 794. The statute prohibits, inter alia, dis­
crimination against handicapped persons in federally assisted programs 
and the exclusion of handicapped persons from such programs. 
130 Section 1983 provides a cause of action to any person 
deprived under color of state law of rights secured by the Constitu­
tion or laws of the United States. 
13129 U.S.C. Sec. 794a. 
^Compare e.g., Monahan v. Nebrasks, 1983-83 EHLR DEC. 554:140 
(8th Cir. 1982) and Espino v. Besteiro, 1983-84 EHLR DEC. 555:145 
(5th Cir. 1983) with Timms v. Metropolitan School Dist., 1983-84 EHLR 
DEC. 555:178 (7th Cir. 1983) and Department of Education v. Katherine 
D., 1983-84 EHLR DEC 555:276 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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Interagency Responsibilities 
Tommy Smith, a physically and emotionally handicapped child, was 
placed by his school district in a special education program. Subse­
quently, the district decided that the state mental health agency was 
responsible for the education of children with such multiple handicaps. 
The district accordingly announced that it would no longer educate 
Tommy and that his parents, the Smiths, should seek services from mental 
health authorities—who had no program available for Tommy at the time 
and could not have provided him with free services in any event. 
Tommy's parents filed an administrative appeal with the school 
district concerning its decision to terminate Tommy's program. In 
addition, they filed suit in federal court under Section 1983, arguing 
that the Due Process Clause prohibited the district from terminating 
the program before a decision had been reached on the administrative 
133 appeal. The court agreed and issued a preliminary injunction against 
such termination. 
The district decided the administrative appeal adversely to 
Tommy, and state education officials upheld the decision. The Smiths 
then amended their federal court complaint, joining the state officials 
as defendants and alleging additional claims. These claims were that 
Tommy's exclusion from public education on the basis of his multiple 
handicaps would violate his rights under the Education for All 
133 
These events predated the effective date of the 1975 amend­
ments to the Education for All Handicapped Act, which included a pro­
vision preventing districts from terminating a child's program during 
the pendency of an administrative appeal. 20 U.S.C. Section 1415 (e) 
(3). 
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Handicapped Act, The Equal Protection Clause, Section 504, and state 
law. The parents also alleged that the handling of their administra­
tive appeal had violated the Due Process Clause and the Education for 
All Handicapped Act because the decision-makers had been employees of 
the district and of the state education agency. Section 1983 was 
invoked as the basis for the new equal protection and due process 
claims. 
The court ruled for Tommy on the central issue of the case, 
holding that he could not be excluded from public education services.^ 
On the issue of the impartiality of the administrative proceedings, the 
court decided in favor of the defendants. 
The court then approved an agreed award of attorney's fees 
against the school district for the work done in securing the prelimi­
nary injunction. The court also awarded fees against the state defen­
dants for most of the work done in the administrative hearings and in 
court following the entry of the preliminary injunction. This fee award 
was based on Section 1988, the court reasoning that the plaintiffs 
had asserted a substantial equal protection claim via Section 1983 and 
obtained—albeit on other grounds—the relief that they sought. 
The award of fees against the state defendants was reversed by 
135 
the Court of Appeals. That court noted that the plaintiffs' 
134 
Before reaching this conclusion, the court certified to the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court the question of whether the district was 
required under state law to educate Tommy. That court answered in the 
affirmative, Smith v. Cumberland School Committee, 1979-80 EHLR DEC. 
551:639 (Sup. Ct. RI 1980). 
^Smith v. Cumberland School Committee, 1982-83 EHLR DEC. 554: 
431 Ost Cir. 1983}. 
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constitutional claims were factually identical to claims raised under 
the Education for All Handicapped Act. To allow attorneys' fees under 
Section 1988 in such circumstances, the court held, would defeat the 
Congressional intent evidenced by the omission of an express fee pro­
vision from the Education for All Handicapped Act. The Court of Appeals 
also held, for similar reasons, that the award could not be justified 
under Section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act. 
Supreme Court Proceedings 
In the Supreme Court, the Smiths argued that they were entitled 
136 to fees under the court's unanimous decision in Maher v. Gagne. 
Maher authorized fees under Section 1988 where a plaintiff raises a 
substantial Constitutional claim and obtains relief, even if that 
relief is awarded on a nonconstitutional theory. In addition, they 
argued that they entitled to fees under Section 505 of the Rehabilita­
tion Act because they had asserted a substantial claim under Section 
504. Respondent officials countered—in a literacy tone rarely found 
in Supreme Court briefs—that fees should be denied because "the so-
called Constitutional claim is nothing but a simulacrum of the Education 
for All Handicapped Act, and the claim under Section 504 of the Rehabil­
itation Act is nothing but a spectral avatar of the very same Education 
for All Handicapped Act claim. Petitioners are simply attempting to 
do Indirectly what they can't do directly." 
136448 U.S. 122 (1980) . 
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In a 6-3 opinion by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court sided 
with the defendants. First, the court held that the Smiths had not 
advanced a viable equal protection claim under Section 1983 in the 
court below. This was because that claim was factually identical to 
the Education for All Handicapped Act cause of action. The court 
reasoned that if special education plaintiffs could pursue equal pro­
tection claims under Section 1983, which does not require exhaustion of 
administrative remedies, they could thereby evade the Education for All 
Handicapped Act's elaborate procedures for Individualized Education 
Plan development and for administrative review. This, the court held, 
would defeat Congress' intent that the rights, remedies and procedures 
available with respect to such claims be those specified in the Educa­
tion for All Handicapped Act be "the exclusive avenue through which a 
plaintiff may assert an equal protection claim to a publicly financed 
special education." Accordingly, Section 1983 was not available for 
enforcement of the Smiths' equal protection claim, and fees under 
Section 1988 could not be awarded. 
The court took a different view of the Smiths' due process 
claims. The court did not question that Section 1983 had been avail­
able to assert the first of these claims, i.e., that Tommy's program 
could not be terminated during the pendency of his administrative 
appeal. However, the Smiths had already recovered attorney's fees for 
the work done on this claim, which had resulted in the preliminary 
injunction. And, according to the court, this due process claim was 
"entirely separate" from the subsequent proceedings to establish 
Tommy's entitlement to educational services; therefore, the Smiths' 
102 
success in obtaining the preliminary injunction did not justify an 
additional award for the remainder of the litigation. 
The court reached a similar conclusion regarding the second due 
process claim, which related to the impartiality of the administrative 
proceedings. In dicta that future plaintiffs should find useful, the 
court suggested that section 1983 could indeed be used as a vehicle for 
such challenges to the adequacy of the administrative procedures estab­
lished pursuant to the Education for All Handicapped Act. In this case, 
however, the procedural claim was distinct from the access-to-education 
claim on which most of the litigation had focused. Therefore, even if 
the Smiths had prevailed on the issue of the impartiality of the admin­
istrative proceedings (which they had not), that success would not have 
supported a fee award for the entire litigation. 
Finally, the court addressed the Smiths' argument that, having 
stated a substantial claim under Section 504, they were entitled to 
fees under Section 505. The court acknowledged that the regulations 
under Section 504 require the provision of an appropriate education to 
a handicapped child. But, the court asserted, "it is only in the Educa­
tion for All Handicapped Act that Congress specified the rights and 
remedies available to a handicapped child seeking access to public 
education." It followed, according to the court, that Congress intended 
only those remedies and procedures specified in the Education for All 
Handicapped Act to be available to plaintiffs seeking special education 
services. But Section 504 does not contain an exhaustion requirement, 
and (in conjunction with Section 505) it offers relief unavailable under 
the Education for All Handicapped Act—i.e., attorney's fees and in some 
103 
cases damages that the Education for All Handicapped Act would not 
authorize.^ Therefore, the court concluded, Section 504 was not 
available to a plaintiff whose claim could be asserted under the Educa­
tion for All Handicapped Act, and Section 505 fees were therefore also 
barred.^ 
Comments and Implications 
Smith has important implications for special education and may 
prove significant in other areas of law as well. First, attorney's 
fees are now unavailable under the Education for All Handicapped Act, 
Section 1988, or Section 505 in the majority of special education cases, 
i.e., those seeking access to special education services or challenging 
a particular program or placement. On the other hand, it appears that 
Section 1983 can be invoked and Section 1988 fees awarded for claims 
that an education agency followed defective procedures with respect to 
a handicapped child. • 
The court's holding with respect to Section 1988 was not based 
on any new interpretation of that statute.^ It rested instead on the 
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The court noted that damages have generally been held to be 
available under the EHA in "exceptional circumstances," citing such 
cases as Anderson v. Thompson, 1981-82 EHLR DEC. 553:105 (7th Cir. 
1981). 
1 "38 
The court did indicate that a Section 504 claim would be per­
mitted in a case "where Section 504 guarantees substantive rights 
greater than those available under the EHA." Presumably, such cases 
might include, e.g., instances in which a child qualifies as "handi­
capped" under Section 504.but not under the EHA, and cases in which the 
state in question does not receive EHA funds. 
139 
Thus, the court avoided expressly modifying or overruling the 
holding of Maher v. Gagne, supra. 
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court's conclusion that equal protection claims to educational services 
cannot be raised under Section 1983. This represents a dramatic exten­
sion of the doctrine set forth three years ago in Middlesex County 
Sewage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association,^0 where the 
court held that by enacting a federal statute that contained its own 
comprehensive enforcement scheme, Congress intended to preclude the use 
of Section 1983 to enforce that same statute. The holding in Smith, by 
contrast, is that by enacting a comprehensive statute on special educa­
tion, Congress intended to preclude the use of Section 1983 to enforce 
certain Constitutional rights in that area—a proposition that might 
surprise those who voted on the Education for All Handicapped Act, not 
a single one of whom stated at the time that such was his or her intent. 
To be sure, the Section 1983 holding may not make much differ­
ence to special education plaintiffs except on the issue of attorney's 
fees. Much of the other relief that might have been secured under the 
Equal Protection Clause is available under the Education for All Handi-
141 capped Act. But the holding carries ominous implications for other 
areas of the law, since it shows that the court is willing to find, on 
relatively meager evidence, that Congress intended to circumscribe the 
enforcement of Constitutional rights. 
140453 U.S. .1 (1981). 
^41While Smith forecloses the possibility of obtaining damages 
on an equal protection theory, that possibility probably only existed 
where an intentional deprivation of rights could be shown, in such 
cases, a court might find "exceptinal circumstances" sufficient to 
justify a damage award under the EHA. See n. 10, supra. 
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The Section 1983 holding is also remarkable for the argument on 
which it is based. Because exhaustion is not required under Section 
1983, the court reasons, and because Congress intended that exhaustion 
be required iri special education cases, Section 1983 must be inappli­
cable to such claims. It would be equally logical to fix a leaky roof 
by blowing up the house. If the Education for All Handicapped Act 
and Section 1983 conflict on the issue of exhaustion, the proper 
approach—as Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens argue in dissent-
is to construe the later statute not as repealing the earlier act 
entirely but as amending it to the extent necessary to resolve the con­
flict. If this well-settled rule were followed, the substantive 
guarantees of Section 1983 would be preserved, subject only to an 
exhaustion requirement in cases where Education for All Handicapped Act 
procedures are available. 
Moreover, the Education for All Handicapped Act is a Spending 
Clause enactment that applies only in states which have accepted 
federal special education funds. While all fifty states currently 
accept those funds, such has not always been true and will not neces­
sarily be true in the future. If a state opts out of the program, will 
plaintiffs in the state regain the right to assert equal protection 
claims under Section 1983 and to receive fee awards if they prevail? 
Congress surely did not intend to make Section 1983 remedies available 
on a state-by-state basis, but such results (or others equally anoma­
lous) appear to follow from the court's holding in Smith. 
The court's conclusion with respect to Section 505 is also 
problematic. In concluding that the relief sought for Tommy was 
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"specifically required only by the Education for All Handicapped Act," 
the court overlooked the language of Section 504 itself, which prohibits 
"exclusion" on the basis of handicap. It is difficult to imagine how 
Congress could have spoken more "specifically" to a case such as 
Tommy's. Furthermore, like its holding that Section 1983 may not be 
used to assert equal protection claims to special education, the court's 
partial abrogation of Section 504 in the special education area is an 
act of overkill. The conflict between Section 504 and the Education 
for All Handicapped Act on the issue of exhaustion should be resolved 
by construing the former to require exhaustion in special education 
cases rather than by curbing its substantive guarantees. And the con­
flict, if any exists, between the Education for All Handicapped Act and 
Section 505 on the issue of fees should be resolved by giving effect to 
Section 505, which was enacted three years later than the Education for 
All Handicapped Act. 
Ultimately, Smith seems to rest more on a practical concern than 
on legal logic. That concern, which figures prominently in the opinion, 
is the "financial burden" that the education system might incur if it 
had to pay the lawyer's fees of those who win cases against it. One 
problem with the decision, of course, is that the court has merely 
transferred the burden to parents, who are even less able to absorb it. 
Even routine special education litigation involves legal costs in the 
thousands of dollars; while such costs may be substantial for a school 
system, they are overwhelming for parents already burdened with extra­
ordinary expenses for medical care, psychological treatment, therapies, 
and the 1 ike. 
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The further problem, however, is that Congress has already 
weighed these competing interests and made its choice. That choice, 
clearly expressed in two statutes enacted well after the Education for 
All Handicapped Act, was to authorize fee awards to prevailing plain­
tiffs in cases raising claims under Sections 1983 and 504. Congress 
set forth in these statutes no exception for cases raising claims to 
special education services, nor was any exception discussed. 
The tortured reasoning of Smith was thus necessary only because 
a more straightforward analysis would have produced a result that the 
court did not desire. Apart from its immediate significance for special 
education plaintiffs, therefore, the court's outcome-oriented approach 
is a troublesome precedent in its own right. It also stands as yet 
142 
another example of the "voracious appetite for judicial activism' of 
a court that swears allegiance to a philosophy of judicial restraint. 
Summary 
The following cases were selected because they speak specifically 
to problem areas in special education that often arise from parents 
seeking additional services and school districts objecting. 
The question of residential placement was addressed in Appeal v. 
143 Ambach. Because of deteriorating home situation between herself and 
her severely emotionally disturbed child, mother transferred her child 
from a local school system program to a 24-hour residential facility, 
142 Stevens, J., dissenting from order in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
No. 83-712, 52 U.S.L.W. 3935 (July 5, 1984). 
l43Current EHLR DEC. 554:236 (SD NY 1982). 
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without knowledge or consent of local school system or its Committee on 
the Handicapped. The Committee on the Handicapped subsequently denied 
the mother's request to fund this placement because it was unilaterally 
and not primarily for educational reasons. The due process hearing 
officer concluded that placement was "the more approrpiate one" for the 
child; he ordered local school system to pay for placement for the 
current year but not for the prior year because of unilateral action. 
On appeal, the state level hearing reversed the hearing officer's deci­
sion, finding that the local school system had offered an appropriate 
nonresidential placement. However, because the residential school was 
in the public school district that the child was entitled to attend 
under state law, State Education Agency found that residential school 
was required to admit the child and that local school system was obli­
gated to pay the child's tuition, though not her maintenance. The 
mother sought review of State Education Agency decision in court, moving 
for summary judgment; defendants cross-moved to dismiss for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for summary judg­
ment. On referral, the magistrate recommended that all motions be 
denied and that the court had subject matter jurisdiction. 
It was held that motions of parties to dismiss or for summary 
judgment are denied; the case was dismissed without prejudice to the 
plaintiff and remanded to the State Education Agency. 
Although the claim under Education for All Handicapped Act arose 
prior to the effective date of the Act, the motion to dismiss for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction must be denied where, under law of the 
circuit, retroactive application of the Act is warranted. The decision 
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by the Committee on the Handicapped and State Education Agency on edu­
cational program for handicapped child without complying with mandated 
procedural safeguards of Education for All Handicapped Act—e.g., con­
duct evaluation of the child, notify the mother of her right to present 
information concerning placement, and prepare the Individualized Educa­
tion Plan—precludes the court from making a de novo finding on an 
appropriate program; accordingly, action to review the State Education 
Agency decision is dismissed without prejudice and remanded to the 
State Education Agency with directions that procedural safeguards can 
be complied with. 
The question of summer programming was addressed in Birmingham 
and Lampshere School Districts v. Superintendent of Public Instruction 
144 for the State of Michigan. The school district discontinued the 
summer program when a request for funding was denied. The parent of a 
handicapped child, who had been in summer program for five years, 
requested due process hearing. The hearing officer found that the pro­
gram was required to meet a child's needs. The school district appealed 
to the State Board of Education, asking who the state-level hearing 
officer would be and when briefs must be filed, but was never notified. 
A state-level decision affirmed the hearing officer's decision. The 
school district then filed civil action in state court, alleging that 
procedures violated due process requirements, that the hearing officer's 
decision was not supported by the evidence, and that implementation of 
the summer program would violate the state constitutional provision. 
144Current EHLR DEC. 554:318 (CA-6 1982). 
110  
The trial court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. The 
lower court decision was affirmed. 
The trial court did not commit a reversible error in refusing to 
remand cause to the state hearing officer for written and oral arguments 
since, under applicable state and federal law, 34 CFR 300.510, the deci-
to allow an opportunity for oral or written argument is left entirely 
to the state hearing officer's discretion. 
The local hearing officer properly concluded that the proposed 
summer enrichment activities, essentially noninstructional in nature-
camping, field trips, swimming, other sports, playground and recrea­
tional activities, gardening and work skills training—fall within the 
broad definitions of "special education" and "related services" as 
defined in the Education for All Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. 1401 (16). 
and 07). 
State regulations providing for a minimum of 180 days of instruc­
tion per year do not preclude educational programs in excess of 180 
days; moreover, since state regulations expressly confer upon local 
districts the authority to provide additional programs and services, 
state law provides some basis for a hearing officer's decision to 
require an educational program in excess of 180 days. 
A state constitutional amendment precluding a state's mandating 
of a "new activity or service" by local governmental units without con-
commitant state appropriation to pay the costs thereof does not excuse 
local school district from providing summer enrichment program required 
by federal law. 
I l l  
The question of minimum competency testing was addressed in 
Brookhart v. Illinois State Board of Education.^45 Appeal from federal 
district court decision, 1981-82 EHLR DEC. 553:595, holding that handi­
capped students who failed minimum competency test because they had not 
been educated in the subject matter of the test are not denied due 
process of law where the lack of exposure results from a determination, 
in preparing the students' Individualized Education Plan, that subject 
matter is inappropriate in view of students' handicapping conditions. 
The lower court decision was reversed. 
Denial of diplomas to handicapped children who have been receiv­
ing the special education and related services required by Education for 
All Handicapped Act, but are unable to achieve the educational level 
necessary to pass a minimum competency test, is not a denial of a free 
appropriate public education. 
Use of minimum competency tests does not violate requirement of 
Education for All Handicapped Act that no single procedure shall be the 
sole criterion for determining an appropriate educational program for 
a child, 20 U.S.C. 1412(5) (c), 34 CFR 300.532, where the test is but 
one of three requirements a child must fulfill in order to graduate. 
Denial of a diploma to a student because of a student's inability 
to pass a minimum competency test does not violate 504 because such a 
student is not an individual who is qualified in spite of his handicap; 
moreover, altering the content of minimum competency tests to accommo­
date a student's inability to learn the tested material because of his 
145Current EHLR DEC. 553:595 (CA-7 1983). 
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handicap would be a "substantial modification," as well as a "perver­
sion," of the diploma requirement. 
Students have liberty interest in a diploma insufficient to 
invoke the procedural protections of the due process clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; thus denying students ade­
quate notice of any new diploma requirement, e.g., sufficient time to 
prepare for new diploma requirements, is fundamentally unfair and 
violates due process clause. 
The question of filing suits simultaneously in federal and state 
courts was addressed in Coe v. Michigan Department of Education.^ 
Objecting to a proposed change of placement, parents pursued, but lost, 
administrative proceedings, in the course of which the program which 
they preferred was discontinued. They appealed to the state court which 
failed to issue a decision for two years. Because of this failure, the 
parents filed suit in federal court, which agreed to take jurisdiction 
if the state court decision was not issued within two weeks of the 
parents' pursuit of other state court remedies. When the state court 
finally issued its decision, the federal court dismissed the parents' 
complaint on grounds that plaintiffs had chosen to litigate in state 
court and could not simultaneously litigate in federal court. Parents 
appealed this dismissal. The district court's dismissal is affirmed. 
Language of Education for All Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. 1415(e) 
(2), clearly indicates Congressional intention that plaintiffs should 
not be permitted to litigate simultaneously in federal and state courts. 
146EHLR DEC. 554:252 (CA-6 1982). 
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Where claims asserted in federal action arise basically out of 
the same factual situation that is the subject of state proceedings, 
and are against essentially the same parties, the plaintiffs' failure 
to assert additional claims in a state court does not give a federal 
court jurisdiction to decide issues, and a suit is barred by res 
judicata. 
The question of being able to recover damages was addressed in 
Davis v. Maine Endwell Central School District J^ The action chal­
lenged the classification and placement of a child as emotionally 
handicapped. A previous motion for a preliminary injunction, the effect 
of which would be to change the child's placement, was denied for 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and that denial was upheld 
on appeal. Plaintiffs withdrew their claim for injunctive relief prior 
to trial because of their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
On the remaining claims for monetary damages for alleged violations of 
the Education for All Handicapped Act, Rehabilitation Act, and the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the court granted 
defendants' motion to dismiss all claims except for claim under First 
Amendment. Trial resulted in a jury verdict of $50,000.00 for plain­
tiffs. The opinion which follows sets forth the court's justification 
for granting motions to dismiss other claims for monetary damages. It 
was held that monetary damages may not be recovered for violations of 
Education for All Handicapped Act, Rehabilitation Act, or Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
147EHLR DEC. 554:101 (ND Ny 19821. 
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Monetary damages are not recoverable under Education for All 
Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. 1415, since the emphasis of the statute 
strongly suggests that Congress did not intend the punitive remedy of 
damages to be included within the phrase "appropriate relief." Monetary 
damages are not recoverable by plaintiffs who seek to enforce their 
Education for All Handicapped Act rights under U.S.C. 1983 since 
Congress intended the procedural safeguards set forth in Education for 
All Handicapped Act to be an exclusive remedy. Monetary damages are not 
recoverable under the Rehabilitation Act by plaintiffs who fail to 
exhaust their administrative remedies under Education for All Handi­
capped Act because Congress intended that the right to a free and 
appropriate education be determined, in the first instance, by local and 
state education officials through determinations made in administrative 
proceedings at the local and state level. Monetary damages are not 
recoverable under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for 
an alleged denial of a free and appropriate education because there is 
no Constitutional right to a free and appropriate education. 
The question of improper placement or educational malpractice 
was addressed in Doe v. Board of Education of Montgomery County. Upon 
a child's entry into a school system in 1967, he was evaluated by a 
psychologist employed by the state health department working in con­
junction with the board of education. The psychologist concluded that 
the child had suffered brain damage which resulted in mental retardation 
and recommended placement in a class for the brain injured, and that 
revaluation be conducted in ten months, which was not done. The 
following year the board was notified by private physicians that the 
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child was, in fact, dyslectic and that he was improperly placed; how­
ever, no reevaluation was conducted until 1975, when the psychologist 
employed by the board recommended retention in the program for children 
with mild learning handicaps. Subsequently, the parents sued the Board 
of Education, superintendents, health department, and two psychologists, 
all of whom demurred and moved for summary judgment. The trial court's 
granting of motion was affirmed by the intermediate appellate court, 
which held that although action was cast in the form of actionable 
negligence, in reality, the suit was for educational malpractice. This 
appeal followed. The judgment was affirmed. 
Action seeking, among other things, damages for allegedly negli­
gent evaluation of a handicapped student is not suit for professional 
malpractice, but is, rather, action for educational malpractice which 
must be dismissed. 
The question of determining when administrative remedies have 
been exhausted was addressed in Pore T. v. Board of Education of the 
Northeastern Clinton Central School District. Following the school 
district's refusal to hold a due process hearing, on the grounds that 
the child was not a resident of the school district and could not attend 
school in the district and that neither the child nor her representative 
had standing to request a hearing, the child filed suit in federal 
district court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleg­
ing violations of Federal and State Constitutions and statutes. It was 
also alleged that the state education agency failed to properly super­
vise the local education system and that the state education agency's 
regulations concerning persons who could act as "parents" violated 
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federal law. The court issued a temporary restraining order requiring 
the school to enroll the child until action was resolved. The defen­
dants moved for dismissal of complaint, for appointment of guardian ad 
litem, and for costs and attorney's fees associated with these motions. 
In the end, motions for dismissal and attorney's fees were 
denied; motion for appointment of guardian ad litem was denied without 
prejudice pending in camera evidentiary hearing. 
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is excused where 
administrative process cannot fully remedy plaintiff's grievances, e.g., 
challenges to validity of state education agency regulations, commis­
sioner's performance of his duties under federal law, and alleged vio­
lation of Constitutional rights under due process clause for excluding 
the child from school without an opportunity to be heard. Damages are 
recoverable under Education for All Handicapped Act, 504 and the Civil 
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983, for violations of the provisions of those 
statutes. 
The question of defining Free Appropriate Public Education CFAPE) 
under state statutes was addressed in Harrell v. Wilson County 
148 Schools. Appeal from trial court affirmance of due process and 
state review hearings upholding a local education system's refusal to 
fund out-of-state residential placement for a hearing-impaired child. 
Parents contended that the school committee violated due process, that 
the individual education plan was not responsive to a child's special 
needs, and that the local education system failed to provide "the most 
148EHLR DEC. 554:125 (Ct. App NC 1982). 
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appropriate education" for the child. The lower court judgment was 
affirmed. 
While the U.S. Supreme Court's definition of Free Appropriate 
Public Education in Rowley, 1981-82 DEC. EHLR 553:656 does not control 
interpretation of a state statute intended to provide each handicapped 
child an opportunity to achieve his full potential commensurate with 
that given other children, facts of this case show that the local edu­
cation system met its obligation to provide a hearing-impaired child 
with free appropriate public education. 
The expressed professional preference of an evaluation team 
member for mainstreaming over residential placement does not, consider­
ing the record as a whole, constitute sufficient degree of involvement, 
prejudgment, or predisposition to constitute violation of due process. 
The question of bad faith or failing to cooperate was addressed 
149 
in Intrator v. District of Columbia Board of Education. The plain­
tiff moved for costs and attorney's fees in action seeking declaratory 
and injunctive relief, e.g., placement and funding of a handicapped 
child in private residential school. At a prior hearing on a motion for 
a temporary restraining order, the local education system counsel first 
contended that plaintiffs had failed to cooperate in consideration of 
alternative placements but, two hours after hearing had begun, he 
advised the court that the local education system residential placement 
committee had met on the day the plaintiffs' suit was filed and decided 
to provide and fund the requested placement. Local education has 
149EHLR DEC. 554:193 (D DC 1982). 
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failed to provide explanation of why plaintiffs were not advised of 
the decision at the time of filing or why the court was not advised. 
The motion for costs and attorney's fees was granted. The local educa­
tion system, guilty of bad faith—e.g., failing to inform the plaintiff 
or the court of actions that substantially mooted the lawsuit thus 
causing the plaintiff to incur unnecessary fees and costs—is required 
to pay attorney's fees, costs, and a ten percent incentive fee under 
the "bad faith" exception to the "American Rule." 
The question of how much a school district can be expected to 
1 50 
fund was addressed in Pinkerton v. Moye. A child identified as 
having a learning disability "with an emotional overlay" was proposed to 
be placed in "self-contained" learning disabilities class. However, 
the only such class was located in a school six miles further from the 
child's home and in another school district. The parent, contending 
that such a class should be created in the child's "neighborhood" 
school, instituted due process hearing, which she lost at local and 
state levels. Partial summary judgment was granted to defendants. 
In enacting Education for All Handicapped Act, Congress intended 
for states to balance the competing interest of economic necessity on 
the one hand and the special needs of a handicapped child on the other; 
so a school board that provided placement in a school six miles further 
from home than the child's "neighborhood" school reached reasonable 
accommodation in view of the school's central location and small number 
of children requiring similar placement. 
150EHLR DEC. 554:291 (WD VA 1981). 
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The Education for All Handicapped Act Reg. 300.551(c), directing 
that placement of a handicapped child be as close as possible to the 
child's home and in the school the child would attend if not handi­
capped would aittend if not handicapped, does not require placement in 
neighborhood school where, as here, the child's Individual Education 
Plan requires some other arrangement, and that arrangement is reason­
able. 
The school district's decision not to establish "self-contained" 
program at neighborhood school was reasonably based, and therefore, 
substantially justified under 504, because compelling creation of a 
program at the neighborhood school would necessitate substantial modi­
fications to school district programs that are not required by 504. 
The child appropriately placed in a program located in an out-
of-district school is entitled to costs of alternative transportation 
as a related service under Education for All Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. 
1401(17). 
The mainstreaming question was addressed in Roncker v. Waiter.^ 
This was an appeal of a district court decision, 1981-82 EHLR DEC. 553: 
221, which found that the school district did not abuse its discretion 
in proposing that a severely mentally retarded student be placed in the 
county school program for mentally retarded in which he would have 
received no contact with nonhandicapped children. The local hearing 
officer had held that the student should be placed within an appropriate 
special education class in a regular elementary school setting, but the 
151EHLR DEC. 554:381 CCA-6 1983). 
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state board of education concluded that the student required a split 
program—placement the county school with provision for contact with 
nonhandicapped—though without indicating how such a program should be 
administered. During administrative and court proceedings, the student 
had been attending special education class in a regular school and con­
tact with nonhandicapped had been limited to lunch, gym, and recess. 
The district court judgment was vacated and the matter was remanded for 
further proceedings. 
The district court which found that the school district's pro­
posed placement did not satisfy the Education for All Handicapped Act's 
mainstreaming requirement erroneously reviewed the placement decision 
under the deferential abuse of discretion standard; accordingly, the 
district court's judgment must be vacated and the matter remanded for 
reexamination under the proper standard of review. 
The standard for judicial review of administrative proceedings 
under Education for All Handicapped Act requires de novo review with 
due weight to be given to the administrative proceedings. 
In determining whether placement in a segregated institution 
meets the mainstreaming requirement of the Education for All Handicapped 
Act, courts should determine whether the services which make that 
placement superior could be feasibly provided in a nonsegregated 
setting. Cost is a proper factor to consider since excessive spending 
on one handicapped child deprives other handicapped children, but is not 
a defense where the school district has failed to use its funds to pro­
vide a proper continuum of alternative placements for handicapped 
children. 
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Since the Education for All Handicapped Act does not bar class 
actions, the fact that the act requires individual placement decisions 
does not of itself bar all class actions; so where the plaintiff alleged 
that the school district automatically sends students classified as 
trainable mentally retarded to segregated county schools and that 
children are labelled as trainable mentally retarded solely on the basis 
of IQ scores, the court erred in refusing to allow the case to proceed 
as class action, at least as to these issues. 
Dr. Joseph E. Bryson, in a speech to the Orton Dyslexia Society, 
concluded by stating: 
So Amy Rowley's public education academic experience for all 
intent and purpose provided the Supreme Court with a logical 
model for determining Congressional intent of the 1975 Handicapped 
Act. A provocative question arises - what if there had been a 
less able scholar than Amy Rowley? Would the Supreme Court's 
standard of "benefits" have been lower? Have been less? Would 
"access" and "basic f loor"  develop a synonymous r e l a t i o n s h i p ? ^ 5 2  
Based on an analysis of Rowley the following conclusions are 
drawn: 
The 1975 Education for All Handicapped Act requires a state to 
provide handicapped children with a "free appropriate public 
education. 
Personalized instruction with sufficient support service to 
permit the handicapped child to benefit educationally from the 
instructional program. 
All services - instructional and related services - must be at 
public expense. 
The instructional program must meet state educational standards 
and approximate grade to grade level and meet the child's 
Individualized Education Plan. 
152  
Joseph E. Bryson, 
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All provisional imperatives of the 1975 Handicapped Act must be 
met. 
Decisions to educate handicapped children in a regular classroom 
should be predicated on "reasonable" calculation that will enable 
the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to 
grade.153 
153Bryson, 
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CHAPTER V 
AN ANALYSIS OF DUE PROCESS HEARINGS 
A major purpose of Public Law 94-142—Education for All Handi­
capped Children Act of 1975— is to assure that the rights of handi­
capped children and their parents or guardians are protected. 
Section 615 of the legislation details the procedures which 
must be followed by educational agencies to assure that handicapped 
children and their parents or guardians are guaranteed procedural 
safeguards with respect to the provision of free appropriate public 
education. That is, when a decision or potential decision affecting 
a child's educational environment is faced, the child's parents or 
guardians must have the opportunity to be heard, as well as the right to 
impartial resolution of conflicting positions. 
Although the Public Law 94-142 regulations provide a framework 
for implementing the due process provisions, many details are left to 
the state or local education systems. Under Part 121a of the federal 
regulations, educational agencies seeking to qualify for Public Law 
94-142 funding must establish procedures for parents and guardians to 
examine their child's records, to obtain an independent evaluation of 
their child, to receive prior written notice throughout the educational 
decision-making process, to have an opportunity to present complaints, 
and rights to an impartial hearing and appeal. Procedures must also 
be established by which a surrogate parent, under certain conditions, 
can be appointed. 
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The due process provisions for North Carolina are defined and 
enumerated in Section 1517 of the Rules Governing Programs and Services 
for Children with Special Needs called "Due Process Procedures for 
Parents and Children."^ Those provisions list the steps the state's 
public school systems must take when differences between the local 
school district and the parents Cor other persons having primary care 
and custody of the child) or the child arise regarding the identifica­
tion, evaluation, and educational placement of the child, or the pro­
vision for a free appropriate public education. They also define the 
following hearing rights for participants in a hearing: 
1. Right to a full notice of procedures and rights 
2. Right to have a hearing chaired by an impartial due process 
hearing officer (someone not an employee of the state or 
local agency providing services to the child] 
3. Right to a timely proceeding, with a decision in writing 45 
days of the request for a hearing, and within 30 days of an 
appeal 
4. Right to appear and be accompanied by counsel and by persons 
with special knowledge 
5. Right to present evidence and to prohibit introduction of 
evidence not disclosed to them five days before the hearing 
6. Right to compel attendance of witnesses and to cross-examine 
them 
^State Board of Education, Rules Governing Programs and Services 
for Children with Special Needs (Raleigh, NC: State Department of 
Public Instruction, 1985), Sec. 1517, p. 48. 
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7. Right to receive a verbatim copy of the proceedings 
8. Right to a written decision with findings of fact relied 
upon 
9. Right to appeal to the state education agency and from the 
state education agency to state or federal court 
10. Right to have the child remain in the present educational 
placement until the proceedings are completed 
Study of Due Process Hearings 
The primary concern of this study was on procedures that seek 
to determine whether, and under what circumstances, due process rights 
were utilized by the local education system, parents or other persons 
having primary care and custody of the child, or the child. 
A search of the literature revealed that federal and state of 
North Carolina procedures, specified in legislation and regulation, 
require that all children needing special education services be identv 
fied, appropriate evaluations be made, placement options be generated, 
and an appropriate education be provided at no cost to parents. They 
involve necessary outreach procedures such as providing notice to 
parents and obtaining their consent prior to evaluation procedures; 
rules for school conduct of the evaluation; development of an individ­
ual educational plan by expert child evaluators, teachers, and related 
personnel; resources for Individual educational programs in the least 
restrictive environment; parental notice, participation, and informed 
consent following development of the individual education plan; and 
provisions for monitoring handicapped children's progress. 
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The purpose of this study was to present an analysis of local 
education systems due process hearings concerning exceptional children 
conducted from September 1, 1978 through June 30, 1984. Surveys and 
interviews with the program administrators or their designees were con­
ducted to elicit information regarding the hearings. The questions 
asked in the interviews and surveys were specifically designed to obtain 
information relating to the incidence, precipitating factors, the 
initiators of the hearings, characteristics of the children, the time 
and cost involved in each hearing, decisions of the hearing officers, 
and the availability of internal mediation procedures. 
Not all exceptional children program administrators or their 
designees surveyed and interviewed for the study gave complete informa­
tion. Details such as the participants in each hearing and the exact 
time and cost involved in each hearing were often incomplete. When 
estimates and ranges were reported, the mean or mode was utilized to 
report this information. The findings, therefore, are reported in 
various ways. Taken in total, they relate considerable information 
about exceptional children due process hearings and procedures for the 
sample population. 
Sample Responses 
Fred Kerlinger, writing in Foundations of Behavioral Research, 
reported the difficulty of securing complete results from mailed ques­
tionnaires, indicating that the researcher can expect less than a 40 
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2  percent return. Therefore, an Interview technique in combination with 
a questionnaire was employed to elicit the needed information. As 
Asher pointed out, "The interview format allows greater rapport to be 
O 
established and more sensitive questions to be asked." 
The 142 local education agencies of North Carolina were chosen 
as the sample population. After the program administrators of each 
local education agency were contacted, 106 (74.6 percent) were able to 
participate in the study. This is a considerably higher participation 
rate than Kerlinger's estimate of mailed questionnaires. The program 
administrators of the local education agencies that did not participate 
in the study declined because they felt they had nothing to offer since 
they had not been involved in a due process procedure or were too small 
in size. 
The surveys and interviews conducted provided usable data. In 
the eight regions that participated, 106 local education agencies were 
represented 
Responses to Research Questions 
The research questions were analyzed according to the respective 
factors. The purpose of this procedure was to determine whether or not 
significant differences existed between or among values of each factor. 
2 Fred Kerllnger, Foundations of Behavioral Research, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), p. 397. 
3 
William Asher, Educational Research and Evaluation Methods 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976), p. 173. 
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This determination permitted the framing of answers concerning the 
relationship between a factor and due process hearings. 
Incidence Factors 
1. How many due process cases were initiated and heard by a 
hearing officer at the local education agency? 
2. Was the enrollment related to the incidence of local 
education agency due process hearings? 
3. Did internal mediation avert local education agency due 
process hearings? 
Due Process Cases Initiated 
In the period involved in this study, a total of 72 hearing 
requests were initiated involving the sample population. Of that total, 
six requests (8.8 percent) were cancelled for reasons such as the issues 
being resolved through prehearing mediation, change in school district 
residence, and a change in the decision or need to proceed with a due 
process hearing. The remaining requests were either heard at the local 
education agency or were still in process. Information relative to 
the local education agency hearing requests and basic resultant actions 
as of July 1, 1984 are summarized in Table 3. 
In the six-year period covered by this study, 62 hearings were 
held that involved the sample population. They represented nearly 
72 percent of the total hearing requests filed, and slightly more than 
80 percent of the 71 uncancelled requests. 
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Table  3  
Disposition of Due Process Hearing Requests 
Number Percentage 
A. Hearing requests and their 
disposition 
Cancelled 
Held or in process 
6 
62 
8.8 
91 .2 
Total Requests 68 100.0 
B. Status of uncancelled hearings 
Hearings held 
Cases pending 
62 
10 
86.1 
13.9 
Total Uncancelled Hearings 72 100.0 
Local Education System Enrollment 
The relationship between enrollment and various information 
regarding local education agency hearings are summarized in Table 4. 
The enrollment data were obtained in the interviews and verified through 
4 the Division for Exceptional Children. 
Over twenty-five percent of the local education system hearings 
analyzed for the study were initiated and conducted in the Southwest 
Region. The State Board of Education of North Carolina has divided the 
local education agencies into eight regions designated as Northeast, 
^Division for Exceptional Children, 1984 Directory (Raleigh: 
North Carolina State Department of Public Instruction, 1985). 
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Table  4  
Enrollment and Hearing Data: Exceptional 
Children Headcount 
Local 
Education Total 
System Enrollment 
Exceptional Number of 
Child Hearings 
Count Initiated 
Number of Number of 
Hearings Hearings 
Held Cancelled 
1 5582 670 2 2 0 
2 11579 1389 2 1 0 
3 4115 494 1 1 0 
4 14880 1786 3 2 0 
5 2524 303 2 1 0 
6 7856 943 1 1 0 
7 13138 1577 1 1 0 
8 56730 6808 3 3 1 
9 9015 1083 3 3 0 
10 2100 252 4 3 1 
11 3025 363 1 1 0 
12 20172 2421 1 1 0 
13 5112 613 1 1 0 
14 1752 210 1 1 0 
15 11970 1436 2 1 0 
16 4519 542 1 1 0 
17 9102 1092 1 1 0 
18 5106 613 1 1 0 
19 2959 355 2 2 1 
20 17106 2053 3 2 0 
21 5369 644 2 2 0 
22 8568 1028 1 1 1 
23 40451 4854 2 2 0 
24 33665 4040 1 1 0 
25 22990 2759 3 2 0 
26 24596 2952 1 1 0 
27 74559 8947 12 10 1 
28 5230 628 1 1 0 
29 12892 1547 2 2 0 
30 37236 4468 2 1 0 
31 2046 246 1 1 0 
32 5037 604 1 1 0 
33 8633 1036 1 1 0 
34 7356 883 1 1 1 
35 13139 1577 2 2 0 
36 12892 1547 1 1 0 
37 13502 1620 1 1 0 
North Carolina Education Directory 1984-85. 
NC State Department of Public Instruction Exceptional Children Headcount. 
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Southeast, Central, South Central, North Central, Southwest, Northeast, 
5 
and Western. The Southwest Region had sixteen or 25.8 percent of the 
total hearings, the North Central Region twelve or 19.3 percent, the 
South Central and Norwest Regions had nine each or 14.5 percent for 
each. Of the local education agencies that did not participate in this 
study, twenty-six were located in the Western Region and nine were 
located in the Northeast Region and one was located in the Southeast 
Region. 
Internal Due Process Procedures 
The relationship between the number of hearings initiated in each 
local education system and their use of an internal due process proce­
dure or mediation attempt prior to formal due process proceedings is 
reported in Table 5. The local education agencies use of an internal 
mode to notify parents of their procedural safeguards is also reported. 
Fifty-eight percent of the participating local education agencies who 
had hearings utilized an internal due process procedure in an attempt 
to mediate differences prior to formal due process procedures. All of 
the local education agencies studied informed parents and guardians of 
their procedural safeguards. 
5Ibid., pp. 13-15. 
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Table  5  
Internal Due Process Machinery 
Local 
Education 
System of Due Process Notification Number of Number of 
Exceptional Procedure of Rights Hearings Hearings 
Children Yes No Yes No Initiated Cancelled 
1 X X 2 0 
2 X X 1 0 
3 X X 1 0 
4 X X 2 0 
5 X X 1 0 
6 X X 1 0 
7 X X 1 0 
8 X X 3 1 
9 X X 3 0 
10 X X 3 1 
11 X X 1 0 
12 X X 1 0 
13 X X 1 0 
14 X X 1 0 
15 X X 1 0 
16 X X 1 0 
17 X X 1 0 
18 X X 1 0 
19 X X 2 1 
20 X X 2 0 
21 X X 2 0 
22 X X 1 0 
23 X X 2 1 
24 X X 1 0 
25 X X 2 0 
26 X X 1 0 
27 X X 10 1 
28 X X 1 0 
29 X X 2 0 
30 X X 1 0 
31 X X 1 0 
32 X X 1 0 
33 X X 1 0 
34 X X 1 1 
35 X X 2 0 
36 X X 1 0 
37 X X 1 0 
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Characteristics of the Children 
All of the cases studied included information relative to 
characteristics of the children including age, sex, and the prehearing 
educational classification as determined by school personnel. Table 6 
analyzes the ages and sex of the children involved in the district-
leve' due process hearings conducted for the sample population. 
Table 6 
Age and Sex of Children at Time 
of Due Process Hearing 
Sex Total Cumulative 
Age Frequency Male Female Percentage Percentage 
5 1 1 1.6 1.6 
6 5 4 1 8.1 9.7 
7 5 3 2 8.1 17.8 
8 3 2 1 4.8 22.6 
9 6 3 3 9.7 32.3 
10 4 3 1 6.5 38.8 
11 9 3 6 14.5 53.3 
12 4 2 2 6.5 59.8 
13 10 7 3 16.0 75.8 
14 3 3 4.8 80.6 
15 4 3 1 6.5 87.1 
16 6 4 2 9.7 96.8 
17 2 2 3.2 100.0 
Totals 62 39 23 100.0 100.0 
134  
There were more children involved in the sample in the 9-, 11-, 
13- and 16-year-old age groups. Of the sixty-two hearings held, thirty-
nine cases (.62.9 percent) involved boys and twenty-three cases (37.1 
percent) involved girls. The prevalence of males over females sub­
stantiates other studies depicting sex.6 
Seventeen mentally handicapped children (27.5 percent) made up 
the largest group. The second largest group involved children classi­
fied as learning disabled. Table 7 shows the educational classifica­
tions of the children for whom requests for local education agency due 
process hearings were initiated and conducted. Eleven (17.7 percent) 
of the local education agency hearings for the sample population were 
requested for children classified by school personnel as behaviorally/ 
emotionally handicapped. 
Discussion 
The information reported and summarized xx\ Table 4 indicates 
that no significant relationship existed in the number of exceptional 
children due process hearings initiated and the enrollment of the local 
education agency. The range was from zero to ten cases initiated during 
the 1978-84 school years and involving a local education agency. The 
largest number of hearings initiated was naturally in the local educa­
tion agency with the largest child count and member enrollment. In 
total, seventy-two requests for due process hearings have been initia­
ted. 
£ 
M. Stephen Lilly, Children with Exceptional Needs: A Survey of 
Special Education (New YorlTi Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979), pp. 
61-67. 
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Table 7 
Educational Classifications of Children 
in Due Process Hearings 
School Classification at the Time 
of the Request for a Hearing Frequency Percentage 
Autistic 1 1.6 
Academically gifted 9 14.5 
Hearing impaired 2 3.2 
Mentally handicapped 17 27.5 
Multihandicapped 3 4.8 
Orthopedically impaired 1 1.6 
Pregnant school girls 0 0 
Behaviorally/emotionally handicapped 11 17.7 
Specific learning disabilities 15 24.2 
Speech and language impaired 2 3.3 
Visually impaired 1 1.6 
Totals 62 100.0 
The number of hearings initiated and the number held in local 
education agencies that had developed an internal procedure to mediate 
conflicts was impossible to analyze since the exact number of possible 
hearings averted through prehearing mediation was not available. The 
respondents did indicate that when informal prehearing mediation was 
attempted, fewer formal hearings resulted. All of the respondents 
agreed that informal procedures, where most cases can be resolved, 
are more beneficial than a due process hearing that becomes formal, 
adversarial, and expensive. They also indicated that mediation is time 
consuming and involves a number of school personnel. 
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In those local education agencies that utilized an informal pre­
hearing mediation procedure, the respondents were asked to elaborate in 
regard to the procedure. Many of the respondents provided this writer 
with a copy of their procedure. All of the procedures discussed and 
studied required a conference (mini-hearingl before formal procedures 
could be initiated. In the comments following Section 121a.506 of P.L. 
7 
94-142, the Office of Education discusses mediation as an intervening 
step prior to a formal hearing that may serve as a useful function in 
the resolution of differences. 
All of the respondents reported that all parents and guardians 
of handicapped children were informed of their procedural safeguards. 
Procedures to inform parents and guardians of the rights of handicapped 
8 9 
children are mandated by both North Carolina and federal regulations. 
The modes of communication most frequently used were reported as mail­
ings, newsletters, and a parents' guide published by the North Carolina 
State Board of Education.^ 
In the analysis of the sixty-two local education agency due 
process cases heard, 62.9 percent of the children were male and 37.1 
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, "Education of 
Handicapped Children," Federal Register (Washington, DC: U.S. Office of 
Education, 1977), Subpart E, Sec. 121a.506, "Comment." 
O 
North Carolina State Board of Education, Rules'Governing Programs 
and Services for Children with Special Needs, Sec. 1507 (b) 3 lRaleigh: 
North Carolina Department of Public Instruction, 1984), p. 17. 
g 
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, "Education of 
Handicapped Children," Subpart E. 
^North Carolina State Board of Education, The Educational Rights 
of Handicapped Children (Raleigh: Division for Exceptional Children). 
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percent were female. The greatest frequency occurred for children 
whose prehearing educational classification, as determined by school 
personnel, was mentally handicapped (27.5 percent) and for children 
in the 9-, 11-', 13-, and 16-year-old age groups. 
Precipitating Factors 
What were the critical issues that generated hearings? Conflict 
is the critical focus of the major factors leading to a local education 
agency due process hearing. It is a function of the needs of the child, 
the extent to which resources are available to deal with those needs, 
parental objectives, and school system goals. Those conflicts can 
arise whenever the local educational agency plans to initiate or change 
or refuses to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, or 
educational placement of children, or the provision for free appro­
priate public education. 
Table 8 summarizes the precipitators of the various hearings 
and the frequency. 
Table 8 
Precipitating Factors Leading to District-
Level Due Process Hearings 
Precipitating Factor Frequency Percentage 
Identification 0 0 
Evaluation 8 14 
Placement 35 56 
Free appropriate public education 19 30 
Totals 62 100 
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Characteristics of the Children 
There was only one case where there was any disagreement as to 
the handicapping condition. The majority of the cases dealt with the 
severity of the handicapping condition and the consequent needs. 
Eleven of the hearings held were for children who attended 
private schools with full-time special education programs. Table 9 
shows the prehearing educational placement for those hearings held 
during the 1978-84 school years involving the sample population. 
Table 9 
Educational Placement of Children 
in Due Process Hearings 
Prehearing Full-Time Placement Frequency Percentage 
Public special education (day) 10 16.2 
Private special education (day) 11 17.7 
Private special education (residential) 8 12.9 
Public regular education (related services) 23 37.1 
Public regular education 4 6.5 
Private regular education (related services) 2 3.2 
Private regular education 0 0 
Private regular education (residential) 0 0 
Homebound 2 3.2 
Hospital 2 3.2 
Totals 62 100.0 
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Twenty-three of the twenty-seven children enrolled in regular 
education at the time of the request for a hearing were receiving a 
service related to special education. In North Carolina, related 
services are defined as follows: 
. . . transportation and such developmental, corrective, and other 
supportive services as are required to assist a child with special 
needs to benefit from special education, and includes speech 
pathology and audiology, psychological services, physical and 
occupational therapy, recreation, early identification and 
assessment of disabilities in children, counseling services, and 
medical services for diagnostic or evaluation purposes. The 
term also includes school health services, social work services 
in schools, and parent counseling and training.^! 
This continuum of program options may include regular education 
placement where the child receives his or her basic educational 
experiences through the standard program which is augmented by one or 
more related services. 
The age and sex of the children involved in the hearings were 
analyzed. Table 10 is a summary of these factors as they related to 
the precipitating factors for each hearing. 
Although there were more male pupils involved in the local 
education agency hearings heard for the sample population, it can also 
be noted that more males were involved in precipitating factors involv­
ing evaluation and a free appropriate public education. More males 
were also involved in issues dealing with placement which had the 
greatest frequency as a precipitating factor. Females outnumbered 
males only in the eleven-year-old age group involving placement issues. 
11 North Carolina, G.S. 115C-108 through 110; 115C-113; eff. 
October 1, 1978. 
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Table 10 
Precipitating Factors, Age, and Sex of 
Children at Time of Due Process Hearing 
Precipitating Factors Free Appropriate 
Child's Evaluation Placement Public Education 
Age Male Female Male Female Male Female Totals 
5 1 1 
6 1 1 3 5 
7 3 1 1 5 
8 1 1 1 3 
9 2 2 1 1 6 
10 1 3 4 
11 1 2 2 3 1 9 
12 1 1 1 1 4 
13 3 2 4 1 10 
14 1 1 1 3 
15 3 1 4 
16 1 3 2 6 
17 1 1 2 
Totals 5 5 24 12 10 6 62 
Table 11 summarizes the prehearing classification of exceptional 
children for whom hearings were requested and conducted. The excep­
tional children classification was assigned by school personnel. In 
only one case was there a disagreement as to the classification. The 
disagreements overwhelmingly arose over the consequent needs and place­
ment . 
Table 11 
Precipitating Factors and the Prehearing Educational 
Classification of Children in Due Process Hearings 
Precipitating Factors Free Appropriate 
Identification Evaluation Placement Public Education 
Classification Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Totals 
Autistic 1 1 1 
Academically Gifted 4 5 4 5 9 
Hearing Impaired 1 1 2 
Mentally Handicapped 13 4 5 9 1 2 17 
Multihandicapped 2 1 2 1 3 
Orthopedically Impaired 1 1 
Pregnant School Girls 0 
Behaviorally/Emotionally 
Handicapped 7 4 4 3 2 2 11 
Specific Learning 
Disabilities 12 3 1 6 2 3 3 15 
Speech and Language 
Impaired 1 1 1 1 2 
Visually Impaired 1 1 1 
Totals 43 19 1 20 16 12 13 62 
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Special Issues 
The frequency of local education due process hearings in rela­
tionship to the specific issues for each hearing heard are listed in 
Table 12. 
Table 12 
Specific Issues and Precipitating Factors 
Fre-
School Issue Parent Issue Participating Factor quency 
Self-contained Private Residential Placement 2 
Physically 
Handicapped Homebound Placement 1 
Adequate program Additional Services Free Appripriate Public 
Education 
9 
Adequate program More Cued Speech Free Appropriate Public 
Education 
1 
School Placement Speech Private 
Placement 
Placement 1 
Interagency Should 
Pay 
School Should pay Placement 1 
Classify as BEH Opposed Classifi­
cation 
Evaluation 1 
Assigned Special 
School 
Parent Resisted Placement 1 
Group Speech Individual Speech Free Appropriate Public 
Education 
2 
Self-contained Regular Class Placement 5 
Adequate Program Wanted Reimburse­
ment 
Free Appropriate Public 
Education 
1 
Public Residential Private Residential Free Appropriate Public 
Education 
1 
Did Not Qualify 
Exc. Children 
Wanted to Classify 
Exc. Children 
Placement 1 
Resisted Mucus Wanted Mucus Free Appropriate Public 1 
Suctioning Suctioning Education 
143 
Table 12 (continued) 
Fre-
School Issue Parent Issue Participating Factor quency 
Adjoining Program Local Special 
Program 
Placement 1 
Self-contained at 
Jr. High 
S-Car Special 
School 
Free Appropriate Public 
Education 
1 
LEA Program Self-contained Placement 1 
Self-contained Reimbursed Private Placement 1 
Special School LEA Evaluation 1 
Resource Room Self-contained Placement 1 
LEA Private School Free Appropriate Public 
Education 
5 
Regular Class Related Services Evaluation 3 
Approved Program Special Program Free Appropriate Public 
Education 
1 
Regular AG Evaluation 3 
LEA Wanted More Free Appropriate Public 
Education 
6 
Category Label Non-category Label Evaluation 2 
State School LEA Placement 1 
Discussion 
The information analyzed is highly significant to exceptional 
children educators. A breakdown analysis of the precipitating factors 
yielded results which indicated a significant difference among those 
factors. Consequently, it was concluded that significant differences 
existed in the precipitating factors leading to due process hearings as 
they related to the disposition of placements, identification and eval­
uation of handicaps, and the provisions for free appropriate public 
education. 
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The results of the analyses revealed that there was no disagree­
ment as to the existence of a handicapping condition of any child in 
question. Even in those cases where the parents were requesting regular 
education services rather than special education services, the school's 
evaluation and educational classification was questioned only once. 
The contention arose over the placement where the child could be served. 
Seventy-eight percent of the local education agency due process 
cases heard by a hearing officer involved a dispute over placement and 
56.25 percent of those cases involved the parents' requesting a private 
school placement. Thirty-two placement cases (51 .6 percent) related to 
the appropriateness of programs within the public schools. One place­
ment case involved parents' disagreeing with the school's recommenda­
tion for a private school placement. Another case involved parents 
disagreeing with the school's recommendation for a residential place­
ment. The majority of the remaining cases involved major disagreements 
over the severity of the handicapping conditions and the consequent 
needs. The trend of the hearings for the sample population was from 
parents requesting more specialized and expensive treatment than the 
public schools considered appropriate. 
The results of the analyses also revealed a greater number of 
male pupils in the 10-, 11-, 13-, 15-, and 16-year-old age groups, 
classified as behavior disordered, and involving issues related to 
placement. The results also revealed that at the time of the initial 
request for a hearing, more children were in full-time special educa­
tion programs rather than any other placement. 
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Initiating Factors 
Who initiated the hearings? The requirement of an impartial 
hearing is the central feature of the "Procedural Safeguards" regula­
tion of Public Law 94-142. It is during the hearing that both sides 
have the opportunity to present evidence and offer witnesses to an 
impartial adjudicator who will subsequently render a decision. The 
parents, guardians, child, or the school system may request a hearing 
on matters pertaining to the school's proposal or refusal to initiate or 
change the identification, evaluation or placement of the child, or the 
provision for a free appropriate public education. 
Requests for local education agency due process hearings were 
overwhelmingly initiated by parents. Of the sixty-two hearings con­
ducted, fifty were requested by parents. Table 13 shows the initiators 
of those hearings that were held. 
Although direct information was not often available, the con­
sensus was that parents who were involved in the hearings were over­
whelmingly middle- and upper-income whites. It was estimated that 
less than five percent of the hearings for the sample population 
involved minority or low-income parents. 
Characteristics of the Children 
Eight of the children involved in hearings had been in full-time 
regular education programs at the time the hearing was requested. 
Twenty-seven had been in full-time special education programs. One 
child had been receiving temporary homebound services and one had been 
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Table 13 
Initiators of District-Level Due Process Hearings 
Initiator Frequency Percentage 
Parent 50 80.7 
School 10 16.1 
Other 2 3.2 
Totals 62 100.0 
temporarily hospitalized because of their handicapping condition. 
Table 14 presents an analysis of the prehearing full-time educational 
placement status of the children and the initiators of those hearings 
that were held during the 1978-84 school years. 
All the hearings initiated and held had been requested by the 
parents or a local education agency. In the fifty-nine hearings 
initiated by parents, twenty-six of the requests (44.1 percent) were 
filed and held for children who had full-time special-education assign­
ments prior to any proposal for an educational change regarding a 
special education program or related service. Seven (12.1 percent) 
involved cases where the prehearing full-time educational placement 
was in a regular education program. One case (5.8 percent) involved 
homebound services and one case (5.8 percent) involved a child who was 
hospitalized because of his handicapping condition. 
Of the three cases initiated by local education agencies, only 
one was filed and held for a child who had a full-time special 
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Table 14 
Due Process Initiator and Prehearing 
Educational Placement 
Initiators and Frequency 
Local 
Prehearing Education 
Full-Time Placement Parent Agency Total 
Public special education 26 1 27 
Public regular education 7 1 8 
Public special education 
(residential) 2 2 
Private special education 21 1 22 
Private special education 
(residential) 1 1 
Homebound 1 1 
Hospital 1 1 
Totals 59 3 62 
education assignment prior to any proposal for an educational change 
regarding an exceptional children education program and related 
services. One case involved a child in regular education programs 
and one case involved a child who was in regular education. 
Discussion 
The results of the analysis, as shown in Table 13 revealed that 
parents had filed 80.7 percent of the hearings held in the educational 
systems studied during the 1978-84 school years. A breakdown analysis 
of the factors yielded results regarding the prehearing educational 
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placement, educational classification, and sex of the children in 
relation to the initiator of the hearing. Twenty-six of the cases 
heard Involved children who were programmed in a full-time self-
contained education placement. Twenty-four of these cases were initi­
ated by parents. Although the remaining thirty-six cases involved 
children who were programmed in full-time regular education programs, 
an exceptional children classification had been assigned by school 
personnel of the local educational agency. The classification was 
disputed in only one case. Of those thirty-six cases, thirty-five were 
initiated by parents. 
The largest exceptional children category involved children 
classified by school personnel as mentally handicapped. All of the 
due process cases initiated by school personnel and heard by a hearing 
officer involved children classified as mentally handicapped. 
Of the sixty-two cases heard, the fifty cases initiated by 
parents involved thirty-three male pupils and sixteen females. Four 
male pupils and nine females were involved in the cases initiated by 
schools. 
Decision Factors 
1. What were the decisions of the hearing officers? 
2. Were the decisions of the hearing officers implemented? 
The major concern in a due process hearing is fairness. The hearing 
officer must clearly be neutral, impartial, and actively involved in 
the search for the most effective programs appropriate to the child's 
needs. Procedurally, this requires reconsideration of the evidence 
149 
prior to the hearing so that the issues in the case can be understood 
and the occasion of the district-level hearing can be used to collect 
additional evidence to clarify particular points being contested. 
Information about whether a decision favored the school or the 
parent was available for all of the hearings studied. The decisions 
rendered for thirty-six of the hearings (58 percent) favored the 
school's recommended plan and thirteen of the decisions (21 percent) 
favored the parents. Ten decisions (16 percent) seemed to favor both 
the parents and the school. Three decisions (5 percent) seemed to 
favor neither the parent or the school. Table 15 presents an analysis 
of the relationship of decisions to the initiator of the hearing. 
Table 15 
Relationship of Decision to Initiator 
Decisions Favoring 
Both Neither 
Initiator Parent School Parties Party Total 
Parent 13 0 5 3 21 
School 0 36 5 0 41 
Totals 13 36 10 3 62 
Of the fifty cases initiated by parents, the decision of the 
hearing officer sustained the initial recommendation of the school in 
forty cases. In those cases initiated by school personnel, the hearing 
officer sustained the school's recommendation in every case but one. 
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The information summarized in Table 16 is an analysis of the 
decisions relative to the educational classification of the children 
involved in the hearings. In that comparison, forty-one of the 
decisions favoring schools involved seventeen children classified as 
behavior disordered. 
Table 16 
Decisions Relative to Classification 
School Classification Decision Favoring 
at the Time 
of the Hearing Parent School 
Both 
Parties 
Neither 
Party Total 
Autistic 1 1 
Academically gifted 1 6 1 1 9 
Hearing impaired 2 2 
Mentally handicapped 2 12 3 17 
Multihandicapped 1 2 3 
Orthopedically impaired 1 1 
Pregnant school girls 0 
Behaviorally/emotionally 
handicapped 1 8 2 11 
Specific learning 
disabilities 5 9 1 15 
Speech and language 
impaired 1 1 2 
Visually impaired 1 1 
Totals 12 41 8 1 62 
Table 17 compares the decisions relative to the full-time educa­
tional placement status at the time of the hearing. 
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Table 17 
Decisions Relative to Prehearing Status 
Prehearing Decision Favoring 
Full-Time 
Placement Parent School 
Both 
Parties 
Neither 
Party Total 
Public special education 3 19 4 26 
Private special education 6 13 3 22 
Private special education 
(residential) 2 2 
Public regular education 2 4 1 7 
Public special education 
(residential) 1 1 2 
Public regular school 1 1 
Homebound 1 1 
Hospital 1 1 
Totals 12 41 9 62 
Performance of Hearing Officers 
The respondents were asked to rate the performance of the hear­
ing officers for those local education agency cases heard and decided 
during the 1978-84 school years. Table 18 summarizes the analysis of 
that information which indicates that in most cases school personnel 
were satisfied with the performance of the hearing officer. 
Implementation of Decisions 
Valid observations on decision implementation could be made for 
all of the hearings conducted. The decisions were implemented as 
specified by the hearing officer in thirty-eight (61.2 percent) of the 
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Table 18 
Performance Rating of the Hearing Officer 
Rating Frequency Percentage 
Exceeded expectations 20 33.0 
Met expectations 35 56.0 
Did not meet expectations 7 11.0 
Totals 62 100.0 
cases. A decision could not be implemented in one case because the 
family involved moved from the local education agency in which the due 
process action was taken. In six cases, the parents kept their child 
in a private educational facility at their own expense. In the case 
of one preschooler, the parents withdrew their child from school rather 
than follow the recommendation of the hearing officer. In the case of 
a hospitalized child, the parents enrolled the child in a private 
educational facility rather than the local education agency program as 
recommended by the school and sustained by the hearing officer. In two 
cases, the schools followed the parents' recommendation even though the 
hearing officers had ruled in favor of the public education agency's 
recommendation. The remaining cases were appealed. 
Table 19 
Appeals for a State-Level Review 
Hearing Decision 
Appeal Educational Prehearing Initiated in Favor Appeal 
Number Age Sex Classification Placement by of by Specific Issue 
1 13 F 
9 M 
5 F 
10 F 
H I 
S L D 
M H 
B E H 
13 M S L D 
6 M Multi-
handicapped 
16 F M H 
Private 
Special 
Education 
Public 
Special 
Education 
Private 
Special 
Education 
Public 
Special 
Education 
Private 
Special 
Education 
Public 
Special 
Education 
Public 
Parent 
Parent 
Parent 
Parent 
Parent 
Parent 
Parent 
L E A  P a r e n t  P l a c e m e n t  H  I  -
Private School 
L E A  P a r e n t  T u i t i o n  R e i m b u r s e m e n t /  
Change 1-1 
L E A  P a r e n t  I n t e r a g e n c y  -  W h o  
Should Pay 
L E A  P a r e n t  E v a l u a t i o n  -  L  D  v .  
B E H 
Parent LEA Tuition - Reimbursement 
Parent LEA Related Service: -
Mucus Suctioning 
L E A  P a r e n t  A p p r o p r i a t e  P r o g . ;  
Parent objected to 
segregated school 
Table 19 (continued) 
Appeal Educational Prehearing 
Number Age Sex Classification Placement 
Hearing Decision 
Initiated in Favor Appeal 
by of by Specific Issue 
8 10 M B E H 
8 F 
10 7 F 
M H 
S L 
11 11 F S L D 
12 10 M Ort. Im 
13 16 M S L D 
14 11 F S L D 
15 16 M S L D 
Publi c 
Special 
Education 
Publ ic 
Special 
Education 
Publi c 
Special 
Education 
Public 
Special 
Education 
Private 
Special 
Education 
Public 
Special 
Education 
Private 
Special 
Education 
Private 
Special 
Education 
Parent LEA 
Parent LEA 
Parent 
Parent 
Parent 
Parent 
Parent 
Parent 
Both 
Both 
L E A  
L E A  
Parent 
Parent 
Parent LEA wanted hospital; 
parent wanted private 
school 
Parent Parent wanted self-
contained; LEA wanted 
private school 
Parent Parent wanted more: 
Speech therapy 
Parent Placement - half day 
block v. spec, school 
Parent Tuition for prior year 
Parent SLD placement with 
more service 
L E A  P a r e n t  w a n t s  L E A  t o  
pay for private school 
L E A  P a r e n t  w a n t s  L E A  t o  
pay for private school 
Table 19 (continued) 
Appeal Educational Prehearing 
Number Age Sex Classification Placement 
Hearing 
Initiated 
by 
Decision 
in Favor 
of 
Appeal 
by Specific Issue 
16 13 M 
17 11 M 
18 9 M 
19 9 F 
20 16 M 
21 
22 
16 
13 
23 17 M 
S L D 
S L D  
S L 
A G 
M H 
Multi-
handicapped 
S L D  
M H 
Private 
Special 
Education 
Private 
Special 
Education 
Publi c 
Special 
Education 
Publi c 
Special 
Education 
Private 
Special 
Education 
Publi c 
Special 
Education 
Publi c 
Special 
Education 
Public 
Special 
Education 
Parent LEA Parent Parent wants LEA to pay 
private school tuition 
Parent LEA Parent Parent wants LEA to pay 
private school tuition 
Parent LEA Parent Parent wants more speech 
therapy 
Parent LEA Parent Qualified as AG? 
Parent LEA Parent Parent wants LEA to pay 
for private school 
tuition 
Parent LEA Parent Parent wants LEA to pay 
private school tuition 
Parent LEA Parent Is program appropriate? 
Parent LEA Parent Must TMH program be 
offered at high school? 
U1 <J1 
Appeal 
Number 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Table 19 (continued) 
Educational Prehearing 
Age Sex Classification Placement 
Hearing 
Initiated 
by 
Decision 
in Favor 
of 
Appeal 
by Specific Issue 
12 
13 M 
17 M 
7 M 
14 M 
13 M 
11 F 
B EH 
S L D 
M H 
M H 
V I 
S L D 
H I 
A B 
M H 
Public 
Special 
Education 
Publi c 
Special 
Education 
Public 
Special 
Education 
Private 
Special 
Education 
Public 
Special 
Education 
Private 
Special 
Education 
Public 
Special 
Education 
Public 
Special 
Education 
Public 
Special 
Education 
Parent L E A  
Parent LEA 
Parent LEA 
Parent 
L E A  
Parent 
Parent 
Parent 
Parent 
L E A  
Parent 
L E A  
L E A  
L E A  
Both 
Parent Is program appropriate? 
Parent Is program appropriate? 
Parent Parent objects to TMH 
center placement 
Parent Parent objects to public 
school placement 
L E A  P a r e n t  o b j e c t s  t o  s e n d ­
ing child to state 
residential school 
Parent Is program appropriate? 
Parent Program placement -
parents want cued speech 
with aid 
Parent Parent objects to intra-
district transfer 
Parent Related service: 
speech therapy 
CJ1 cr> 
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Appeals 
A decision made in a local education system due process hearing 
12 is final unless either party appeals to the State Education Agency. 
If such an appeal is made, the State Education Agency will conduct 
an impartial state-level review in the following manner: 
1. Examine the district-level hearing record 
2. Insure that due process requirements were met 
3. See additional evidence, if necessary 
4. Afford the opportunity for oral or written arguments, or 
both, at the State Education Agency's discretion 
5. Make an independent decision 
6. Provide a written copy of the findings to the parties 
Thirty-two decisions (51.6 percent) of hearing officers, out of 
the sixty-two local education agency due process hearings for the sample 
population, were appealed during the period studied. Table 19 provides 
a summary of the basic information on the appeals made to the state 
superintendent during the period of this study. 
The appeals involved thirty-two children in nine categories. 
The majority of the cases appealed involved an issue concerning place­
ment. Of the thirty-two cases, only five were appealed by a public 
educational agency. Three of those cases involved the same education 
agency of exceptional.children. 
12 U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, "Education 
of Handicapped Children," sec. 121a 510. 
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Discussion 
The results of the information analyzed indicated that there 
were not significant differences in the decisions of the hearing 
officers in regard to the local educational system's recommendations 
to initiate or change or refusal to initiate or change the identifica­
tion, evaluation, educational placement of children, or the provision 
for free appropriate public education. 
Of the sixty-two cases initiated and heard, the hearing 
officers sustained the schools' recommendations in forty-eight cases. 
All but seven of those hearings had been initiated by parents. In the 
seven hearings initiated by school personnel, the hearing officers 
supported the school's recommendations in five cases. Eight decisions 
were rendered in favor of the parents' recommendation, one decision 
supported neither the school nor the parents, and eight decisions 
favored both the parents and the school. In these cases, the issue 
involved related services for children placed in a residential facility 
by the parents. Both parties agreed to the need for related services, 
but the school claimed service was available in the local school 
agency and that they were not responsible for tuition payments to the 
private residential facility. The hearing officer sustained the 
school's position in regard to tuition, but recommended that the local 
education agency pay for the related special education services to be 
provided at the private facility. 
The initial decisions of the hearing officers were implemented 
in seventeen of the sixty-two cases heard. One case could not be 
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implemented because the family moved out of state. Six parents chose 
to continue private special-education placement at their own expense 
and in contradiction to the recommendations of the hearing officers. 
When the decision favored the school's recommendation that a preschooler 
attend a categorical special-education program rather than a noncate-
gorical special-education program, the parents withdrew the child from 
school. In another case, the parents enrolled their hospitalized child 
in a private special-education program rather than the local education 
agency's program. Even though two cases involved decisions by the 
hearing officers in favor of the local education agency's recommenda­
tions, the school personnel eventually sustained the parents' recom­
mended plan. 
Thirty-two of the cases were appealed to the State Superintendent 
of Public Instruction for a state-level review. The appeals represented 
six of the eight regions. One local education agency had five appeals, 
another two, and the remaining fifteen local education agencies had one 
appeal. The trend of the appeals involved issues related to placement 
and involved a greater number of children classified by school person­
nel as mentally handicapped. Eighty-five percent of the appealed 
cases involved children receiving special education or related 
services. The majority of the issues were related to the quality or 
quantity of services available through the public educational agencies 
represented in the study. 
All of the respondents were asked to rate the performance of 
the hearing officer. In sixty-seven percent of the cases, the hearing 
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officers were evaluated as meeting or exceeding expectations. The 
decisions of the hearing officers sustained the schools' recommenda­
tions in more than seventy-three percent of the cases. 
Analysis of Additional Factors 
The purpose for conducting the surveys and interviews for this 
study was to obtain.general information regarding internal due process 
mechanisms and specific information regarding the district-level due 
process hearings that involved the sample population. In addition, the 
interview allowed an in-depth discussion related to the time, cost, 
number of school personnel involved in hearings, and general comments or 
suggestions regarding district-level due process hearings. 
Exact information regarding the time involved in preparing for 
a hearing, the time involved from the initiation of a hearing and the 
decision, the cost involved in each hearing, and the number of school 
personnel involved in a hearing was often not available. Missing 
information in many cases prevented a complete comparison of when 
decisions were rendered relative to the exact date of initiation of 
the hearing, the exact cost, and number of staff and staff time 
utilized for each hearing. 
Hearing Timetables 
Of the sixty-two hearings held, no undue delays were reported 
from the time of the request for the hearing through the decision of 
the hearing officer. Both federal and state regulations are very 
clear in specifying how quickly school officials and hearing officers 
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must move on requests for hearings. A decision must be rendered by the 
hearing officer "... not later than forty-five days after receipt 
of request for a hearing . . . and a copy of the decision . . . mailed 
13 
to each of the parties." During that period of time, no change in 
the pupils' educational assignment can be made. 
Personnel Involved 
In an analysis of those cases in which the information was 
available, the public schools were generally represented by six to 
eight professional staff members. In many of the cases, both parents 
were present at the hearing. In hearings involving issues related to 
private school placements, the parents usually brought representatives 
from the private school. Some of the parents and schools used attor­
neys. There did not appear to be a trend in the use of an attorney 
and the appearance of an attorney seemed to have little impact on the 
results of the hearing. 
Time and Cost 
Exact information regarding the time involved in hearing prepa­
ration and attendance at the hearings as well as the cost was not 
available for most hearings. Therefore, the information presented is 
based on the estimates provided by the respondents. 
Hearings averaged six to eight hours. Preparation for the hear­
ing involved a greater number of hours. The range reported was from 
ten hours to one hundred hours. The mode was forty hours. 
13Ibid., sec. 121a, 512. 
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In regard to expenses, exact costs were difficult to compute 
because of the indirect costs that involved the cost of substitutes, 
secretarial time, cost of paper incurred in the preparation of written 
material, and staff time. In addition, some schools incurred attorney's 
fees. However, the respondents estimated costs that ranged from six 
hundred dollars to five thousand dollars per hearing. The mode was 
two thousand dollars. 
Respondents' Comments 
The comments of the program administrators' units or their 
designees in regard to implementing due process hearings at the local 
education agency level were analyzed. Although varied responses were 
evoked, the following similar problems were noted. 
Hearing Officers 
The issue of the qualifications and training of hearing officers 
was reiterated. Many respondents focused on the lack of training and 
experience regarding educational practices, labels, state and federal 
regulations, and failure to control the hearing as a natural and 
orderly education hearing process. Following are some of the specific 
comments and suggestions: "The State Board of Education should 
develop some parameters for the hearing officers. At the present time, 
they are 'God' and do whatever meets their fancy."; "Some hearing 
officers do not understand the educational system and labels."; and 
"The state should develop a three-member panel to hear cases at the 
local education agency rather than one person who often attempts to be 
infallible." 
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Adversarial Nature of Hearings 
The most basic comments appeared to be that the hearing intensi­
fied the antagonism between school personnel and parents. One respon­
dent suggested that a parent advisory council be formed to refer cases 
for mediation so that school recommendations may not be considered 
biased and antagonism be intensified. Another program administrator 
of exceptional children termed the due process hearing mechanism as 
"the Trojan Horse of Special Education." 
Expense and Time 
Expenses to the school system including the cost of substitutes, 
the preparation of written material, staff time, and attorney's fees 
were emphasized by many respondents. In addition to the expense, the 
amount of staff time utilized in preparation for the hearing and 
attendance at the hearing was listed as a problem. Specific problems 
were noted in the more frequent use of attorneys at the local education 
agency hearings. This was considered by many respondents as an addi­
tional unnecessary cost. One respondent termed local education agency 
hearings as "often frivolous." He further added that the "State Board 
of Education is not monitoring the requests for hearings." 
Critical Issues 
Problems were often encountered in attempts to develop appro­
priate treatment plans for the children based on parent proposals, 
public school system proposals, and the task of the hearing officer to 
determine what evidence was relevant to the issues presented. One 
respondent summed up this problem as "the hearing ultimately becomes 
an invitation for dispute." 
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Summary 
With the mandates of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, Public Law 94-142, and the North Carolina Rules Governing Programs 
and Services for Children with Special Needs, school personnel, the 
parents or guardians of handicapped children, or the child have received 
the opportunity to take formal steps when differences arise regarding 
the identification, evaluation, educational placement of children, or 
the provisions for a free appropriate public education for handicapped 
children. 
During the six-year period covered for this study, seventy-eight 
requests for local education agency due process hearings were filed for 
the sample population. Six requests were cancelled. Of the remaining 
seventy-two requests, sixty-two were heard. The other ten requests 
were the caseload that remained in process at the terminal point of 
the study. The number of hearings initiated seemed to have no direct 
relationship to the exceptional children enrollment (head count) or 
total enrollment of the local education agency. Although mediation 
seemed to avert formal hearings, no direct information was available to 
support this factor. 
In all of the cases analyzed, there was only one disagreement as 
to the existence of a handicapping condition of a child in question. 
Seventy-eight percent of the due process cases heard involved a dis­
pute over placement. Fifteen percent of the cases dealt with provisions 
for a free appropriate public education, and seven percent involved 
issues concerning evaluation. No cases dealt with issues regarding 
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identification. It was concluded that a substantial difference does 
exist 1n the precipitating factors leading to a due process hearing. 
There was a significant difference in the initiator of the 
hearings. Parents filed 80.6 percent of the hearings heard at the local 
education agency level. More than half of the hearings heard (53.7 
percent) were for children classified by school personnel as mentally 
handicapped. Sixty-one percent of the cases heard involved children 
who had been in full-time special education programs at the time the 
hearing was initiated and conducted. 
Of the sixty-two hearings heard, 54 percent involved males. 
Ages of the children ranged from three to seventeen, with 76 percent 
being nine through sixteen years old. 
No delays were experienced between the times that requests were 
filed and the decisions that were rendered by the hearing officers. 
The hearings held were all reported within the time span established 
by the federal and state regulations. 
There was no significant difference found in the decisions of 
the hearing officers and the school's initial recommendations. The 
decisions of the hearing officers favored the school's recommendations 
in 73.2 percent of the cases heard. The hearing officers' decisions 
were implemented in 41.5 percent of the cases. Appeals for state-level 
reviews were filed for 31.7 percent of the decisions rendered by the 
hearing o-ficers at the local education agency level. The majority of 
the remaining cases involved parents supporting special education 
placements in private facilities, at their own expense and in contra­
diction to the decision of the hearing officer. 
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The results of the analyses indicated that the mode for the 
cost incurred by local education agencies involving due process hear­
ings was two thousand dollars per case. The time involved for school 
personnel to attend hearings averaged six to eight hours per case. The 
mode reported for the time involved for school preparation for the 
hearings was forty hours per case. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this study was to determine the impact of the 
procedural safeguards mandated by Public Law 94-142—Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975—at two levels: the local education 
system, and client pupils and their parents or guardians. Concerns 
were the conditions required for the assurance of procedural fairness 
in the areas of identification, evaluation, placement, and the provi­
sions for free appropriate public education, and in the processes 
associated with dispute resolution. Little attention has been paid to 
this problem in the past because advocacy groups for the handicapped 
have been concerned with the extension of procedural safeguards rather 
than intended benefits as well. 
The related literature regarding procedural safeguards was 
examined to review the history of events, including litigation and 
legislative actions, that led to mandated federal and state legisla­
tion. Finally, the literature revealed that the events influenced by 
legislation led to the administration of a due process hearing mechanism 
for public educational systems. 
The sample population included the local education systems in 
the state of North Carolina. The eight regional centers represented 
142 local education systems. Local education systems from all eight 
regions participated in the current study and represented 142 local 
education systems with a total school population of 1,397,557 pupils. 
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The North Carolina local education systems studied provided a 
manageable number which allowed this writer the opportunity to survey 
and interview the administrator or person most responsible for 
administering the due process machinery for the local education system. 
In addition, the local education agencies in the sample provided 
reasonably comprehensive exceptional-children programs and services. 
The major objectives of the study were analyzed to provide 
answers to the eight research questions established in Chapter I: 
Question 1. How many due process cases were initiated and 
heard in the state of North Carolina from August 1978 to 
August 1984? 
During the period of September 1, 1978 through June 30, 1984, 
sixty-two exceptional-children local education system due process cases 
were heard by hearing officers out of the seventy-two initiated in the 
sample population. The number of hearings initiated suggested a direct 
relationship to the exceptional children enrollment and total enroll­
ment of the local education system; however, the number of hearings 
initiated would be an invalid criterion for use in evaluating federal 
and state implementation of procedural safeguards. 
Question 2. Who were the children being referred for due 
process hearings? 
The children most likely to be involved in a due process hearing 
are those classified as mentally handicapped. Twenty-four percent 
involved children classified as specific learned-disabled; the remain­
ing cases involved a small sample of children with hearing, speech/ 
language, and multiple impairments. 
169 
Fifty-nine percent of the cases heard involved children who had 
been in full-time regular special-education programs at the time the 
hearing was initiated and conducted. Fifty-three percent involved 
males. Sixty-one percent were between ten and sixteen years old. 
Parents who were involved in the hearings heard were overwhelm­
ingly middle and upper-income whites. Less than five percent of the 
hearings involved minority or low-income parents. 
Question 3. What were the critical issues that had generated 
hearings? 
The leading cause of due process hearings was the conflicts that 
arise whenever the local school system plans to initiate or change or 
refuses to initiate or change the identification, evaluation, educa­
tional placement of children, or the provision for free appropriate 
public education. 
In a majority of the cases, there were major disagreements over 
the severity of the handicapping condition and the consequent needs. 
Fifty-six percent of the cases heard involved a dispute over placement 
and more than half of those cases involved the parents' requesting a 
private school placement. 
Appropriateness of programs within the public schools was the 
issue in thirty percent of the placement cases heard. Issues regarding 
provisions for free appropriate public education generated fifteen 
percent of the cases, while fourteen percent involved issues regarding 
evaluation. However, no cases were initiated that involved issues 
regarding the identification of handicapped children. 
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Question 4. Who would most likely initiate a due process 
hearing? 
Parents filed over sixty-four percent of the hearings heard at 
the local school system level. Of the sixty-two cases heard, school 
personnel had only initiated four cases. The trend of the requests 
was from parents requesting more specialized and expensive treatment 
than the public schools considered appropriate. 
Question 5. What were the decisions of the hearing officers? 
Although parents had filed the majority of requests for hearings 
the decisions of the hearing officers overwhelmingly favored the 
schools' recommendations. Thirty-seven cases (51.6 percent) were 
appealed to the North Carolina State Superintendent for a state-level 
review. Twenty-seven (43.5 percent) were appealed by parents and five 
cases (6.4 percent) were appealed by school personnel. The trend of 
the appeals involved issues related to the quality or quantity of 
services available through the local education agency. Whenever 
possible, the decision seemed to favor both the school system and the 
parent. In most cases, school personnel were satisfied with the per­
formance of the hearing officer. 
Question 6. Were the decisions made by the hearing officers 
implemented? 
Sixty-one percent of all decisions made by hearing officers were 
implemented. Of those not implemented, most were the result of parents 
opting to continue private education for their child at their own 
expense. Forty-nine percent of the decisions of hearing officers were 
appealed to the state department level. 
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Question 7. What were the time line and expense involved in 
the hearings? 
Information regarding the time involved in hearing preparation 
and attendance at the hearings as well as the costs is based on the 
estimates provided by the respondents. Hearings averaged six to eight 
hours. Preparation for the hearing ranged from ten hours to one 
hundred hours. The mode was forty hours. Exact costs were difficult to 
compute because of the indirect costs of substitutes, secretarial time, 
paper, and staff time. In addition, some schools incurred attorney's 
fees. However, estimated costs ranged from six hundred dollars to five 
thousand dollars per hearing. The mode was two thousand dollars. 
Question 8. Did the school systems mediate with parents to 
avert formal due process hearings? 
All of the school systems studied informed parents and guardians 
of their procedural safeguards. However, the exact number of possible 
hearings averted through prehearing mediation was not available. When 
informal prehearing mediation was attempted, fewer formal hearings 
resulted. Even though mediation is time consuming and involves a 
number of school personnel, informal procedures, where most cases can 
be resolved, are more beneficial than due process hearings which tend 
to be formal, adversarial, and expensive. 
Conclusions 
The major objectives of the study were analyzed to provide 
answers to the research questions listed in Chapter I. Of the remaining 
ten cases, six were cancelled and four were pending as of July 1, 1984. 
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Of the 106 local education agencies participating in the study, the 
local education agency with the largest number of hearings ranked first 
in enrollment. Although direct information was not always available, 
the consensus from the respondents was that prehearing mediation was 
helpful in averting formal local education agency due process hearings. 
A high number of hearings would not necessarily indicate a 
"problem local education system" nor would a low number of hearings or 
no hearings in a local education system necessarily indicate a "good 
local education system." The due process mechanism would be abused if 
it were not used since it does provide an impartial point of view 
toward all parties and weighs the evidence to reach a decision or 
recommendation. 
Recommendations 
The following recommendations are based on the foregoing con­
clusions and findings: 
1. Schools should promote and encourage parental involvement 
which may help to open the communication process and resolve 
problems that could otherwise lead to adversarial and 
expensive due process hearings. 
2. Local education agencies of exceptional children should give 
greater emphasis to an informal mediation process which 
could serve to screen out complaints and resolve them at less 
costly and perhaps less adversarial level. All of the 
respondents in this study who utilized a prehearing mediation 
procedure emphasized its value in seemingly averting formal 
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hearings. Based on their remarks, the North Carolina State 
Board of Education should consider the potential value of 
prehearing mediation and its possible inclusion in the 
North Carolina regulations as a required procedure prior to 
any request for a local education agency due process hear­
ing. 
A possible approach to prehearing mediation is the formula­
tion of a review panel, which could be responsible for 
screening requests, reviewing the case material, suggesting 
alternative strategies and possible solutions for alleviat­
ing the conflict, and facilitating appropriate educational 
programming. 
3. Each local education agency of exceptional children should 
conduct a needs assessment of the programs and services 
offered in each of their regions to determine whether they 
meet the specifications of appropriateness of education for 
individual handicapped children. This assessment is rele­
vant to the issue of "appropriate services" versus "optimal 
services" and the need to meet federal and state mandates of 
providing free appropriate public education, at no cost to 
parents, for all handicapped children. 
4. Local education agencies of exceptional children should 
attempt to anticipate the number of possible requests for 
hearings from parents based on the tone and agenda of parent 
groups, appropriateness and quantity of local programs and 
services, and the number of children programmed in private 
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facilities that could appropriately return to public school 
programs. The assessment is relevant to early and ongoing 
communication with parents and staff in regard to the indi­
vidual needs of handicapped children and the spirit and 
intent of federal and state legislation and their regula­
tions . 
5. Qualifications for hearing officers—including training, 
education, and experience—should be defined and developed. 
Hearing officers must be able to develop impartial and fair 
decisions or agreements that will result in appropriate and 
effective educational plans for handicapped children. The 
responsibility rests with building the most complete set of 
facts possible to meet the hearing officers' obligation to 
the children. Procedurally, this requires reconsideration 
of the evidence prior to the hearing or mediation so that the 
issues can be understood, and the occasion of the hearing 
can be used to collect additional information to clarify 
particular points being contested. The hearing officer 
must be impartial but favorable to the child's needs so 
that appropriate programs and services can be recommended. 
6. The current North Carolina practice of selecting names from 
a list of prospective trained hearing officers to choose one 
that is acceptable to the local education agency involved in 
a hearing appears to be working well and should be continued. 
7. Due to the high cost of due process hearings, local education 
agencies should develop their annual budgets so that they 
reflect the cost of potential hearings. 
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Recommendations for Further Research 
The following areas of concern were beyond the scope of this 
study but could be explored by other researchers. 
1. Replicate the study with other states to determine whether 
the results are consistent. Such studies would provide a 
basis for comparison as well as identify probable sources 
of differences, thus leading to the identification of other 
potentially powerful variables which may influence the pro­
cedures that seek to determine whether, and under what cir­
cumstances, the use of a local education agency due process 
hearing may be exercised with their intended effects. 
2. There is a need for a continued after-the-fact survey of 
parents to determine whether local education agency due 
process hearings were conducted to their satisfaction and if 
they have a better understanding of and appreciation for 
their child's educational program. In addition, parents 
could be surveyed as to the time and expense they incurred 
in the hearing and their perception of the issue that 
precipitated the due process hearing. 
3. An analysis of who is served in the local education agency 
under P.L. 94-142 should be made to address questions such 
as (a) Are the clients protected by the mandates of the Act? 
(b) What is the percentage of children who come through at 
least some part of the exceptional children education system? 
(c) What proportion are minority group children? (d) How many 
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come from non-English-speaking families? (e) How many come 
from low-income families? (f) How many severely or multiple 
handicapped children are potentially underserved? and (g) 
Within each of the subgroups, what is the rate of due process 
hearings initiated? 
Finally, the results of the present study sould be shared with 
professionals, parents, and advocates of educational opportunities for 
handicapped children as the findings may enable each constituency to 
understand the complexities involved in realizing the intended benefits 
which transcend the mere mandating of due process procedural safe­
guards for handicapped children. With this information, all who are 
interested in the education of handicapped children are encouraged to 
work together to achieve their common goals. 
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APPENDIX A 
LETTER OF INTRODUCTION 
185 
Route 1, Box 70-A 
011n, NC 28660 
May 11, 1985 
Dear 
The economic costs involved for school districts to conduct 
exceptional children local education agency due process hearings are 
considerable, while the time required for school personnel to present 
evidence and provide documentation can be disruptive to educational 
programs. As a Ed.D. candidate in educational administration at the 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro, I am currently developing 
a study which will examine the cost, length of time, and issues so 
that implementation strategies and effective procedures to expedite 
hearings may be established. 
Your participation, or the participation of the appropriate 
person designated to represent your administrative unit in due 
process local education agency hearings, will be sought in the form of 
a twenty-five to thirty minute interview. The interview questions are 
constructed to provide you with the opportunity to elaborate as 
described. A copy of the questions is enclosed. 
When the study is completed, I will be happy to send you a 
local education agency due process hearing procedure that will be 
designed to reflect the North Carolina regulations, Sections 504, and 
Public Law 94-142. Finally, let me assure you that neither your name, 
the name of the school districts that you represent, nor any direct 
identification will appear in the study. 
I shall call your secretary in a few days to arrange a con­
venient time for the interview with you or your designee. Your 
cooperation in this regard will be greatly appreciated. 
Sincerely, 
Kenneth A. Wilson 
APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
NORTH CAROLINA 
DUE PROCESS HEARINGS 
1978-84 SCHOOL YEARS 
Local Education Agency of Exceptional Children: 
Person Interviewed: 
Name Title 
Exceptional Children Child Count: 
Total Local Education Agency Enrollment: 
PART I 
1. During the period 1978-84 school years, was your Local Education 
Agency of Exceptional Children involved in a due process special 
education hearing? 
Yes 
Number of hearings initiated: 
Number of hearings still in process: 
Number of hearings cancelled: 
Number of hearings decided: 
What do you think is the reason that your Local 
Education Agency of Exceptional Children has not been 
involved in a due process hearing? 
2. Do you have an internal procedure to follow in regard to a Local 
Education Agency hearing? 
Yes , Describe: 
No , Describe: 
If yes, what is the length of time the Local Education Agency has 
been implementing a due process procedure? 
188 
3. Do you have an Internal mode of information to inform the parent 
of their due process rights? 
Yes 
Newsletter 
Mailing 
Handbook 
Other Describe 
No 
PART II 
Complete the following for each individual Local Education Agency due 
process hearings: 
1. If your Local Education Agency has been involved in due process 
Exceptional Children hearings at the local level during the 1978-84 
period, briefly describe the issue. 
Identification: 
Evaluation: 
Placement: 
Free Appropriate Public Education: 
2. Who initiated the hearing? 
School District 
Parent 
Other, describe: 
3. What was the age, sex, and Exceptional Child Classification of the 
child? 
Age 
Sex 
Exceptional Child Classification: 
189 
Exceptional Children (Private): 
Regular Education: 
Other: 
9. Did you personally know the hearing officer prior to selection? 
10. How did you make your selection? 
11. Did you seek assistance from the State Exceptional Childrens1 
Office? 
12. Was the decision of the hearing officer implemented? 
Yes 
No , Describe: 
Appeal 
13. What socioeconomic class would you place the family (guardian) of 
the child involved in the hearing? 
Low Income 
Middle Income 
High Income 
14. What was the time from the initial request for a district-level 
due process hearing through the decision of the impartial hearing 
officer at the local education agency? 
Hours: 
Days: 
Weeks: 
Months: 
15. What was the local education agency direct cost for the hearing? 
190 
16. Estimate the indirect local education agency cost for the hearing 
(cost of staff time already employed, supplies, etc.). 
17. Estimate the staff time utilized in preparation for the hearing. 
18. Rate the performance of the hearing officer. 
Above expectations 
Met expectations 
Did not meet expectations 
19. Did you feel that the local education agency personnel had the 
competencies to prepare for a due process hearing? 
20. General comments or suggestions regarding local education agency 
due process hearings: 
APPENDIX C 
DUE PROCESS TIMELINE 
i -
DUE PROCESS TIMELINE 
NORTH CAROLINA DISTRICT-LEVEL DUE PROCESS HEARINGS 
Local District 
N.C. State Board 
of Education Local District 
1 
Hearing Officer Hearing Officer 
School District 
Parent/Guardian 
5 School Days 5 Calendar Days 5 Calendar Days 15 Calendar Days 10 Calendar Days 15 Calendar Days 
Hearing Request for 
Requested Hearing Officer 
(a) The dis­
trict shall 
send a certi­
fied letter to 
the N.C. State 
Board of Educa­
tion, with a 
copy to the 
person request­
ing the hearing 
requesting the 
appointment of 
an impartial 
hearing offi­
cer. 
(b) If the dis­
trict decides 
not to honor 
the request for 
a hearing, the 
parents or 
guardian of the 
student shall 
be notified in 
writing within 
five (5) cal­
endar days. 
List of 
Hearing Officers 
After the N.C. 
State Board of 
Education 
receives the 
request from 
the local dis­
trict, it shall 
provide a list 
of five (5) 
prospective 
trained impar­
tial hearing 
officers. 
Selection of 
Hearing Officer 
Hearing 
Scheduled Decision 
The local dis­
trict shall 
notify the N.C. 
State Board of 
Education, in 
writing, of the 
name of the 
person jointly 
selected by 
the district 
and the 
parent/guar­
dian to be 
appointed as 
the hearing 
officer. 
Within Five (5) 
calendar days 
of appointment, 
the hearing 
officer shall 
schedule the 
time and place 
of the hearing 
which shall be 
scheduled not 
later than 
fifteen (15) 
calendar days 
after the 
appointment of 
the hearing 
officer. 
Request for 
Appeal 
After the con­
clusion of the 
hearing, the 
hearing offi­
cer shall 
render the 
decision, by 
certified mail, 
to the district, 
the parent/guar­
dian, the N.C. 
State Board of 
Education and 
upon request, to 
the attorney, 
if any, for both 
parties. 
Either party 
aggrieved by the 
decision of the 
hearing officer 
may appeal that 
decision, 1n 
writing, to the 
N.C. State 
Board of Educa­
tion with a copy 
of the written 
request to the 
other party 1n 
the hearing. 
